Covered Accounts

--by Tom Hannagan

I was hoping someone would ask about these risk management terms…and someone did. The obvious answer is that the “A” and the “O” are reversed. But, there’s more to it than that. First, let’s see how the acronyms were derived. RORAC is Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital. RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital. Both of these five-letter abbreviations are a step up from ROE.

This is natural, I suppose, since ROE, meaning Return on Equity of course, is merely a three-letter profitability ratio. A serious breakthrough in risk management and profit performance measurement will have to move up to at least six initials in its abbreviation. Nonetheless, ROE is the jumping-off point towards both RORAC and RAROC.

ROE is generally Net Income divided by Equity, and ROE has many advantages over Return on Assets (ROA), which is Net Income divided by Average Assets. I promise, really, no more new acronyms in this post.

The calculations themselves are pretty easy. ROA tends to tell us how effectively an organization is generating general ledger earnings on its base of assets.  This used to be the most popular way of comparing banks to each other and for banks to monitor their own performance from period to period. Many bank executives in the U.S. still prefer to use ROA, although this tends to be those at smaller banks.

ROE tends to tell us how effectively an organization is taking advantage of its base of equity, or risk-based capital. This has gained in popularity for several reasons and has become the preferred measure at medium and larger U.S. banks, and all international banks. One huge reason for the growing popularity of ROE is simply that it is not asset-dependent. ROE can be applied to any line of business or any product. You must have “assets” for ROA, since one cannot divide by zero. Hopefully your Equity account is always greater than zero. If not, well, lets just say it’s too late to read about this general topic.

The flexibility of basing profitability measurement on contribution to Equity allows banks with differing asset structures to be compared to each other.  This also may apply even for banks to be compared to other types of businesses. The asset-independency of ROE can also allow a bank to compare internal product lines to each other. Perhaps most importantly, this permits looking at the comparative profitability of lines of business that are almost complete opposites, like lending versus deposit services. This includes risk-based pricing considerations. This would be difficult, if even possible, using ROA.

ROE also tells us how effectively a bank (or any business) is using shareholders equity. Many observers prefer ROE, since equity represents the owners’ interest in the business. As we have all learned anew in the past two years, their equity investment is fully at-risk. Equity holders are paid last, compared to other sources of funds supporting the bank. Shareholders are the last in line if the going gets rough. So, equity capital tends to be the most expensive source of funds, carrying the largest risk premium of all funding options. Its successful deployment is critical to the profit performance, even the survival, of the bank. Indeed, capital deployment, or allocation, is the most important executive decision facing the leadership of any organization.

So, why bother with RORAC or RAROC? In short, it is to take risks more fully into the process of risk management within the institution. ROA and ROE are somewhat risk-adjusted, but only on a point-in-time basis and only to the extent risks are already mitigated in the net interest margin and other general ledger numbers. The Net Income figure is risk-adjusted for mitigated (hedged) interest rate risk, for mitigated operational risk (insurance expenses) and for the expected risk within the cost of credit (loan loss provision).

The big risk management elements missing in general ledger-based numbers include: market risk embedded in the balance sheet and not mitigated, credit risk costs associated with an economic downturn, unmitigated operational risk, and essentially all of the strategic risk (or business risk) associated with being a banking entity. Most of these risks are summed into a lump called Unexpected Loss (UL). Okay, so I fibbed about no more new acronyms. UL is covered by the Equity account, or the solvency of the bank becomes an issue.

RORAC is Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RORAC doesn’t add much risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, but it can take into account the risk of unexpected loss. It does this, by moving beyond just book or average Equity, by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. This, in turn, makes it possible to move towards risk-based pricing at the relationship management level as well as portfolio risk management.  This equity, or capital, allocation should be based on the relative risk of unexpected loss for the different product groups. So, it’s a big step in the right direction if you want a profitability metric that goes beyond ROE in addressing risk. And, many of us do.

RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RAROC does add risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, by taking into account the unmitigated market risk embedded in an asset or liability. RAROC, like RORAC, also takes into account the risk of unexpected loss by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. So, RAROC risk-adjusts both the Net Income in the numerator AND the allocated Equity in the denominator. It is a fully risk-adjusted metric or ratio of profitability and is an ultimate goal of modern risk management. 

So, RORAC is a big step in the right direction and RAROC would be the full step in management of risk. RORAC can be a useful step towards RAROC. RAROC takes ROE to a fully risk-adjusted metric that can be used at the entity level.  This  can also be broken down for any and all lines of business within the organization. Thence, it can be further broken down to the product level, the client relationship level, and summarized by lender portfolio or various market segments. This kind of measurement is invaluable for a highly leveraged business that is built on managing risk successfully as much as it is on operational or marketing prowess.

Please refer to my blogs five and six for more information about ROE and the term “unpredictable variability:”  http://www.decisionanalyticsblog.experian.com/blog/risk-based-pricing-2

RORAC versus RAROC ?
--by Tom Hannagan

I was hoping someone would ask about these risk management terms…nd someone did. The obvious answer is that the “A” and the “O” are reversed. But, there’s more to it than that. First, let’s see how the acronyms were derived. RORAC is Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital. RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital. Both of these five-letter abbreviations are a step up from ROE. This is natural I suppose since ROE, meaning Return on Equity of course, is merely a three-letter profitability ratio. A serious breakthrough in risk management and profit performance measurement will have to move up to at least six initials in its abbreviation. Nonetheless, ROE is the jumping-off point towards both RORAC and RAROC.

ROE is generally Net Income divided by Equity, and ROE has many advantages over Return on Assets (ROA), which is Net Income divided by Average Assets. I promise, really, no more new acronyms in this post.

The calculations themselves are pretty easy. ROA tends to tell us how effectively an organization is generating general ledger earnings on its base of assets.  This used to be the most popular way of comparing banks to each other and for banks to monitor their own performance from period to period. Many bank executives in the U.S. still prefer to use ROA, although this tends to be those at smaller banks.

ROE tends to tell us how effectively an organization is taking advantage of its base of equity, or risk-based capital. This has gained in popularity for several reasons and has become the preferred measure at medium and larger U.S. banks, and all international banks. One huge reason for the growing popularity of ROE is simply that it is not asset-dependent. ROE can be applied to any line of business or any product. You must have “assets” for ROA, since one cannot divide by zero. Hopefully your Equity account is always greater than zero. If not, well, lets just say it’s too late to read about this general topic.

The flexibility of basing profitability measurement on contribution to Equity allows banks with differing asset structures to be compared to each other.  This also may apply even for banks to be compared to other types of businesses. The asset-independency of ROE can also allow a bank to compare internal product lines to each other. Perhaps most importantly, this permits looking at the comparative profitability of lines of business that are almost complete opposites, like lending versus deposit services. This includes risk-based pricing considerations. This would be difficult, if even possible, using ROA.

ROE also tells us how effectively a bank (or any business) is using shareholders equity. Many observers prefer ROE, since equity represents the owners’ interest in the business. As we have all learned anew in the past two years, their equity investment is fully at-risk. Equity holders are paid last, compared to other sources of funds supporting the bank. Shareholders are the last in line if the going gets rough. So, equity capital tends to be the most expensive source of funds, carrying the largest risk premium of all funding options. Its successful deployment is critical to the profit performance, even the survival, of the bank. Indeed, capital deployment, or allocation, is the most important executive decision facing the leadership of any organization.

So, why bother with RORAC or RAROC? In short, it is to take risks more fully into the process of risk management within the institution. ROA and ROE are somewhat risk-adjusted, but only on a point-in-time basis and only to the extent risks are already mitigated in the net interest margin and other general ledger numbers. The Net Income figure is risk-adjusted for mitigated (hedged) interest rate risk, for mitigated operational risk (insurance expenses) and for the expected risk within the cost of credit (loan loss provision).

The big risk management elements missing in general ledger-based numbers include: market risk embedded in the balance sheet and not mitigated, credit risk costs associated with an economic downturn, unmitigated operational risk, and essentially all of the strategic risk (or business risk) associated with being a banking entity. Most of these risks are summed into a lump called Unexpected Loss (UL). Okay, so I fibbed about no more new acronyms. UL is covered by the Equity account, or the solvency of the bank becomes an issue.

RORAC is Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RORAC doesn’t add much risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, but it can take into account the risk of unexpected loss. It does this, by moving beyond just book or average Equity, by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. This, in turn, makes it possible to move towards risk-based pricing at the relationship management level as well as portfolio risk management.  This equity, or capital, allocation should be based on the relative risk of unexpected loss for the different product groups. So, it’s a big step in the right direction if you want a profitability metric that goes beyond ROE in addressing risk. And, many of us do.

RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RAROC does add risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, by taking into account the unmitigated market risk embedded in an asset or liability. RAROC, like RORAC, also takes into account the risk of unexpected loss by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. So, RAROC risk-adjusts both the Net Income in the numerator AND the allocated Equity in the denominator. It is a fully risk-adjusted metric or ratio of profitability and is an ultimate goal of modern risk management. 

So, RORAC is a big step in the right direction and RAROC would be the full step in management of risk. RORAC can be a useful step towards RAROC. RAROC takes ROE to a fully risk-adjusted metric that can be used at the entity level.  This  can also be broken down for any and all lines of business within the organization. Thence, it can be further broken down to the product level, the client relationship level, and summarized by lender portfolio or various market segments. This kind of measurement is invaluable for a highly leveraged business that is built on managing risk successfully as much as it is on operational or marketing prowess.

Please refer to my blogs five and six for more information about ROE and the term “unpredictable variability:”  http://www.decisionanalyticsblog.experian.com/blog/risk-based-pricing-2

--by Kelly Kent

For the past couple of years, the deterioration of the real estate market and the economy as a whole has been widely reported as a national and international crisis. Events such as 401k plans have fallen, bankruptcy scores are high and homeowners have simply abandoned their now under-valued properties, and the federal government has raced to save the banking and automotive sectors. While the perspective of most is that this is a national decline, this is clearly a situation where the real story is in the details.

A closer look reveals that while there are places that have experienced serious real estate and employment issues (California, Florida, Michigan) there are also areas (Texas) that did not experience the same deterioration in a similar manner.

Flash forward to November, 2009 – with signs of recovery seemingly beginning to appear on the horizon – there again seems to be a great deal of variability between areas that seem poised for recovery and those that are continuing down the slope of decline.

Interestingly though, this time the list of usual suspects is changing.

In a recent article posted to CNN.com, Julianne Pepitone observes that many cities that were tops in foreclosure a year ago have since shown stabilization, while at the same time, other cities have regressed. A related article outlines a growing list of cities that, not long ago, considered themselves immune from the problems being experienced in other parts of the country. Previous economic success stories are now being identified as economic laggards and experiencing the same pains, but only a year or two later.

So – is there a lesson to be taken from this?

From a business intelligence perspective, the lesson is generalized reporting information and forecasting capabilities are not going to be successful in managing risk. Risk management solutions and forecasting techniques will need to be developed around specific macro- and micro-economic changes. They will also need to incorporate a number of economic scenarios to properly reflect the range of possible future outcomes. Moving forward, it will be vital to understand the differences in unemployment between Dallas and Houston and between regions that rely on automotive manufacturing and those with hi-tech jobs.

These differences will directly impact the performance of lenders’ specific footprints, as this year’s “Best Place to Live” according to Money.CNN.com can quickly become next year’s foreclosure capital.

*ihttp://money.cnn.com/2009/10/28/real_estate/foreclosures_worst_cities/index.htm?postversion=2009102811

*iihttp://money.cnn.com/galleries/2009/real_estate/0910/gallery.foreclosures_worst_cities/2.html

-- by Dan Buell

Towards the end of 2007, the management of Bay Area Credit Service embarked on an agressive strategy to dramatically enhance the company's market position and increase its collection revenues.  These goals could be achieved only through superior performance at competitive rates.  At the same time, though, the company needed to drastically reduce internal operating expenses while facing significant competition.  The company's major goals for 208 included:

*  Earn a much larger share of business from one of the nation's top five cellular phone service providers;

*  Become a major collections partner for one of the nation's largest banking institutions;

*  Earn more than 50 percent of the market in the pre-charge-off, early-out segment for the nation's largest landline communications provider;

*  Enhance the company's position in the secondary collections tier.

It's an interesting case study.  Navigate to the link to learn more: 

http://www.experian.com/whitepapers/index.html

--by Matt Ehrlich

While the FACT Act’s Red Flags Rule seems to capture all of the headlines these days, it’s just one of a number of compliance challenges that banks, credit unions, and a myriad of other institutions face on a daily basis.  And meeting today’s regulatory requirements is more complicated than ever.  Risk managers and compliance officers are asked to consider many questions, including:

1. Do FACTA Sections 114 and 315 apply to me?
2. What do I have to do to comply?
3. What impact does this have on the customer’s experience?
4. What is this going to cost me in terms of people and process?

Interpretation of the law or guideline – including who it applies to and to whom it does not - varies widely.  Which types of businesses are subject to the Red Flags Rule?  What is a “covered account?”  If you’re not sure, you’re not alone - it’s a primary reason why the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) continues to postpone enforcement of the rule, while this healthy debate continues.

And by the way, FTC – it’s almost November 1st…aren’t we about due for another delay? But we’re not talking about just protecting consumers from identity theft and reducing fraud and protecting themselves using the Identity Theft Prevention Program.

The USA Patriot Act and “Know Your Customer” requirements have been around much longer, but there are current challenges of interpretation and practical application when it comes to identifying customers and performing due diligence to deter fraud and money laundering.  Since Customer Identification Programs require procedures based on the bank’s own “assessment of the relevant risks,” including types of accounts opened, methods of opening, and even the bank’s “size, location, and customer base,” it’s safe to say that each program will differ slightly – or even greatly.

So it’s clear there’s a lack of specificity in the regulations of the Red Flags Rule which cause heartburn for those tasked with compliance…but are there some common themes and requirements across the two?  The short answer is Yes.  In my next post, I’ll talk about the elements in common and how authentication products can play a part in addressing both.

Red Flags Rule and commercial accounts

-- by Kristan Keelan

Most financial institutions are well underway in complying with the FTC’s ID Theft Red Flags Rule by:

1.  Identifying covered accounts  
2.  Determining what red flags need to be monitored
3.  Implementing a risk based approach 

However, one of the areas that seems to be overlooked in complying with the rule is the area of commercial accounts.  Did your institution include commercial accounts when identifying covered accounts?  You’re not alone if you focused only on consumer accounts initially.

Keep in mind that commercial credit and deposit accounts also can be included as covered accounts when there is a “reasonably foreseeable risk” of identity theft to customers or to safety and soundness.

Start by determining if there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of identity theft in a business or commercial account, especially in small business accounts.   Consider the risk of identity theft presented by the methods used to open business accounts, the methods provided to access business accounts, and previous experiences with identity theft on a business account.

I encourage you to revisit your institution’s compliance program and review whether commercial accounts have been examined closely enough.

-- by Kelly Kent

In a recent article, www.CNNMoney.com reported that Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, said that the pace of recovery in 2010 would be moderate and added that the unemployment rate would come down quite slowly, due to headwinds on ongoing credit problems and the effort by families to reduce household debt.’

While some media outlets promote an optimistic economic viewpoint, clearly there are signs that significant challenges lie ahead for lenders. As Bernanke forecasts, many issues that have plagued credit markets will sustain themselves in the coming years. Therefore lenders need to be equipped to monitor these continued credit problems if they wish to survive this protracted time of distress.

While banks and financial institutions are implementing increasingly sophisticated and thorough processes to monitor fluctuations in credit trends, they have little intelligence to compare their credit performance to that of their peers.  Lenders frequently cite that they are concerned about their lack of awareness or intelligence regarding the credit performance and status of their peers.  Marketing intelligence solutions are important for management of risk, loan portfolio monitoring and related decisioning strategies.

Currently, many vendors offer data on industry-wide trends, but few vendors provide the information needed to allow a lender to understand its position relative to a well-defined group of firms that it considers its peers. As a result, too many lenders are performing benchmarking using data sources that are biased, incomplete, inaccurate, or that lack the detail necessary to derive meaningful conclusions.

If you were going to measure yourself personally against a group to understand your comparative performance, why would you perform that comparison against people who had little or nothing in common with you? Does an elite runner measure himself against a weekend warrior to gauge his performance? No; he segments the runners by gender, age, and performance class to understand exactly how he stacks up.

Today’s lending environment is not forgiving enough for lenders to make broad industry comparisons if they want to ensure long-term success. Lenders cannot presume they are leading the pack, when, in fact, the race is closer than ever.

-- By Ken Pruett

Earlier this week I blogged about some of the other types of frauds that impact our customers such as “never pay” and “bust out” fraud. Today I want to touch a bit on some of the third party fraud scenarios that are often top of mind with our customers: identity theft; synthetic identities; and account takeover.  

Identity Theft
Identity theft usually occurs during the acquisition stage of the customer life cycle. Simply put, identity theft is the use of stolen identity information to fraudulently open up a new account.  These accounts do not have to be just credit card related. For example, there are instances of people using others identities to open up wireless phone and utilities accounts 

Recent fraud trends show this type of fraud is on the rise again after a decrease over the past several years.  A recent Experian study found that people who have better credit scores are more likely to have their identity stolen than those with very poor credit scores. It does seem logical that fraudsters would likely opt to steal an identity from someone with higher credit limits and available purchasing power.  This type of fraud gets the majority of media attention because it is the consumer who is often the victim (as opposed to a major corporation). 

Fraud changes over time and recent findings show that looking at data from a historical perspective is a good way to help prevent identity theft.  For example, if you see a phone number being used by multiple parties, this could be an indicator of a fraud ring in action.  Using these types of data elements can make your fraud models much more predictive and reduce your fraud referral rates. 

Synthetic Identities
Synthetic Identities are another acquisition fraud problem.  It is similar to identity theft, but the information used is fictitious in nature.  The fraud perpetrator may be taking pieces of information from a variety of parties to create a new identity.  Trade lines may be purchased from companies who act as middle men between good consumers with good credit and perpetrators who creating new identities.   This strategy allows the fraud perpetrator to quickly create a fictitious identity that looks like a real person with an active and good credit history. 

Most of the trade lines will be for authorized users only.  The perpetrator opens up a variety of accounts in a short period of time using the trade lines. When creditors try to collect, they can’t find the account owners because they never existed.  As Heather Grover mentioned in her blog, this fraud has leveled off in some areas and even decreased in others, but is probably still worth keeping an eye on.  One concern on which to focus especially is that these identities are sometimes used for bust out fraud. 

The best approach to predicting this type of fraud is using strong fraud models that incorporate a variety of non-credit and credit variables in the model development process.  These models look beyond the basic validation and verification of identity elements (such as name, address, and social security number), by leveraging additional attributes associated with a holistic identity -- such as inconsistent use of those identity elements.

Account Takeover
Another type of fraud that occurs during the account management period of the customer life cycle is account takeover fraud.  This type of fraud occurs when an individual uses a variety of methods to take over an account of another individual. This may be accomplished by changing online passwords, changing an address or even adding themselves as an authorized user to a credit card.  

Some customers have tools in place to try to prevent this, but social networking sites are making it easier to obtain personal information for many consumers.  For example, a person may have been asked to provide the answer to a challenge question such as the name of their high school as a means to properly identify them before gaining access to a banking account.  Today, this piece of information is often readily available on social networking sites making it easier for the fraud perpetrators to defeat these types of tools. 

It may be more useful to use out of wallet, or knowledge-based authentication and challenge tools that dynamically generate questions based on credit or public record data to avoid this type of fraud. 

There are a lot of areas covered in your comment: efficiency; credit quality (human side or character in an impersonal environment); and policy adherence. 

We define efficiency and effectiveness using these metrics:

• Turnaround time from application submission to decision;
• Resulting delinquencies based upon type of underwriting (centralized vs. decentralized);
• Production levels between centralized and decentralized;
• Performance of the portfolio based upon type of underwriting; and
• Turnaround time from application submission to decision

Due to the nature of Experian’s technology, we are able to capture start and stop times of the typical activities related to loan origination.  After analyzing the data from 160+ financial institutions of all sizes, Experian publishes an annual small business benchmark report that documents loan origination process efficiencies and inefficiencies, benchmarking these as industry standards.  

Turnaround Time

From the benchmark report, we’ve seen that institutions that are centralized have consistently had a turnaround time that is half of those with decentralized environments.

Interestingly, turnaround time is also much faster for the larger institutions than for smaller.  This is confusing because the smaller community banks tend to promote the close relationship they have with their clients and their communities. Yet, when it comes to actually making a loan decision, it tends to take longer.

In addition to speed, another aspect of turnaround is consistency.  We all can think of situations where we were able to beat the stated turnaround times of the larger or the centralized institutions.  Unfortunately, these tend to be isolated instances versus the consistent performance that is delivered in the centralized environment.

Resulting delinquencies based upon type of underwriting/Performance of the portfolio based upon type of underwriting

Again, referring to the annual small business lending benchmark report, delinquencies in a centralized environment are 50% of those in a decentralized environment. 

I have worked with a number of institutions that allow the loan officer/relationship manager to “reverse the decision” made by a centralized underwriting group.  The thinking is that the human aspect is otherwise missing in centralized underwriting.  When the data is collected, though, the incremental business/portfolio that is approved by the loan officer (who is close to the client and knows the human side) is not profitable from a credit quality perspective.  Specifically, this incremental portfolio typically has a net charge-off rate that exceeds the net interest margin -- and this is before we even consider the non-interest expense incurred. 

Your choice: is the incremental business critical to your success…or could you more fruitfully direct your relationship officer’s attention elsewhere?

Production levels between centralized and decentralized

Not to beat a dead horse, but the multiple of two comes into play here too.  As one looks at the throughput of each role (data entry, underwriter, relationship manager/lender), the production levels of a centralized environment are typically double that of a decentralized.

It’s clear that the data point to the efficiency and effectiveness of a centralized environment

-- by Jeff Bernstein

So, here I am with my first contribution to Experian Decision Analytics’ collections blog, and what I am discussing has practically nothing to do with analytics. But, it has everything to do with managing the opportunities to positively impact collections results and leveraging your investment in analytics and strategies, beginning with the most important weapon in your arsenal – collectors.

Yes, I know it’s a bit unconventional for a solutions and analytics company to talk about something other than models; but the difference between mediocre results and optimization rests with your collectors and your organization’s ability to manage customer interactions.

Let’s take a trip down memory lane and reminisce about one of the true landscape changing paradigm shifts in collections in recent memory – the use of skill models to become payment of choice.

AT&T Universal Card was one of the first early adopters of a radical new approach towards managing an emerging Gen X debtor population during the early 1990s. Armed with fresh research into what influenced delinquent debtors into paying certain collectors while dogging others, they adopted what we called a “management systems” approach towards collections.

They taught their entire collections team a new set of skills models that stressed bridging skills between the collector and the customer, thus allowing the collector to interact in a more collaborative, non-aggressive manner. The new approach enabled collectors to more favorably influence customer behavior, creating payment solutions collaboratively that allowed AT&T to become “payment of choice” when competing with other creditors competing for share of wallet.

A new of set of skill metrics, which we now affectionately call our “dashboard,” were created to measure the effective use of the newly taught skill models, and collectors were empowered to own their own performance – and to leverage their team leader for coaching and skills development. Team developers, the new name for front line collection managers, were tasked with spending 40-50% or more of their time on developmental activities, using leadership skills in their coaching and development activities.  

The game plan was simple.

• Engage collectors with customer focused skills that influenced behavior and get paid sooner.
• Empower collectors to take on the responsibility for their own development.
• Make performance results visible top-to-bottom in the organization to stimulate competitiveness, leveraging our innate desire for recognition.
• Make leaders accountable for continuous performance improvement of individuals and teams.

It worked. AT&T Universal won the Malcom Baldrige National Quality Award in 1992 for its efforts in “delighting the customer” while driving their delinquencies and charge-offs to superior levels. A new paradigm shift was unleashed and spread like wildfire across the industry, including many of the major credit card issuers and top tier U.S. banks, and large retailers.

Why do I bring this little slice of history up in my first blog?

I see many banking and financial services companies across the globe struggle with more complex customer situations and harder collections cases -- with their attention naturally focused on tools, models, and technologies. As an industry, we are focused on early lifecycle treatment strategy, identifying current, non-delinquent customers who may be at-risk for future default, and triaging them before they become delinquent. Risk-based collections and segmentation is now a hot topic. Outsourcing and leveraging multiple, non-agent based contact channels to reduce the pressures on collection resources is more important than ever. Optimization is getting top billing as the next “thing.”

What I don’t hear enough of is how organizations are engaged in improving the skills of collectors, and executing the right management systems approach to the process to extract the best performance possible from our existing resources. In some ways, this may be lost in the chaos of our current economic climate. With all the focus on analytics, segmentation, strategy and technology, the opportunity to improve operational performance through skill building and leadership may have taken a back seat.

I’ve seen plenty of examples of organizations who have spent millions on analytical tools and technologies, improving portfolio risk strategy and targeting of the right customers for treatment. I’ve seen the most advanced dialer, IVR, and other contact channel strategies used successfully to obtain the highest right party contact rates and the lowest possible cost. Yet, with all of that focus and investment, I’ve seen these right party contacts mismanaged by collectors who were not provided with the optimal coaching and skills.

With the enriched data available for decisioning, coupled with the amazing capabilities we have for real time segmentation, strategy scripting, context-sensitive screens, and rules-based workflow management in our next generation collections systems, we are at a crossroads in the evolution of collections.

Let’s not forget some of the “nuts and bolts” that drive operational performance and ensure success.

Something old can be something new. Examine your internal processes aimed at producing the best possible skills at all collector levels and ensure that you are not missing the easiest opportunity to improve your results.

Some articles that I’ve come across recently have puzzled me.

In those articles, authors use the terms “monetary base” and “money supply” synonymously -- but those terms are actually very different.

The monetary base (currency plus Fed deposits) is a much smaller number than the money supply (M1). The huge change in the “base”, which the Fed did affect by adding $1T or so to infuse a lot of quick liquidity into the financial system late in 2007/early 2008, does not necessarily impact M1 (which includes the base plus all bank demand deposits) all that much in the short-term, and may impact it even less in the intermediate-term if the Fed reduces its holdings of securities.  Some are correct, of course, in positing that a rotation out of securities by the Fed will tend to put pressure on market rates.

Some are equivocating the 2007 liquidity moves of the Fed, with a major monetary policy change. When the capital markets froze due to liquidity and credit risks in August/September of 2007, monetary policy was not the immediate risk, or even a consideration. Without the liquidity injections in that timeframe, monetary policy would have become less than an academic consideration.

Tying the “constrained” (which actually was a slowdown in growth of) bank lending to bank reserves on account at the Fed I don’t think their Fed reserve balance was ever an issue for lending. Banks slowed down lending because the level of credit risk increased. Borrowers were defaulting. Bank deposit balances were actually increasing through the financial crisis. [See my Feb 26 and March 5 blogs] So, loan funding, at least from deposit sources was not the problem for most banks. Of course, for a small number of banks that had major securities losses, capital was being lost and therefore not available to back increased lending. But demand deposit balances were growing.

Some authors are linking bank reserves to the ability of banks to raise liabilities, which makes little sense. Banks’ respective abilities to gather demand deposits (insured by the FDIC, at no small expense to the banks) was always wide open, and their ability to borrow funds is much more a function of asset quality (or net asset value) more than it relates their relatively small reserve balances at the Fed.

These actions may result in high inflation levels and high interest rates -- but it will be because of poor Fed decisions in the future, not because of the Fed’s action of last year. It will also depend on whether the fiscal (deficit) actions of the government are: 1) economically productive and 2) tempered to a recovery, or not. I think that is a bigger macro-economic risk than Fed monetary policy.

In fact, the only way bank executives can wisely manage the entity over an extended timeframe is to be able to direct resources across all possibilities on a risk-adjusted basis. The question isn’t whether risk-based pricing is appropriate for all lines of business, but rather how might or should it be applied.

For commercial lending into the middle and corporate markets, there is enough money at stake to warrant evaluating each loan and deposit, as well as the status of the client relationship, on an individual basis. This means some form of simulation modeling by relationship managers on new sales opportunities (including renewals) and the model’s ready access to current data on all existing pieces of business with each relationship. [See my April 24 blog entry.]

This process also implies the ability to easily aggregate the risk-return status of a group of related clients and to show lenders how their portfolio of accounts is performing on a risk-adjusted basis. This type of model-based analysis needs to be flexible enough to handle differing loan structures, easy for a lender to use and quick. The better models can perform such analysis in minutes. I’ve discussed the elements of such models in earlier posts.

But, with small business and consumer lending there are other considerations that come into play. The principles of risk-based pricing are consistent across any loan or deposit. With small business lending, the process of selling, negotiating, underwriting and origination is significantly more streamlined and under some form of workflow control.

With consumer lending, there are more regulations to take into account and there are mass marketing considerations driving the “sales” process.

Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.
 

-- By Kelly Kent

In recent months, the topics of stress-testing and loss forecasting have been at the forefront of the international media and, more importantly, at the forefront of the minds of American banking executives. The increased involvement of the federal government in managing the balance sheets of the country’s largest banks has mixed implications for financial institutions in this country.

On one hand, some banks have been in the practice of building macroeconomic scenarios for years and have tried and tested methods for risk management and loss forecasting. On the other hand, in financial institutions where these practices were conducted in a less methodical manner, if at all, the scrutiny placed on capital adequacy forecasting has left many looking to quickly implement standards that will address regulatory concerns when their number is called.

For those clients to whom this process is new, or for those who do not possess a methodology that would withstand the examination of federal inspectors, the question seems to be – where do we begin?

I think that before you can understand where you’re going, you must first understand where you are and where you have been. In this case, it means having a detailed understanding of key industry and peer benchmarks and your relative position to those benchmarks. 

Even simple benchmarking exercises provide answers to some very important questions.

• What is my risk profile versus that of the industry?
• How does the composition of my portfolio differ from that of my peers?
• How do my delinquencies compare to those of my peers? How has this position been changing?

By having a thorough understanding of one’s position in these challenging circumstances, it allows for a more educated foundation upon which to build assessments of the future.
 

• Risk isn't evident in the general ledger
• Risk certainly DOES exist
• Risk needs to be identified, measured and managed
• Without (in spite of) Generally Accepted Accounting Practices, banks need other risk analytics
• Risk measures need to assist bankers with product level and relationship-level pricing and profitability

As I'm preparing for traveling to the Baker Hill Solution Summit next week, I thought I would revisit the ideas of risk-based loan pricing.

Risk Adjusted Loan Pricing – The Major Parts 

I have referred to risk-adjusted commercial loan pricing (or the lack of it) in previous posts. At times, I’ve commented on aspects of risk-based pricing and risk-based bank performance measurement,  but I haven’t discussed what risk-based pricing is -- in a comprehensive manner. Perhaps, I can begin to do that now, and in my next posts.

Risk-based pricing analysis is a product-level microcosm of risk-based bank performance. You begin by looking at the financial implications of a product sale from a cost accounting perspective. This means calculating the revenues associated with a loan, including the interest income and any fee-based income. These revenues need to be spread over the life of the loan, while taking into account the amortization characteristics of the balance (or average usage for a line of credit). To save effort (and in providing good client relationship management), we often download the balance and rate information for existing loans from a bank’s loan accounting system.

To “risk-adjust” the interest income, you need to apply a cost of funds that has the same implied market risk characteristics as the loan balance. This is not like the bank’s actual cost of funds for several reasons. Most importantly, there is usually no automatic risk-based matching between the manner in which the bank makes loans and the term characteristics of its deposits and/or borrowing. Once we establish a cost of funds approach that removes interest rate risk from the loan, we subtract the risk-adjusted interest expense from the revenues to arrive at risk-adjusted net interest income, or our risk-adjusted gross margin.

We then subtract two types of costs. One cost includes the administrative or overhead expenses associated with the product. Our best practice is to derive an approach to operating expense breakdowns that takes into account all of the bank’s non-interest expenses. This is a “full absorption” method of cost accounting. We want to know the marginal cost of doing business, but if we just apply the marginal cost to all loans, a large portion of real-life expenses won’t be covered by resulting pricing. As a result, the bank’s profits may suffer.

We fully understand the argument for marginal cost coverage, but have seen the unfortunate end-result of too many sales -- that use this lower cost factor -- hurt a bank’s bottom line. Administrative cost does not normally require additional risk adjustment, as any risk-based operational expenses and costs of mitigating operation risk are already included in the bank’s general ledger for non-interest expenses.

The second expense subtracted from net interest income is credit risk cost. This is not the same as the bank’s provision expense, and is certainly not the same as the loss provision in any one accounting period.  The credit risk cost for pricing purposes should be risk adjusted based on both product type (usually loan collateral category) and the bank’s risk rating for the loan in question. This metric will calculate the relative probability of default for the borrower combined with the loss given default for the loan type in question.

We usually annualize the expected loss numbers by taking into account a multi-year history and a one- or two-year projection of net loan losses. These losses are broken down by loan type and risk rating based on the bank’s actual distribution of loan balances.

The risk costs by risk rating are then created using an up-sloping curve that is similar in shape to an industry default experience curve. This assures a realistic differentiation of losses by risk rating. Many banks have loss curves that are too flat in nature, resulting in little or no price differentiation based on credit quality. This leads to poor risk-based performance metrics and, ultimately, to poor overall financial performance. The loss expense curves are fine-tuned so that over a period of years the total credit risk costs, when applied to the entire portfolio, should cover the average annual expected loss experience of the bank.

By subtracting the operating expenses and credit risk loss from risk-adjusted net interest income, we arrive at risk-adjusted pre-tax income. In my next post we’ll expand this discussion further to risk-adjusted net income, capital allocation for unexpected loss and profit ratio considerations.

The debate continues in the banking industry -- Do we push the loan authority to the field or do we centralize it (particularly when we are talking about small business loans)?

A common argument for sending the loan authority to the field is the improved turnaround time for the applicant. However reality is that centralized loan authority actually provides a decision time almost two times faster than those of a decentralized nature.  The statistics supporting this fact are from the Small Business Benchmark Study created and published by Baker Hill, a Part of Experian, for the past five years.

Based upon the 2008 Small Business Benchmark Study, those institutions with assets of $20 billion to $100 billion used only centralized underwriting and provided decisions within 2.5 days on average. In contrast, the next closest category ($2 billion to $20 billion in assets) took 4.4 days.

Now, if we only consider the time it takes to make a decision (meaning we have all the information needed), the same disparity exists.  The largest banks using solely centralized underwriting took 0.8 days to make a decision, while the next tier ($2 billion to $20 billion) took an average 1.5 days to make a decision.  This drop in centralized underwriting usage between these two tiers was simply a 15 percent change. This means that the $20 billion to $100 billion banks had 100% usage of centralized underwriting while the $2 billion to $20 billion dropped only to 85% usage. Eighty-five percent is still a strong usage percentage, but it has a significant impact on turnaround time.

The most perplexing issue is that the smaller community banks are consistently telling me that they feel their competitive advantages are that they can respond faster and they know their clients better than bigger, impersonal banks.  Based upon the stats, I am not seeing this competitive advantage supported by reality.  What is particularly confusing is that the small community banks, that are supposed to be closest to the client, take twice as long overall from application receipt to decision and almost three times as long when you compare them to the $20 billion to $100 billion category (0.8 days) to the $500 million to $2 billion category (2.2 days).

As you can see - centralized underwriting works.  It is consistent, provides improved customer service, improved throughput, increased efficiency and improved credit quality when compared to the decentralized approach.  

In future blogs, I will address the credit quality component.

We’ve stopped taking phone applications and are using the out-of-wallet questions for Internet credit applications. Are we going overboard?

The Red Flags Rule does not preclude phone applications or otherwise limit the manner in which you m ay accept applications for covered accounts. However, different methods to open covered accounts present different identity theft risks, and you must consider those differing risks in identifying the relevant Red Flags for each type of covered account that you provide.

 

Beyond the financial risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital, which would be directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk. We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk. Business risk includes a variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making, corporate governance considerations, executive behavior (for better or worse), management succession events (Apple and Steve Jobs, for instance) or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business.

Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a roughly 20 percent infusion of added tier one capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department says it does not seek voting rights, but none-the-less has gotten them in at least some cases. The real “kicker” is embedded in the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form. 

The most interesting clause, that appears to represent a very open-ended business risk to management decision making, is one relatively small paragraph, named Amendment, in the middle of Article V - Miscellaneous, just ahead of governing law (which is federal law, backed up by the laws of the State of New York).

Amendment begins normally enough, requiring the usual signed agreement of each party, but then states: “provided that the Investor may unilaterally amend any provision of this Agreement to the extent required to comply with any changes after the Signing Date in applicable federal statutes.” Wow. My reading of this is that if in the future Congress enacts anything that Treasury finds applicable to any aspect of the previously signed TARP Agreement, the bank is bound to go along. Regardless of whether the Treasury negotiates any voting rights, once the TARP Agreement is executed by the bank, management is not only bound by what is in the document to begin with, it is subject to future federal law as long as the TARP shares are held by the government. As a result, many banks have said no thank you to TARP.

At least four banks have recently paid back $340 million to repurchase the government’s shares. And, apparently another bank has offered to pay back $1 billion but, according to Andrew Napolitano at Fox Business Channel, the offer was turned down and the bank was threatened with adverse consequences if it persisted in its attempt to get out.

More pointed and public, and much larger in size, is the dance taking place now between Chrysler Corporation, Fiat, the UAW, four lead lenders and, you guessed it, the federal government. The secured loans in question total almost $7 billion and the government wants J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citicorp and Morgan Stanley to exchange $5 billion of the loans for Chrysler stock. The banks know they would do better (for their shareholders) by selling off Chryslers assets. This is an example of why bankruptcy exists. The stakes are large and so is the business risk of the influence from the government. It will be interesting to see how things turn out.

So, this new major owner does have a voice. If Congress wants certain lending volumes or terms, or they want certain compensation levels, it needs to be enacted into federal law. Short of having to pass a law, there is the implied threat of the big stick in the TARP agreement. The Purchase Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.

This post continues the feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Mark Sofietti, Associate Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian.

In today’s market, the banking industry seems to be changing at a very rapid pace.  The current crisis that we are in, as an industry and as a nation, is forcing institutions to revisit risk management policies and procedures to make the appropriate changes needed to remain healthy and profitable.  However, the current crisis is not the only reason why institutions should focus on change management.  Change management needs to be appropriately handled in bad and good times.  Understanding change management is always a necessity to a well-run organization.  Whether it is a reorganization, a new software system, a new policy or moving to a new building, change can cause a great deal of stress and uncertainty -- but it can also cause benefits.

So, as managers, you may be asking, “What can I do to ensure that positive changes are happening within my organization?  What are some of the items that I should consider when I am bringing about organizational change?” 

There are four necessary steps that need to be taken in order to improve the success of an initiative that is causing change to an institution. I covered two in my last post. Here are the additional steps.

3. Consider methods of change
One method of change is the education of individuals about new ways of operating.  This method should be used when there is more resistance to change and when individuals lack a clear understanding or knowledge of the change being made.  Education may cause the implementation to take longer, but those involved will better understand the effects of the change.

A second method is gathering participation from different levels and skill sets within the organizations.  Building a team should be used when there is the highest risk of failure due to change resistance and when more information needs to be gathered before an effective implementation can be completed.

Negotiation is a method that is used when a group or person is going to be negatively affected by the change.  This method could alleviate the discomfort by giving the person or group some other benefit.  Negotiations could allow an organization to avoid resistance, but it may be very costly and time consuming to implement the change.

The coercion change method is when a change is implemented with little room for diversion from the plan.  Employees are told what the change is going to be and they have to accept it.  This method should be used when speed is of the utmost importance, or if the change is not going to be easily accepted.  Most employees do not like this approach and it may cause resentment or it might cause staff members to leave.

The final method of change uses manipulation, the conscious decision to share limited information about the change that is taking place.  This method should only be used when no other tactic will work, or if time or cost is major issues.  This approach is dangerous because it can lead to more problems in the future.

4. Create plan of action
A plan should be created for the implementation of change to clearly address reservations and define the change strategy.  It should include internal and external audiences who can be affected by the change.  It is common to forget those who are indirectly impacted by the change -- and these audiences (customers, for example) may be the most important.  Objectives of the change need to be clearly outlined in the plan in order to understand how the new future state of the organization will look and operate.  The plan needs to be communicated to all those involved so that the transition can be understood and everyone can be held accountable.  The plan should be periodically revisited after implementation in order to review progress.  Creating a plan of action is a very important step to ensure that those who resisted the change do not revert back to their old habits. 

Achieving change is not an easy process, especially when time is not on your side.  If you take a second look at the change that you are trying to implement and do the necessary planning, you have a greater chance for success than if you or your organization fails to fully evaluate the consequences. 

Effective change management should be part of any financial risk management process. Take charge of your institution’s future through a calculated approach to change management and your organization will be in a better position for the next change that is coming around the bend.
 

This post is a feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Mark Sofietti, Associate Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian.

Change is inevitable.  If you are not changing, then you are standing still and the world around you is changing.  In today’s market, the banking industry seems to be changing at a very rapid pace.  The current crisis that we are in, as an industry and as a nation, is forcing institutions to revisit their risk management policies and procedures to make the appropriate changes needed to remain healthy and profitable.  However, the current crisis is not the only reason why institutions should focus on change management.  Change management needs to be appropriately handled in bad and good times.  Understanding change management is always a necessity to a well-run organization.  Whether it is a reorganization, a new collections software system, a new policy or moving to a new building, change can cause a great deal of stress and uncertainty -- but it can also cause benefits.

So, as managers, you may be asking, “What can I do to ensure that positive changes are happening within my organization?  What are some of the items that I should consider when I am bringing about organizational change?” 

There are four necessary steps that need to be taken in order to improve the success of an initiative that is causing change to an institution.

1.  Understand current situation and needs
The first item necessary to have a successful implementation of change is to understand the current climate and reason for the change.  People are scared of change and many believe that “if it is not broken, don’t fix it.”  This is why the reasons for change need to be understood and communicated to all employees.  Changing, just for the sake of changing, causes a great deal of unrest to a department or organization.  With clearly defined reasons and objectives, the implementation of change can have a lower degree of failure.

2.  Identify resistance
During change, there will be some form of resistance.  As a manager, you will need to have thought through from where resistance might come and consider how to work through confrontations. 

One type of major resistance can be people who are looking out for their own self-interests.  People have their own agendas within the workplace and could view change as a threat to their advancement.  When dealing with these situations, you will need to have a good deal of collaboration and involvement from these individuals in order to successfully implement change.  Note, given this resistance, that the change will not happen as quickly and your timelines should be appropriately set. 

Another major resistance that may slow down the implementation of change is the lack of trust in the leaders enacting the change.  In these situations, management should build teams of trusted and respected people whose objective is to eliminate underlying resistance. 

Finally, providing facts and examples regarding the change is a necessity for a successful implementation.  Doing so can reassure employees that the change being made is beneficial to the organization.

The next post will continue with the additional two necessary steps that need to be taken in order to improve the success of an initiative that is causing change to an institution.