Developing and implementing an Identity Theft Prevention Program

Wednesday, March 25, 2009 by Keir Breitenfeld

If the business is a creditor or a “financial institution” (defined as a depository institution) that offers covered accounts, you must develop a Program to detect possible identity theft in the accounts and respond appropriately. The federal banking agencies, the NCUA and the FTC have issued Guidelines to help covered entities identify, detect and respond to indicators of possible identity theft, as well as to administer the Program.

A copy of the Red Flag Guidelines can be found:
Federal Reserve Board – 12 C.F.R. pt 222, App. J
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – 12 C.F.R. pt 334, App. J
FTC – 16 C.F.R. pt 681, App. A
NCUA – 12 C.F.R. pt 717, App. J
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - 12 C.F.R. pt 41, App. J
Office of Thrift Supervision - 12 C.F.R. pt 571, App. J
 

In this economic environment ...

Wednesday, March 25, 2009 by Prince Varma

Good day all. My last blog revolved around practical approaches to effective client relationship management. It time to get back to a “risk” type conversation.

I recently told my wife that if I hear the phrase “…in this economic environment …” uttered as a caveat one more time, I’m going to scream. I have truly come to anticipate the beginning or introduction to interviews and articles to lead in with this sentiment and it’s driving me nuts.

In these economic times (you can tell I’m from the sales side, I cleverly changed the phrase), it is clearly not business as usual within most financial institutions. Conversations with CEOs and bank presidents over the past two months have usually followed the same theme, “I’ve got money to lend, but I just can’t find a decent deal” or “I’ve got applications up the wazoo, but the quality just isn’t there.”

So, what is going on?
The obvious answer is that we are looking at applications more closely and the credit side (risk management guys) is deliriously happy because everytime they make a recommendation about “reviewing the opportunity further” they also don’t hesitate to mention, “in this economic environment.”

Really, what is the scoop and how do we adjust on the front line?
Clearly, we know that deeper reviews and management of risk is being undertaken. The problem is that the established standards are no longer valid. Yes, the basics ratios still need to be run, but let’s face it, in this economic environment a company’s historical performance is no longer an effective indicator as to their future performance. The playing field is no longer consistent. The past two to three years of financials are based on circumstances that no longer apply. This means that the analysts are having a difficult time establishing effective benchmarks from which to apply credit policy – and we know that those guys are the paragons of adaptability.

We are being asked to evaluate risk in an uncertain circumstance. We are looking at projected revenues and earnings and examining receivables. We are also comparing this business to others in the industry, determining which other market segments have a direct (and indirect) impact on the performance of this one, reviewing business plans and evaluating management depth and experience. And, at the end of the day, either saying no, saying yes but not so much or holding our breath and hoping that divine intervention shows us the way.

Does any of this should sound familiar to you?
It should. We see these type of deals all of the time and we call them the start-ups.

Ok, so what am I recommending? Quite simply, that we take a step back from our typical approach to the established business and engage with them the way we would a start-up.

When an opportunity or request presents itself, restrain the urge to go down the garden path. Slow down! No... stop! Take a deep breath, put on your “economic development hat ” and approach the deal the way you would if it were a start-up (and I don’t mean running away at top speed in the opposite direction screaming). You should: 

  • look for or help them construct a short term (next four to six month) tactical action/priority plan;
  • help them or review their 12-month business plan;
    o NOTE: If the business hasn’t realized that they need a short-term survival plan and a mid-term business plan… run! Run far and run fast!
  • examine their market and have them explain why they will make it versus the competition;
  • dig into their management expertise (think AIG);
  • have them explain how their tactical and 12-month business plan will keep the doors open and the lights on (since its coming into summer we’ll cut them some slack on the heat); and finally
  • review and revise their projections.

If at the end of this, you still feel that the deal has legs, it probably does, and you’ve done a pretty thorough job building the business case for the credit side.

Or, you could just lament that there really isn’t much out there in this economic environment.
 

Financial institution profits, credit risk and loan pricing for 2008

Tuesday, March 17, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 6

Peer Group 2 fee income

Non-interest income again, as a percent of average total assets, declined to .86 percent from .95 percent in 2007. For Peer Group 2 (PG2), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.04 percent of assets in 2005. A smaller, non-interest bearing deposit base with no other new and offsetting sources of fee income will lead to increased pressure on this metric.

Operating expenses
Operating expenses also put more pressure on earnings on these smaller banks. They increased from 2.79 percent to 2.83 percent of average assets. That’s four basis points on the negative. Historically, this metric has been flattering for this size bank and usually moves up or down from year-to-year. It was almost equal at 2.82 percent of assets in 2004.

As a result of the sizeable decline in margins, the continued decline in fee income and the slight increase in operating expenses PG2’s efficiency ratio lost ground from 59.52 percent in 2007 to only 64.72 percent in 2008. That means that every dollar in gross revenue cost them almost 65 cents in administrative expenses this year. This metric averaged 56 cents in 2005/2006. It’s amazing how close these numbers are for banks of very different size where you would expect clear economies of scale.

The total impact of margin performance, fee income and operating expenses, plus the huge increase in provision expense of 59 basis points leads us to a total decline in pre-tax operating income of .96 percent on total assets. That is a total decline from 1.58 percent pre-tax ROA in 2007 to .64 percent pre-tax ROA, a loss of 61 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007. My same conclusion as above would hold regarding the pricing of risk into bank lending (although the smaller banks didn’t perform a badly as the larger in this regard).

Although all 490 banks are declining in all profit metrics, the smaller banks seem to have an edge in pricing loans, but not deposits. Although up dramatically in 2007, and even more in 2008 for both groups, the PG2 banks seem to be suffering fewer credit losses relative to their asset size than their larger brethren. Both groups have resulting huge profit declines, but the largest banks are under the most pressure through this period.

An interesting point, with higher loan yields and fewer apparent losses, is whether PG2 banks are somewhat better at risk-based pricing (for whatever reason) than the largest bank group. Results are results. The 2009 numbers aren’t expected to show a lot of improvement as the general economy continues to slow and credit and financial risk management issues continue. We’ll probably comment on 2009 as the quarterlies become available this year.

 

May 1 is a couple months away, but Nov. 1 still matters.

Thursday, March 12, 2009 by Keir Breitenfeld

For all you folks who, like me, waited until the last minute to knock out a term paper or class project in school, here is a friendly reminder…Yes, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) pushed out the enforcement deadline of the Red Flags Rule to May 1, 2009.  Yes, a sigh of relief was heard across compliance officers and operations managers nationwide.  However, you should still keep a few things in mind as we approach May 1. 

First, per the FTC, "many entities also noted that because they generally are not required to comply with FTC rules in other contexts, they had not followed or even been aware of the rulemaking, and therefore learned of the requirements of the rule too late to be able to come into compliance by November 1, 2008."  Those of you, who have not been subject to FTC enforcement in the past are quite possibly still subject to the Red Flags Rule based on your institution maintaining 'covered accounts' per the definition in the Red Flags Rule itself.  Double check if you think otherwise.

Second, the FTC was clear in stating that "this delay in enforcement is limited to the Identity Theft Red Flags Rule (16 CFR 681.2), and does not extend to the rule regarding address discrepancies applicable to users of consumer reports (16 CFR 681.1), or to the rule regarding changes of address applicable to card issuers (16 CFR 681.3)." 
So, while May 1 is still a few weeks away, if you are accessing consumer credit reports, for example, you should already have a formal written and operational process to detect and respond to address discrepancies on those credit reports.

Defining risk management

Thursday, March 12, 2009 by Prince Varma

Hello. My name is Prince Varma and I’ve spent the better part of the last 16 years helping financial institutions (FI) successfully improve their in business development, portfolio growth and client relationship management practices.

So, since the focus of this blog is to speak to readers about risk management, many of you are probably wondering what a “sales and business development” guy is doing writing a piece related to mitigating and managing risk?

Great question!

The simple fact is that the traditional or prevailing sentiment or definition related to risk management – mitigating credit risk -- is incomplete. A more accurate and comprehensive approach would be to recognize, acknowledge and address that “risk” cuts across the entire client relationship spectrum of:

  • client penetration/growth;
  • client retention; and
  • client credit risk mitigation.

How do penetration and retention count as “risk factors”?
(this is where the sales guy stuff comes in)

From a penetration perspective, the failure to recognize potential opportunities either within the existing client base or in the operating market, introduces revenue growth risk (meaning we aren’t keeping our eye on the top line). Ultimately it impacts the FI’s ability to add assets (either deposits or loans) and also has a direct affect on efficiency and deposit to loan ratios.

From a retention perspective, the risk is even more obvious. Our most valued clients are the ones that we must continuously engage in a proactive manner. Let’s face it. In even the smallest markets, there are no less than four to six other institutions waiting to jump on your client in the event that you grow complacent. There is a huge difference between selection and satisfaction. And, if we aren’t focused on keeping a client after securing them, our net portfolio growth targets will be impossible to achieve. 

Considering the current market environment, now more than ever, effectively managing these three elements of “risk/exposure to the FI” is crucial to an institutions success both practically and pragmatically. Everyone internally at the bank is focused on the “credit risk mitigation” piece. The conversations that are occurring outside of the bank’s walls however are focused on the “L” word or liquidity and getting credit flowing again.

How many times have we read or more frankly been beaten with this comment from business owners “…there’s no one making loans anymore…” or “…its impossible to get credit…?”

That should be read as … penetration and retention

Striking a balance between effective and appropriate credit risk exposure and deepening or growing the portfolio has been a challenge facing those of us in the front office for as long as I can remember. The “sales revolution” is effectively over. We’ve learned the critical lesson that we need to evolve beyond being strictly a credit officer (you did learn that right??!!). And, you didn’t/shouldn’t become a “banking products generalist” with no analytical depth. Knowing all this, it is important that we return to the guiding principles of effective lending which include:
- evaluating the scope of the opportunity;
- isolating the risk and identifying a reasonable and realistic recovery/mitigation remedy;
- determining what other alternatives the borrower might be considering; and
- being willing to let the “bad deals” walk.

In subsequent blogs, I’ll provide you with specific tactics aimed at optimizing penetration and retention efforts and implementing effective and practical client management strategies.

After all what would you expect from a business development guy…
 

Bank profits, credit risk and loan pricing for 2008

Tuesday, March 10, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 5

This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are some findings for the two largest groups, covering 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk.

Peer Group 2 (PG2) consists of 305 reporting banks between $1 billion and $3 billion in assets. PG2’s Net Interest Income was 5.75 percent of average total assets for the year. This is also down, as expected, from 6.73 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense also decreased from 3.07 percent in 2007 to 2.31 percent for 2008.  Net Interest Margin, also declined from 3.66 percent in 2007 to 3.42 percent in 2008, or a loss of 24 basis points. These margins are 31 bps or 10 percent higher than found in Peer Group 1 (PG1), but the drop of .24 percent was much larger than the .05 percent decline in PG1.

As with all banks, Net Interest Margins have shown a steady chronic decline, but the drops for PG2 have been coming in larger chunks the last two years -- -24 basis points last year after dropping 16 points from 2006 to 2007.

Behind the drop in margins, we find loans yields of 6.53 percent for 2008, which is down from 7.82 percent in 2007. This is a decline of 129 basis points or 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.70 percent in 2007 to 2.75 percent in 2008. This 95 basis point decline represents a 26 percent lower cost of interest-bearing deposits. Again, with a steeper decline in interest costs, you would think that margins should have improved somewhat. It wasn’t meant to be. 

We see the same two culprits as we did in PG1. Total deposit balances declined from 78 percent of average assets to 77 percent which means again, that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits continued an already steady decline from 5.58 percent of average assets in 2007 to 5.03 percent. This, of course, resulted in fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size and a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits.

Check my next blog for more on an analysis of Peer Group 2’s fee income, operating expenses and their use of risk-based pricing.

 

Bank profits, credit risk and loan pricing for 2008

Tuesday, March 10, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 4

Let’s dig a bit deeper into why Peer Group 1’s margins didn’t improve. We see two possible reasons: Total deposit balances declined from 72 percent of average assets to 70 percent. This means that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund their assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits declined from 4.85 percent of average assets to 4.24 percent. So, fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size, along with a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits, appear to have made the difference.

Fee income
Non-interest income, again as a percent of average total assets, was down to 1.12 percent from 1.23 percent in 2007. This was a decline of 9 percent. For Peer Group 1 (PG1), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.49 percent of assets in 2005. A lot of fee income is deposit based and largely based on non-interest bearing deposits. So, the declining interest-free balances, as a percent of total assets, are a source of pressure on fee income and have a negative impact on net interest margins.

Operating expenses
Operating expenses constituted more bad news as they increased from 2.63 percent to 2.77 percent of average assets. Most of the large scale cost-cutting didn’t get started early enough to favorably impact this number for last year. Historically, this metric has moved down, irregularly, as the size of the largest banks has grown. This number stood at 2.54 percent in 2006, for instance. We saw increase in both 2007 and again in 2008.

As a result of the decline in margins and the larger percentage decline in fee income, while operating costs increased, the Peer Group 1 efficiency ratio lost ground from 57.71 percent in 2007 up to 63.70 percent in 2008. This 10 percent increase is a move to the bad. It means every dollar in gross revenue [net interest income + fee income] cost them almost 64 cents in administrative expenses in 2008. This metric averaged 55 cents in 2005/2006.

The total impact of changes in margin performance, fee income, operating expenses and the 2008 increase in provision expense of 87 basis points, we arrive at a total decline in pre-tax operating income of 1.23 percent on total assets. That is a total decline of 80 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007 of 1.53 percent pre-tax ROA to the 2008 result for the group of only .30 percent pre-tax ROA.

It would appear that banks have not been utilizing pricing enough credit risk into their loan rates.  This would be further confirmed if you compared bank loan rates to the historic risk spreads and absolute rates that the market currently has priced into both investment grade and below-investment-grade corporate bonds. These spreads have decreased some very recently, but it is predicted that more credit risk is present than bank lending rates would indicate.
 

Does the Identity Theft Red Flags Rule apply to me?

Thursday, March 5, 2009 by Keir Breitenfeld

Here are a few more frequently asked questions.

1. Am I a “creditor” under the rule?
The term “creditor” has the same meaning as under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and is defined as a person who regularly participates in credit decisions, including, for example, a mortgage broker, a person who arranges credit or a servicer of loans who participates in “workout” decisions. The term “credit” is defined, as in the ECOA, as the right granted by a creditor to defer payment for goods or services. It is important to note that commercial, as well as consumer, credit accounts may be covered by the Rule.

2. We are an insurance company that uses credit reports to underwrite insurance. Does the Red Flags Rule apply to us?
The Red Flag Rule applies to creditors and depository institutions and should not apply to an insurer when engaged in activities related to insurance underwriting. To the extent that you extend credit, however, you may be covered. For example, you may wish to examine whether you permit consumers to finance their premiums; whether you extend credit to vendors, independent agents or other business partners; or whether you extend credit in connection with your investment activities, including real-estate investments.

3. I am an auto dealer. Does the rule apply to me?
If the business extends auto credit to consumers or arranges auto credit for consumers, the Red Flag guidelines may apply.
 

Bank profits, credit risk and loan pricing for 2008

Thursday, March 5, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 3

I believe it is quite important to compare your bank or your investment plans in a financial institution to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same, believe it or not. In this column, we use the averages. Again, look for the differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers, while the other half are naturally worse. It can tell a useful story.

This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are the findings for the two largest groups that cover 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk.

Peer Group 1 (PG1) is made up of the largest 189 reporting banks or those with over $3 billion in average total assets for 2008. Interest income was 5.25 percent of average total assets for the period. This is down, as we might expect, based on last year’s decline in the general level of interest rates from 6.16 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense was also down from 2.98 percent in 2007 to 2.06 percent average for the year. Net Interest Margin, the difference between the two metrics, was down from 3.16 percent in 2007 to 3.11 percent as a percentage of total assets.

It should be noted that Net Interest Margins have been in a steady, chronic decline for at least 10 years, with a torturous regular drop of 2 to 5 basis points per annum in recent years. Last year’s drop of five basis points is in line with that progression and it does add to continuing difficulty in generating bottom-line profits.

To find out a bit more about why margins dropped, especially in light of the steady increase in lending over the same past decade, we looked first at loan pricing yields. For PG1 these averaged 6.12 percent for 2008, down (again, expectedly) from 7.32 percent in 2007. This is a drop of 120 basis points or a decline of 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.41 percent in 2007 to 2.39 percent in 2008. This 102 basis point decline represents a 30 percent lower interest expense on interest-bearing deposits. Based only on these two metrics, it seems like margins should have improved and not declined for these banks.

Check my next blog for more on the reasons for Peer Group 1’s drop in margins and an analysis of the fee income and operating expenses for these institutions.
 

Moderation. Moderation. Moderation.

Thursday, March 5, 2009 by Risk Management
Just as with diet recommendations, moderation needs to be the new motto for credit risk management.  Diets provide for the occasional bag of chips or dessert after dinner, but these same food items become problems if the small quantity or occasional indulgence suddenly becomes the norm. 
Similarly, we, in our risk management efforts, put forth guidelines that establish limitations on certain loan types or categories that have been deemed risky should the numbers or quantity become too large a part of the overall portfolio.  Unfortunately, we have a tendency to allow earnings or portfolio growth to cloud our judgment and take an attitude of “just one more.” 
In the past several years, we have experienced excesses in commercial real estate, residential development and subprime mortgages.  It is now these excesses that are creating the problems that we are dealing with today. 
Bringing back these limitations – in other words, reestablishing the discipline in our portfolio risk management – will go a long way in avoiding these same problems in the future. 
As I learned early in my banking career:  “…soundness, profitability and growth…in that order.”

Bank lending, credit risk and profit results for 2008

Thursday, February 26, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 2

In my last post, I started my review of the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest financial institution peer groups through the end of 2008.

Now, lets look at the resutls relating to credit cost, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings. Again, as you look at these results, I encourage you to consider the processes that your bank currently utilizes for credit risk modeling and financial risk management.

Credit costs
More loans, especially in an economic downturn, mean more credit risk. Credit costs were up tremendously. The Peer group 1 banks reported net loan losses of .89% of total loans. This is an increase from .28% in 2007, which was up from an average of 18 basis points on the portfolio in 2006/2005.  The Peer group 2 banks reported net loan losses of .74%. This is also up substantially from 24 basis points in 2007 and an average of 15 basis points in 2006/2005. The net loan losses reported in the fourth quarter significantly boosted both groups’ year-end loss percentages above where they stood through the first three quarters last year.

Loss allowance accounts
Both groups also ramped up their reserve for future expected losses substantially. The year-end loss allowance account (ALLL) as a percent of total loans stood at 1.81% for the largest banks. This is an increase of almost 50% from an average of 1.21% in the years 2007/2004. Peer group 2 banks saw their reserve for losses go up to 1.57% from an average of 1.24% in the years 2007/2004.

The combination of covering the increased net loan losses and also increasing the loss reserve balance required a huge provision expenses. So, loan balances were up even in the face of increased write-offs and expected forward losses.

Impacts on earnings
Obviously, we would expect this provisioning burden to negatively impact earnings. It did, greatly. Peer group 1 banks saw a decline in return on assets to a negative .07%. This is just below break-even as a group. The average net income percentage stood at .42% of average assets at the end of the third quarter. So, the washout in the fourth quarter reports took the group average to a net loss position for the year. The ROA was at .96% in 2007 and an average of 1.26% in 2006/2005. That is a 111% decline in ROA from 2007. Return on equity also went into the red, down from 11.97% in 2007. ROE stood at 14.36% in 2005.

For the $1B to $3B banks, ROA stood at .35%. This is still a positive number, however, it is way down from 1.08% in 2007, 1.30% in 2006 and 1.33% in 2005. The decline in 2008 was 67% from 2007. ROE for the group was also down, at 4.11% from 12.37% in 2007. The drops in profitability were not entirely the result of credit losses, but this was by far the largest impact from 2007.

The seriously beefed-up ALLL accounts would seem to indicate that, as a group, the banks expect further loan losses, at least through 2009.  These numbers largely pre-dated the launch of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the tier one funding it provided in 2008. But, it is clear that banks had not contracted lending for all of 2008, even in the face of mounting credit issues and a declining economic picture. It will be interesting to see how things unfold in the next several quarters.
 

Bank lending, credit risk and profit results for 2008

Thursday, February 26, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 1

It may be quite useful to compare your financial institution's portfolio risk management process or your investment plans , to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same -- believe it or not. Here are the averages. You should look for differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers and the other half may be naturally worse.

As promised, I have again reviewed the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest peer groups through the end 2008. The Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) is a compilation of the FDIC, based on the call reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC reports peer averages for various bank size groupings and here are a few notable findings for the two largest groups that covers 494 reporting banks.

Peer group 1

  • Peer group 1 consisted of 189 institutions over $3 billion in average total assets for the year.
  • Net loans accounted for 67.31% of average total assets, which is up from 65.79 % in 2007. 
  • Loans, as a percent of assets, have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for the largest banks was also up to 96% from 91% in 2007 and 88% in both 2006 and 2005.

So, it appears these banks were lending more in 2008 as an allocation of their total asset base and relative to their deposit sources of funding.

In fact, net loans grew at a rate of 9.34% for this group, which is down from the average growth rate of 15.07% for the years 2005 through 2007.  The growth rate in loans is down, which is probably due to tightened credit standards. However, it is still growth. And, since total average assets also had growth of 11.58% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances increased at the largest banks.

Peer group 2

  • Peer group 2 consisted of 305 reporting financial institutions between $1B and $3B in total assets.
  • The net loans accounted for 72.96% of average total assets, up from 71.75% in 2007. 
  • Again, the loans as a percent of total assets have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for these banks was up to 95% from 92% in 2007 and an average of 90% for 2006 and 2005.

So, these banks are also lending more in 2008 as a portion of their asset base and relative to their deposit source of funding.

Net loans grew at a rate of 10.48% for this group in 2008 which is down from 11.94% growth in 2007 and down from an average growth of 15.04% for 2006 and 2005. And, since total average assets also had growth of 10.02% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances also increased at the intermediate size banks. Again here, the growth rate in loans is down, probably due to tightened credit standards, but it is still growth and it is at a slightly more aggressive rate than the largest bank group.

Combined, for these 494 largest financial institutions, loans were still growing through 2008 both as a percentage of asset allocation and in absolute dollars.

Tune in to my next blog to read more about the results shown relating to credit costs, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings.
 

Pricing effectively "forever"

Wednesday, February 25, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

This post is a feature from my colleague and guest blogger, John Robertson, Senior Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian.

Years ago, I attended a seminar at which the presenter made a statement that struck me as odd, but has proven to be quite prophetic.  He simply stated, “margins will continue to narrow … forever!” He was spot on.
At that time, a variety of loan products (such as mortgage loans) were becoming commoditized and this emerging market acted as an intermediary for needed cash to provide banks the wherewithal to continue to lend in their respective locales. The presenter continued by making a call for a systematic and effective pricing methodology then and “forever”.
Pricing loans in a competitive market does not necessarily translate into smaller yields. Nor should banks be willing to accept smaller yields for less than quality loans. There are several viable options to consider when loan pricing in a market where the margins continue to shrink.

Cutting operating expenses
Generally, a financial institution’s first reaction to narrowing margins is to cut operating expenses. Periodically the chaff does need culling, but most banks run efficient shops by depending heavily on technology to create those efficiencies and for risk management. They continually measure themselves with efficiency ratios which, in part, help to drive their strategic operating decisions. So, when the edict comes from above to cut operating expenses, there aren’t too many options.

So, why is a bank’s first reaction usually an all-out call to cut operating expenses? Generally, it’s because these operating expenses are more easily identifiable and banks still lack effective tools to measure the value of their customers and relationships. Couple that with the perception that there is no control over a competitive market with narrowing margins. As a result, banks price accordingly -- just to get the deal. Consequently, their efficiency ratios may look good, but what about the potential impact on yield, service and internal morale? Community banks, in particular, pride themselves on customer service and, in fact, site it as one of their strengths against larger banks. Do you give up that advantage?

Relationship management
To price effectively in a market where margins have narrowed, the bank has to also consider the relationship’s value. The value of deposits should be measured and included to allow for more competitive pricing. The influence of deposits on the relationship allows the bank to be more aggressive in its loan pricing or can enhance the relationship yield itself.
Loan pricing in a competitive market does not have to translate into smaller yields and/or credit quality. The key to staying ahead of competition is measuring the value of the relationship and applying any or all of the outlined effective risk-based pricing methodologies to position the bank to win the deal and still meet the targeted return objectives. While the phrase “margins will continue to narrow … forever” may seem to hold true, banks can counter by using the “power of pricing” to offset the impact to earnings …forever!
 

Centralized vs. decentralized underwriting

Wednesday, February 25, 2009 by Risk Management

The debate continues in the banking industry -- Do we push the loan authority to the field or do we centralize it (particularly when we are talking about small business loans)?

A common argument for sending the loan underwriting authority to the field is the improved turnaround time for the applicant. However, reality is that centralized loan authority actually provides a credit decisioning time almost two times faster than those of a decentralized nature.  The statistics supporting this fact are from the Small Business Benchmark Study created and published by Baker Hill, a Part of Experian, for the past five years.

Based upon the 2008 Small Business Benchmark Study, those financial institutions with assets of $20 billion to $100 billion used only centralized underwriting and provided decisions within 2.5 days on average. In contrast, the next closest category ($2 billion to $20 billion in assets) took 4.4 days.

Now, if we only consider the time it takes for decisioning (meaning we have all the information needed), the same disparity exists.  The largest banks using solely centralized underwriting took 0.8 days to make a decision, while the next tier ($2 billion to $20 billion) took an average 1.5 days to make a decision.  This drop in centralized underwriting usage between these two tiers was simply a 15 percent change. This means that the $20 billion to $100 billion banks had 100% usage of centralized underwriting while the $2 billion to $20 billion dropped only to 85% usage. Eighty-five percent is still a strong usage percentage, but it has a significant impact on underwriting turnaround time.

The most perplexing issue is that the smaller community banks are consistently telling me that they feel their competitive advantages are that they can respond faster, have consistent account management and they have better relationship management practices than bigger, impersonal banks.  Based upon the stats, I am not seeing this competitive advantage supported by reality.  What is particularly confusing is that the small community banks, that are supposed to have better relationship management, take twice as long overall from application receipt to decision and almost three times as long when you compare them to the $20 billion to $100 billion category (0.8 days) to the $500 million to $2 billion category (2.2 days).

As you can see - centralized loan underwriting processes work.  They are consistent, provide improved customer service, improve throughput, increase efficiency and improve credit quality when compared to the decentralized underwriting approach. 

In future blogs, I will address the credit quality component of loan underwriting processes.
 

The business risk of Troubled Asset Relief Program participation

Thursday, February 19, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 2

There is one rather interesting clause that appears to represent an open-ended business porfolio risk management decision for the future. It is one small paragraph, named Amendment, in the middle of Article V - Miscellaneous, just ahead of governing law (which is federal law, backed up by the laws of the State of New York).

Amendment begins normally enough, requiring the usual signed agreement of each party, but then states: “provided that the Investor may unilaterally amend any provision of this Agreement to the extent required to comply with any changes after the Signing Date in applicable federal statutes.” Wow. My understanding of this is that if Congress in the future, enacts anything that Treasury finds (or Congress requires Treasury to find) applicable to any aspect of the previously signed TARP Agreement, the bank is bound to adhere. Forget about the non-voting aspect of the preferred shares issued to the Treasury. Once the TARP Agreement is executed by the bank, management is not only bound by what’s in the document to begin with, it is in addition, subject to future federal law as long as the TARP shares are held by the government.

So, this new major owner does have a voice. The Purchase Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion, along with the various financial implications of the funding.
 

The business risk of Troubled Asset Relief Program participation

Thursday, February 19, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 1

Beyond the risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital position, which is directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk.  We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk.

Business risk includes:

  • A variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making;
  • Governance considerations; 
  • Executive behavior (for lack of better terminology);
  • Management succession events or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business.

Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a 20% infusion of added tier 1 capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department does not have voting rights like common shareholders, but the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form includes at least 35 pages of terms, plus the required Letter Agreement, Schedules attached to the Letter Agreement and at least five significant Annex’s to the Purchase Agreement. It’s NOT an easy, quick or fun read.

In the Recitals section, it states that the bank: “agrees to expand the flow of credit to U.S. consumers and businesses on competitive terms as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy” and, later, “agrees to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms of residential mortgages as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy.” Fortunately, if you’re a banker, these topics are not (currently) revisited elsewhere in the document, period. However, these are examples of the new shareholder effecting business decision making without the need to be on the Board of Directors, or voting common shares.

The Agreement covers a number of other requirements and limitations, such as executive compensation, dividend payments, other capital sourcing and retention of bank holding company status. None of these are particularly onerous, but they must be taken into account by management.

Visit my next post to read about the very interesting Amendment clause that may represent an open-ended business portfolio risk management decision for the future.
 

Identity Theft Red Flags Rule - frequently asked question

Friday, February 13, 2009 by Keir Breitenfeld

How do I know which Red Flags apply to me?

The Red Flag guidelines that will apply to you depend on a number of factors including:

  1. The types of covered accounts you offer and how those accounts may be opened and accessed
  2. Your previous experiences with identity theft

In order to determine the applicable Red Flags, you must consider these factors as well as various sources and categories of Red Flags identified in the Guidelines.

There are many resources available to help you gain the upper hand on Identity Theft Red Flags. I encourage you to visit this site for more information including a white paper, webinar, data sheet and more.
 

Market risk vs. credit risk

Wednesday, February 11, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing
Market risk is different than credit risk. The bank’s assets are mostly invested in loans and securities (about 90% of average assets). These loans and securities have differing interest rate structures – some are fixed and some are floating. They also have differing maturities. Meanwhile, the bank’s liabilities, deposits and borrowings also have differing maturities and interest rate characteristics. If the bank’s (asset-based) interest income structure is not properly aligned with the (liability-based) interest expense structure, the result is interest rate risk. As market rates change (up or down), the bank’s earning are impacted (positively or negatively) based on the mismatch in its balance sheet structure. 

The bank can offset market risk by purchasing interest rate swaps or other interest rate derivatives. The impact of insufficient attention to interest rate risk can damage earnings and may, again, negatively affect the bank’s capital position.

So, ultimately, the bank’s risk-based capital acts as the last line of defense against the negative impact from, you guessed it, unpredictable variability – or “risk.” That is why equity is considered risk-based capital. Good risk management, predicting and risk-based pricing leads to safer earnings performance and equity position.

Back to the basics ... what is risk?

Wednesday, February 11, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing
In my past postings, we’ve discussed financial risk management, the role of risk-based capital, measuring profitability based on risk characteristics and the need for risk-based loan pricing (credit risk modeling). I thought it might be worthwhile to take one step back and explain what we mean by the term “risk.”

“Risk” means unpredictable variability. Reliable predictions of an outcome tend to reduce the risk associated with that outcome. Similarly, low levels of variability also tend to reduce risk. People who are “set in their ways” tend to lead less risky lives than the more adventuresome types. Insurance companies love the former and charge additional premiums to the latter. This is a terrific example of risk-based pricing.

Financial services involve risk. Banks have many of the same operational risks as other non-financial businesses. They additionally have a lot of credit risk associated with lending money to individuals and businesses. Further, banks are highly leveraged, borrowing funds from depositors and other sources to support their lending activities. Because banks are both collecting interest income and incurring interest expense, they are subject to market, or interest rate, risk.

Banks create credit policies and processes to help them manage credit risk. They try to limit the level of risk and predict how much they are incurring so they can reserve some funds to offset losses. To the extent that banks don’t do this well, they are acting like insurance companies without good actuarial support. It results in a practice called “adverse selection” – incorrectly pricing risk and gathering many of the worst (riskiest) customers.

Sufficiently good credit risk management practices control and predict most of the bad outcomes most of the time, at least at portfolio levels. Bad outcomes (losses) that are not well-predicted, and therefore mitigated with sufficient loan-loss reserves, will negatively impact the bank’s earnings and capital position. If the losses are large enough, they can wipe out capital and result in the bank’s failure.

Risk adjusted loan pricing - the upside

Thursday, February 5, 2009 by Risk-based Pricing

Part 3

This post continues my discussion of the reasons for going through the time and trouble to analyze risk-based pricing for loans. I mentioned before that the second general major justification for going through the effort to risk-adjust loan pricing as a normal part of the lending function is financial.

I thought it might help put this into perspective by offering rough numbers that relate to risk-adjusted profit performance, bottom line earnings and expand on the premise that risk has a cost. Lending, in the leveraged/banking sense, involves credit risk, market (interest rate) risk and operational risk. The fourth area, the risk of unexpected loss, is covered by capital. Unmitigated risk will eventually impact earnings and common equity.  The question is when and by how much? It’s important to understand that the cost of risk mitigation efforts depend on the various risk characteristics of the bank’s loans and loan portfolio.

The differential cost of market risk
As an example, a floating rate loan that reprices every month involves little market risk, requiring little if any expense to offset. Compare it to a five-year fixed rate, interest-only loan that involves greater exposure to market risk. That risk costs something to offset. The difference in annualized marginal funding cost ranges widely depending on the steepness of the yield curve on the date the loan is closed. The difference between Federal Home Loan Banks 30-day rates and five-year bullet funding today, for instance, is close to 200 basis points. If risk-based loan pricing models don’t reflect this difference by using a matched marginal funding cost, the bank is voluntarily assuming some or all of the market (or interest rate) risk. Multiply an implied 200 bps risk-based funding cost difference by $100M in average loan balances and the implied annualized additional risk-free funding expense is $2,000,000. Multiply that by the average life of the portfolio to get the full risk-adjusted cost difference that the bank is assuming. And that’s just for the market risk.

The implied cost of credit risk
A loan with a pass risk rating of ‘2’ involves a lower likelihood of defaulting than a loan with a pass risk rating of ‘4.’ The lower risk (grade 2) loan, therefore, involves less of an Allowance for Loan Lease and Losses reserve requirement and an implied lower provisioning expense than the higher risk (grade 4) loan.

  • Depending on the credit regimen and net loss experience of a given bank, the difference in the implied annualized expected loss due to credit risk could be 40 bps or more.
  • Multiply the implied 40 bps credit risk cost difference by $100M in average loan balances and the implied annualized additional risk-adjusted credit expense is $400,000. 
  • Multiply that by the average tenor of the portfolio to get the full risk-adjusted cost difference to the bank.

The implied difference in administrative (or operations) expenses
These expenses include all mitigated (insured) operational risk. An owner occupied commercial mortgage is normally much less expensive to monitor than a line of credit backing a construction project. Those cost differences often range into several thousand dollars per annum.

  • If, in our example of the $100M portfolio, our average credit is $400K, then we have around 250 loans.
  • These loans multiplied by $3,000 in fully-absorbed annual non-interest expense differences would amount to $750K. A competent risk-adjusted loan pricing effort would take this cost difference into account. 
  • Again, multiply that yearly amount by the average life of the portfolio to get the full cost difference that the bank is incurring.

In reality, the three sample portfolios above would not overlap perfectly. The total actual assets from the above examples would lie between $100M and $300M. However, the total pretax cost difference of these three sample risk-based costs adds up to $3.15M per annum. The after-tax negative impact on risk-adjusted earnings is therefore about $2M yearly. So, the impact on ROA would be between 2.00% (if the three portfolios overlapped perfectly, for $100M in total assets) down to .67% (if there was no overlap, for $300M in total assets). This is a huge difference in earnings, on a risk-adjusted and fully cost-absorbed basis.

Finally, the amount of risk-based capital needed to back loans with differing risk characteristics, for purposes of unexpected loss, can be substantially different. This can be looked at as a difference in the implied cost of capital or in the performance ratio of ROE.

  • In a simple application, the implied required equity might range from say 6% on the lower-risk loans up to 8% for moderate risk (average pass grade risk rating).
  • If the portfolio in question is earning 1% ROA, the difference in risk-based equity would result in an ROE of either 12.5% for the higher risk loans versus 16.7% for the lower risk loans. 
  • The differences in fully risk-based ROE, or RAROC, could easily be more dramatic than this.

As stated before, if these differences are not “priced” into the loans somehow, the bank is not getting paid for the risk it is incurring or it is charging the lower risk borrowers a rate that pays for the added risk expenses of the higher risk borrowers. The business risk to the bank then becomes losing the better clients over time rather than attracting the riskier deals.

An economic look at performance
We are not talking in terms of “normal” accounting practices or “typical” quarterly reporting periods. We do use general ledger numbers to start the analysis process by relying on actual balances, rates and maturities. But, GAAP doesn’t address risk. So the risk adjustments are a more “economic” look at performance. Eventually, the risk reduction approach and the GL-based results will even out. The question is not “if” risk will eventually surface, but when and how it will manifest itself in GL results. We’ve seen a lot of this in the news the past eighteen months – and there’s likely more to come as the economy is in a downturn phase.

Going through the effort is worth it
Once risk is created by making a loan or placing a bet, someone owns it. The reason to go through the effort to price loans (and relationships) on a fully risk-adjusted basis is to understand the impact of risk at the only point in time when you can do something about getting paid for it – at the time the loan is agreed upon. After that, the bank is pretty much along for the ride. Risk-adjusted pricing is smart banking. It not only puts some teeth in the bank’s already existing risk management policies, it is justifiable to the client and it makes sense to most lending officers.