Credit Risk Modeling

Part 6

Peer Group 2 fee income
Non-interest income again, as a percent of average total assets, declined to .86 percent from .95 percent in 2007. For Peer Group 2 (PG2), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.04 percent of assets in 2005. A smaller, non-interest bearing deposit base with no other new and offsetting sources of fee income will lead to increased pressure on this metric.

Operating expenses
Operating expenses also put more pressure on earnings on these smaller banks. They increased from 2.79 percent to 2.83 percent of average assets. That’s four basis points on the negative. Historically, this metric has been flattering for this size bank and usually moves up or down from year-to-year. It was almost equal at 2.82 percent of assets in 2004.

As a result of the sizeable decline in margins, the continued decline in fee income and the slight increase in operating expenses PG2’s efficiency ratio lost ground from 59.52 percent in 2007 to only 64.72 percent in 2008. That means that every dollar in gross revenue cost them almost 65 cents in administrative expenses this year. This metric averaged 56 cents in 2005/2006. It’s amazing how close these numbers are for banks of very different size where you would expect clear economies of scale.

The total impact of margin performance, fee income and operating expenses, plus the huge increase in provision expense of 59 basis points leads us to a total decline in pre-tax operating income of .96 percent on total assets. That is a total decline from 1.58 percent pre-tax ROA in 2007 to .64 percent pre-tax ROA, a loss of 61 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007. My same conclusion as above would hold regarding the pricing of risk into bank lending (although the smaller banks didn’t perform a badly as the larger in this regard).

Although all 490 banks are declining in all profit metrics, the smaller banks seem to have an edge in pricing loans, but not deposits. Although up dramatically in 2007, and even more in 2008 for both groups, the PG2 banks seem to be suffering fewer credit losses relative to their asset size than their larger brethren. Both groups have resulting huge profit declines, but the largest banks are under the most pressure through this period.

An interesting point, with higher loan yields and fewer apparent losses, is whether PG2 banks are somewhat better at risk-based pricing (for whatever reason) than the largest bank group. Results are results. The 2009 numbers aren’t expected to show a lot of improvement as the general economy continues to slow and credit and financial risk management issues continue. We’ll probably comment on 2009 as the quarterlies become available this year.

Hello. My name is Prince Varma and I’ve spent the better part of the last 16 years helping financial institutions (FI) successfully improve their in business development, portfolio growth and client relationship management practices.

So, since the focus of this blog is to speak to readers about risk management, many of you are probably wondering what a “sales and business development” guy is doing writing a piece related to mitigating and managing risk?

Great question!

The simple fact is that the traditional or prevailing sentiment or definition related to risk management – mitigating credit risk -- is incomplete. A more accurate and comprehensive approach would be to recognize, acknowledge and address that “risk” cuts across the entire client relationship spectrum of:

• client penetration/growth;
• client retention; and
• client credit risk mitigation.

How do penetration and retention count as “risk factors”?
(this is where the sales guy stuff comes in)

From a penetration perspective, the failure to recognize potential opportunities either within the existing client base or in the operating market, introduces revenue growth risk (meaning we aren’t keeping our eye on the top line). Ultimately it impacts the FI’s ability to add assets (either deposits or loans) and also has a direct affect on efficiency and deposit to loan ratios.

From a retention perspective, the risk is even more obvious. Our most valued clients are the ones that we must continuously engage in a proactive manner. Let’s face it. In even the smallest markets, there are no less than four to six other institutions waiting to jump on your client in the event that you grow complacent. There is a huge difference between selection and satisfaction. And, if we aren’t focused on keeping a client after securing them, our net portfolio growth targets will be impossible to achieve. 

Considering the current market environment, now more than ever, effectively managing these three elements of “risk/exposure to the FI” is crucial to an institutions success both practically and pragmatically. Everyone internally at the bank is focused on the “credit risk mitigation” piece. The conversations that are occurring outside of the bank’s walls however are focused on the “L” word or liquidity and getting credit flowing again.

How many times have we read or more frankly been beaten with this comment from business owners “…there’s no one making loans anymore…” or “…its impossible to get credit…?”

That should be read as … penetration and retention

Striking a balance between effective and appropriate credit risk exposure and deepening or growing the portfolio has been a challenge facing those of us in the front office for as long as I can remember. The “sales revolution” is effectively over. We’ve learned the critical lesson that we need to evolve beyond being strictly a credit officer (you did learn that right??!!). And, you didn’t/shouldn’t become a “banking products generalist” with no analytical depth. Knowing all this, it is important that we return to the guiding principles of effective lending which include:
- evaluating the scope of the opportunity;
- isolating the risk and identifying a reasonable and realistic recovery/mitigation remedy;
- determining what other alternatives the borrower might be considering; and
- being willing to let the “bad deals” walk.

In subsequent blogs, I’ll provide you with specific tactics aimed at optimizing penetration and retention efforts and implementing effective and practical client management strategies.

After all what would you expect from a business development guy…
 

Part 5

This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are some findings for the two largest groups, covering 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk.

Peer Group 2 (PG2) consists of 305 reporting banks between $1 billion and $3 billion in assets. PG2’s Net Interest Income was 5.75 percent of average total assets for the year. This is also down, as expected, from 6.73 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense also decreased from 3.07 percent in 2007 to 2.31 percent for 2008.  Net Interest Margin, also declined from 3.66 percent in 2007 to 3.42 percent in 2008, or a loss of 24 basis points. These margins are 31 bps or 10 percent higher than found in Peer Group 1 (PG1), but the drop of .24 percent was much larger than the .05 percent decline in PG1.

As with all banks, Net Interest Margins have shown a steady chronic decline, but the drops for PG2 have been coming in larger chunks the last two years -- -24 basis points last year after dropping 16 points from 2006 to 2007.

Behind the drop in margins, we find loans yields of 6.53 percent for 2008, which is down from 7.82 percent in 2007. This is a decline of 129 basis points or 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.70 percent in 2007 to 2.75 percent in 2008. This 95 basis point decline represents a 26 percent lower cost of interest-bearing deposits. Again, with a steeper decline in interest costs, you would think that margins should have improved somewhat. It wasn’t meant to be. 

We see the same two culprits as we did in PG1. Total deposit balances declined from 78 percent of average assets to 77 percent which means again, that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits continued an already steady decline from 5.58 percent of average assets in 2007 to 5.03 percent. This, of course, resulted in fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size and a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits.

Check my next blog for more on an analysis of Peer Group 2’s fee income, operating expenses and their use of risk-based pricing.

 

Part 4

Let’s dig a bit deeper into why Peer Group 1’s margins didn’t improve. We see two possible reasons: Total deposit balances declined from 72 percent of average assets to 70 percent. This means that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund their assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits declined from 4.85 percent of average assets to 4.24 percent. So, fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size, along with a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits, appear to have made the difference.

Fee income
Non-interest income, again as a percent of average total assets, was down to 1.12 percent from 1.23 percent in 2007. This was a decline of 9 percent. For Peer Group 1 (PG1), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.49 percent of assets in 2005. A lot of fee income is deposit based and largely based on non-interest bearing deposits. So, the declining interest-free balances, as a percent of total assets, are a source of pressure on fee income and have a negative impact on net interest margins.

Operating expenses
Operating expenses constituted more bad news as they increased from 2.63 percent to 2.77 percent of average assets. Most of the large scale cost-cutting didn’t get started early enough to favorably impact this number for last year. Historically, this metric has moved down, irregularly, as the size of the largest banks has grown. This number stood at 2.54 percent in 2006, for instance. We saw increase in both 2007 and again in 2008.

As a result of the decline in margins and the larger percentage decline in fee income, while operating costs increased, the Peer Group 1 efficiency ratio lost ground from 57.71 percent in 2007 up to 63.70 percent in 2008. This 10 percent increase is a move to the bad. It means every dollar in gross revenue [net interest income + fee income] cost them almost 64 cents in administrative expenses in 2008. This metric averaged 55 cents in 2005/2006.

The total impact of changes in margin performance, fee income, operating expenses and the 2008 increase in provision expense of 87 basis points, we arrive at a total decline in pre-tax operating income of 1.23 percent on total assets. That is a total decline of 80 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007 of 1.53 percent pre-tax ROA to the 2008 result for the group of only .30 percent pre-tax ROA.

It would appear that banks have not been utilizing pricing enough credit risk into their loan rates.  This would be further confirmed if you compared bank loan rates to the historic risk spreads and absolute rates that the market currently has priced into both investment grade and below-investment-grade corporate bonds. These spreads have decreased some very recently, but it is predicted that more credit risk is present than bank lending rates would indicate.
 

Part 3

I believe it is quite important to compare your bank or your investment plans in a financial institution to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same, believe it or not. In this column, we use the averages. Again, look for the differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers, while the other half are naturally worse. It can tell a useful story.

This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are the findings for the two largest groups that cover 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk.

Peer Group 1 (PG1) is made up of the largest 189 reporting banks or those with over $3 billion in average total assets for 2008. Interest income was 5.25 percent of average total assets for the period. This is down, as we might expect, based on last year’s decline in the general level of interest rates from 6.16 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense was also down from 2.98 percent in 2007 to 2.06 percent average for the year. Net Interest Margin, the difference between the two metrics, was down from 3.16 percent in 2007 to 3.11 percent as a percentage of total assets.

It should be noted that Net Interest Margins have been in a steady, chronic decline for at least 10 years, with a torturous regular drop of 2 to 5 basis points per annum in recent years. Last year’s drop of five basis points is in line with that progression and it does add to continuing difficulty in generating bottom-line profits.

To find out a bit more about why margins dropped, especially in light of the steady increase in lending over the same past decade, we looked first at loan pricing yields. For PG1 these averaged 6.12 percent for 2008, down (again, expectedly) from 7.32 percent in 2007. This is a drop of 120 basis points or a decline of 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.41 percent in 2007 to 2.39 percent in 2008. This 102 basis point decline represents a 30 percent lower interest expense on interest-bearing deposits. Based only on these two metrics, it seems like margins should have improved and not declined for these banks.

Check my next blog for more on the reasons for Peer Group 1’s drop in margins and an analysis of the fee income and operating expenses for these institutions.
 

What is porfolio risk management? It is the active and effective oversight of the current client base with the intent of:

• Maximizing client retention –LOVE
  • Everyone wants to retain clients and deepen relationships!
• Maximize cross-sell opportunities –LOVE
  • Again, everyone wants to retain clients and deepen relationships!
• Minimize loss potential due to credit risk issues –HATE
  • No one wants credit issues to develop!
• Minimize loss potential due to operational risks –HATE
• Maximize profitability through timely identification of risk and appropriate allocation of capital –LOVE / HATE

• Which clients are likely to need additional products and services?
• Which clients have a high potential of leaving your financial institution?
• When do you shift from client retention to credit risk management?
  
   

Part 2

In my last post, I started my review of the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest financial institution peer groups through the end of 2008.

Now, lets look at the resutls relating to credit cost, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings. Again, as you look at these results, I encourage you to consider the processes that your bank currently utilizes for credit risk modeling and financial risk management.

Credit costs
More loans, especially in an economic downturn, mean more credit risk. Credit costs were up tremendously. The Peer group 1 banks reported net loan losses of .89% of total loans. This is an increase from .28% in 2007, which was up from an average of 18 basis points on the portfolio in 2006/2005.  The Peer group 2 banks reported net loan losses of .74%. This is also up substantially from 24 basis points in 2007 and an average of 15 basis points in 2006/2005. The net loan losses reported in the fourth quarter significantly boosted both groups’ year-end loss percentages above where they stood through the first three quarters last year.

Loss allowance accounts
Both groups also ramped up their reserve for future expected losses substantially. The year-end loss allowance account (ALLL) as a percent of total loans stood at 1.81% for the largest banks. This is an increase of almost 50% from an average of 1.21% in the years 2007/2004. Peer group 2 banks saw their reserve for losses go up to 1.57% from an average of 1.24% in the years 2007/2004.

The combination of covering the increased net loan losses and also increasing the loss reserve balance required a huge provision expenses. So, loan balances were up even in the face of increased write-offs and expected forward losses.

Impacts on earnings
Obviously, we would expect this provisioning burden to negatively impact earnings. It did, greatly. Peer group 1 banks saw a decline in return on assets to a negative .07%. This is just below break-even as a group. The average net income percentage stood at .42% of average assets at the end of the third quarter. So, the washout in the fourth quarter reports took the group average to a net loss position for the year. The ROA was at .96% in 2007 and an average of 1.26% in 2006/2005. That is a 111% decline in ROA from 2007. Return on equity also went into the red, down from 11.97% in 2007. ROE stood at 14.36% in 2005.

For the $1B to $3B banks, ROA stood at .35%. This is still a positive number, however, it is way down from 1.08% in 2007, 1.30% in 2006 and 1.33% in 2005. The decline in 2008 was 67% from 2007. ROE for the group was also down, at 4.11% from 12.37% in 2007. The drops in profitability were not entirely the result of credit losses, but this was by far the largest impact from 2007.

The seriously beefed-up ALLL accounts would seem to indicate that, as a group, the banks expect further loan losses, at least through 2009.  These numbers largely pre-dated the launch of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the tier one funding it provided in 2008. But, it is clear that banks had not contracted lending for all of 2008, even in the face of mounting credit issues and a declining economic picture. It will be interesting to see how things unfold in the next several quarters.
 

Part 1

It may be quite useful to compare your financial institution's portfolio risk management process or your investment plans , to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same -- believe it or not. Here are the averages. You should look for differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers and the other half may be naturally worse.

As promised, I have again reviewed the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest peer groups through the end 2008. The Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) is a compilation of the FDIC, based on the call reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC reports peer averages for various bank size groupings and here are a few notable findings for the two largest groups that covers 494 reporting banks.

Peer group 1

• Peer group 1 consisted of 189 institutions over $3 billion in average total assets for the year.
• Net loans accounted for 67.31% of average total assets, which is up from 65.79 % in 2007. 
• Loans, as a percent of assets, have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for the largest banks was also up to 96% from 91% in 2007 and 88% in both 2006 and 2005.

So, it appears these banks were lending more in 2008 as an allocation of their total asset base and relative to their deposit sources of funding.

In fact, net loans grew at a rate of 9.34% for this group, which is down from the average growth rate of 15.07% for the years 2005 through 2007.  The growth rate in loans is down, which is probably due to tightened credit standards. However, it is still growth. And, since total average assets also had growth of 11.58% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances increased at the largest banks.

• Peer group 2 consisted of 305 reporting financial institutions between $1B and $3B in total assets.
• The net loans accounted for 72.96% of average total assets, up from 71.75% in 2007. 
• Again, the loans as a percent of total assets have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for these banks was up to 95% from 92% in 2007 and an average of 90% for 2006 and 2005.

So, these banks are also lending more in 2008 as a portion of their asset base and relative to their deposit source of funding.

Net loans grew at a rate of 10.48% for this group in 2008 which is down from 11.94% growth in 2007 and down from an average growth of 15.04% for 2006 and 2005. And, since total average assets also had growth of 10.02% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances also increased at the intermediate size banks. Again here, the growth rate in loans is down, probably due to tightened credit standards, but it is still growth and it is at a slightly more aggressive rate than the largest bank group.

Combined, for these 494 largest financial institutions, loans were still growing through 2008 both as a percentage of asset allocation and in absolute dollars.

Tune in to my next blog to read more about the results shown relating to credit costs, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings.
 

Part 1

Beyond the risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital position, which is directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk.  We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk.

Business risk includes:

• A variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making;
• Governance considerations; 
• Executive behavior (for lack of better terminology);
• Management succession events or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business.

Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a 20% infusion of added tier 1 capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department does not have voting rights like common shareholders, but the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form includes at least 35 pages of terms, plus the required Letter Agreement, Schedules attached to the Letter Agreement and at least five significant Annex’s to the Purchase Agreement. It’s NOT an easy, quick or fun read.

In the Recitals section, it states that the bank: “agrees to expand the flow of credit to U.S. consumers and businesses on competitive terms as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy” and, later, “agrees to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms of residential mortgages as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy.” Fortunately, if you’re a banker, these topics are not (currently) revisited elsewhere in the document, period. However, these are examples of the new shareholder effecting business decision making without the need to be on the Board of Directors, or voting common shares.

The Agreement covers a number of other requirements and limitations, such as executive compensation, dividend payments, other capital sourcing and retention of bank holding company status. None of these are particularly onerous, but they must be taken into account by management.

Visit my next post to read about the very interesting Amendment clause that may represent an open-ended business portfolio risk management decision for the future.
 

Part 3

This post continues my discussion of the reasons for going through the time and trouble to analyze risk-based pricing for loans. I mentioned before that the second general major justification for going through the effort to risk-adjust loan pricing as a normal part of the lending function is financial.

I thought it might help put this into perspective by offering rough numbers that relate to risk-adjusted profit performance, bottom line earnings and expand on the premise that risk has a cost. Lending, in the leveraged/banking sense, involves credit risk, market (interest rate) risk and operational risk. The fourth area, the risk of unexpected loss, is covered by capital. Unmitigated risk will eventually impact earnings and common equity.  The question is when and by how much? It’s important to understand that the cost of risk mitigation efforts depend on the various risk characteristics of the bank’s loans and loan portfolio.

The differential cost of market risk
As an example, a floating rate loan that reprices every month involves little market risk, requiring little if any expense to offset. Compare it to a five-year fixed rate, interest-only loan that involves greater exposure to market risk. That risk costs something to offset. The difference in annualized marginal funding cost ranges widely depending on the steepness of the yield curve on the date the loan is closed. The difference between Federal Home Loan Banks 30-day rates and five-year bullet funding today, for instance, is close to 200 basis points. If risk-based loan pricing models don’t reflect this difference by using a matched marginal funding cost, the bank is voluntarily assuming some or all of the market (or interest rate) risk. Multiply an implied 200 bps risk-based funding cost difference by $100M in average loan balances and the implied annualized additional risk-free funding expense is $2,000,000. Multiply that by the average life of the portfolio to get the full risk-adjusted cost difference that the bank is assuming. And that’s just for the market risk.

The implied cost of credit risk
A loan with a pass risk rating of ‘2’ involves a lower likelihood of defaulting than a loan with a pass risk rating of ‘4.’ The lower risk (grade 2) loan, therefore, involves less of an Allowance for Loan Lease and Losses reserve requirement and an implied lower provisioning expense than the higher risk (grade 4) loan.

• Depending on the credit regimen and net loss experience of a given bank, the difference in the implied annualized expected loss due to credit risk could be 40 bps or more.
• Multiply the implied 40 bps credit risk cost difference by $100M in average loan balances and the implied annualized additional risk-adjusted credit expense is $400,000. 
• Multiply that by the average tenor of the portfolio to get the full risk-adjusted cost difference to the bank.

The implied difference in administrative (or operations) expenses
These expenses include all mitigated (insured) operational risk. An owner occupied commercial mortgage is normally much less expensive to monitor than a line of credit backing a construction project. Those cost differences often range into several thousand dollars per annum.

• If, in our example of the $100M portfolio, our average credit is $400K, then we have around 250 loans.
• These loans multiplied by $3,000 in fully-absorbed annual non-interest expense differences would amount to $750K. A competent risk-adjusted loan pricing effort would take this cost difference into account. 
• Again, multiply that yearly amount by the average life of the portfolio to get the full cost difference that the bank is incurring.

In reality, the three sample portfolios above would not overlap perfectly. The total actual assets from the above examples would lie between $100M and $300M. However, the total pretax cost difference of these three sample risk-based costs adds up to $3.15M per annum. The after-tax negative impact on risk-adjusted earnings is therefore about $2M yearly. So, the impact on ROA would be between 2.00% (if the three portfolios overlapped perfectly, for $100M in total assets) down to .67% (if there was no overlap, for $300M in total assets). This is a huge difference in earnings, on a risk-adjusted and fully cost-absorbed basis.

Finally, the amount of risk-based capital needed to back loans with differing risk characteristics, for purposes of unexpected loss, can be substantially different. This can be looked at as a difference in the implied cost of capital or in the performance ratio of ROE.

• In a simple application, the implied required equity might range from say 6% on the lower-risk loans up to 8% for moderate risk (average pass grade risk rating).
• If the portfolio in question is earning 1% ROA, the difference in risk-based equity would result in an ROE of either 12.5% for the higher risk loans versus 16.7% for the lower risk loans. 
• The differences in fully risk-based ROE, or RAROC, could easily be more dramatic than this.

As stated before, if these differences are not “priced” into the loans somehow, the bank is not getting paid for the risk it is incurring or it is charging the lower risk borrowers a rate that pays for the added risk expenses of the higher risk borrowers. The business risk to the bank then becomes losing the better clients over time rather than attracting the riskier deals.

An economic look at performance
We are not talking in terms of “normal” accounting practices or “typical” quarterly reporting periods. We do use general ledger numbers to start the analysis process by relying on actual balances, rates and maturities. But, GAAP doesn’t address risk. So the risk adjustments are a more “economic” look at performance. Eventually, the risk reduction approach and the GL-based results will even out. The question is not “if” risk will eventually surface, but when and how it will manifest itself in GL results. We’ve seen a lot of this in the news the past eighteen months – and there’s likely more to come as the economy is in a downturn phase.

Going through the effort is worth it
Once risk is created by making a loan or placing a bet, someone owns it. The reason to go through the effort to price loans (and relationships) on a fully risk-adjusted basis is to understand the impact of risk at the only point in time when you can do something about getting paid for it – at the time the loan is agreed upon. After that, the bank is pretty much along for the ride. Risk-adjusted pricing is smart banking. It not only puts some teeth in the bank’s already existing risk management policies, it is justifiable to the client and it makes sense to most lending officers. 
 

Part 2

This post continues my discussion of the reasons for going through the time and trouble to analyze risk-based pricing for loans. For the discussion of the key elements involved in risk-adjusted loan pricing, please visit my earlier posts. In my last blog we discussed reason number one: good corporate governance. Governance, or responsible and disciplined leadership, makes a lot of sense and promotes trust and confidence which has been missing lately in many large financial institutions. The results can be seen in the market in multiples now and are associated with both the struggling companies and, through guilt by association, the rest of the industry.  But, let’s move beyond the “soft” reason. The second major justification for going through the effort to risk-adjust loan pricing as a normal part of the lending function is financial.

Profit performance
By financial, we mean profit performance or bottom line earnings. This reason relies on the key belief that risk has a cost. Just because risk can be difficult to measure and/or is not addressed within GAAP, doesn’t mean it can’t ultimately cost you something. If, for any reason, you believe you can get away with taking on any unmitigated risk without it ever costing anything, do not continue reading this or any of my other posts. You are wasting your valuable time.

Risk will surface
The saying that “risk will out,” I believe, is true. The question is not if risk will eventually surface, but when, how and how hard it will bite.  Risk can be transferred (hedges, swaps and so on), but it doesn’t disappear from the universe. Once risk is created, someone owns it. The news headlines of the past 18 months are replete with stories of huge writedowns of toxic assets. The securitized assets and/or their collateral loans always contained risk – from the moment the underlying loan was closed. The loans and their payment streams were sliced a dozen ways, repackaged and resold. The risk was also sliced up, but like mercury, it all remained in the system.  Another familiar casino saying that brings this to mind is: “If you don’t know who the ‘mark’ at the table is, it’s you.” There are now several world class examples of such marks. Some have now failed completely and many more would have without federal intervention.

Lending, in the leveraged/banking sense, involves all major types of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk. And, beyond the identifiable and potentially insurable portions of these risks, like any business, it includes the risk of unexpected loss, which needs to be covered by capital. Banks have developed policies and guidelines to mitigate, identify and measure many of their risks. These all fall under the world of risk management and these efforts all cost something. There is no free way to offset risk – other than not doing the loan at all. But lending is the business of banking, isn’t it?

Further, the risk mitigation efforts cost more or less depending on the various risk characteristics of the bank’s loan portfolio each loan. For instance, a floating rate loan involves little market risk and requires little if any expense to offset. A five-year fixed rate, interest-only loan involves a lot of market risk and that costs something to offset. Alternatively, a loan with a pass risk rating of ‘2’ involves a much lower likelihood of defaulting than a loan with a pass risk rating of ‘4’. The lower risk loan; therefore, involves less of an ALLL (Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses) reserve and provisioning expense.  Also, an owner occupied commercial mortgage is normally much less expensive to monitor than a credit backing a floor plan or construction project. Those cost differences could be reflected in the pricing.

Finally, for today, the amount of risk capital needed to back these kinds of differing loan characteristics, for purposes of unexpected loss, is substantially different. If these kinds of differences are not priced into the loans somehow, one of two situations exists:
 

1. Either the bank is not getting paid for the risk it is incurring; or,
2. If it is, it is charging the lower risk borrowers a rate that pays for added risk-adjusted expenses of the higher risk borrowers.

The business risk to the bank then becomes losing the better clients over time in lieu of attracting the riskier deals. This process has a name: adverse selection.

The ongoing expenses of risk mitigation and the negative impact of unexpected losses on retained earnings, over time, materially hurt the bank’s earnings. Someone is paying for all of the risks of being in the business of lending and it’s usually one of two groups: the customers or the shareholders. In the worst of cases, it’s also the taxpayers. The idea of risk-based pricing, at the loan level, is to have the clients pay for the risks the bank is incurring on their behalf by pricing the loan appropriately from the beginning. As a result:

• This tends to protect, and often enhance, the bank’s financial performance;
• It is clever;
• It puts some teeth in the bank’s already existing risk management policies;
• It is justifiable to the client; and
• It even makes sense to most lending officers. 

Part 1

In my last three posts, we have covered the key parts of how risk-based loan pricing works. We have discussed how the key foundational elements involved in risk-adjusted loan pricing can and should relate to the bank’s accounting results and strategic policies. We went from the pricing analysis of an individual loan on a risk-adjusted basis to solving for a bank-wide target or guideline return. We also mentioned how this analysis can be expanded to the client relationship level, both producing a relationship management view of any existing loans and the impact of pricing a renewal or new credit to impact the client-level return. Finally, I mentioned that although this capability can exist (and does in more banks than ever before), it isn’t an easy undertaking in an industry that is historically keyed to volume goals rather than transaction profit (let alone risk-adjusted profit).

So, why go through the effort? Moving to a risk-adjusted view of lending and relationship management requires serious thought, effort and resolve. It involves change and teaching lenders a new trick. It even suggests that the lending executive (perhaps the next president of the bank) hasn’t been doing the best job possible to protect and advance the bank’s margins. Any new undertaking involves management risk. And, accurate or not, bank executives are not generally viewed as terrific change agents. Is this concept of risk-based pricing worth all the time and trouble? We think so – for two general reasons.

Corporate governance
Almost any business, if not any undertaking of any kind, involves risk to some degree. Finance in general, and commercial banking, specifically, involves several kinds of risk. The most obvious risk is repayment or credit risk. Banks have been lending money successfully for a long time. The funny thing is that often, when we’ve studied the actual loan rates of a bank’s portfolio versus the bank’s own risk ratings (or risk grades), we see almost no difference in loan pricing. The banks have credit policies that discuss the different ratings in some detail. And, the banks usually have some sort of provisioning process or ALLL (Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses) logic that uses these differences in risk rating. Loan review guidelines often use the differences in risk rating to gauge the review frequency and depth.

So, the banks know what’s going on. They know that a higher risk borrower/loan is less likely to be repaid in full than a lower credit risk borrower/loan. But, the lending operation goes on as if they were all about the same. There seems to be a disconnect (kind of like when my arms and brain disconnect when I swing a golf club). I know if I slow down I’ll hit a better shot, but I still swing way too fast. It seems to me that since the bank has all of these terrific policies in place dealing with credit risk, that good governance would require that credit risk be reflected more fully when loans are marketed, negotiated and agreed to – rather than just when they go awry.

I would make the same general argument for management consistency associated with other risk types. If the loan duration is longer, good governance would reflect (pay for) a realistic marginal funding cost of the same duration. This would help to align the loan pricing effort with the guidelines or policies associated with ALCO or Asset and Liability Policy Committee and Interest Rate Risk (IRR) management. If a loan involves higher or lower risk of unexpected loss based on loan/collateral type and risk rating, then the risk capital associated with the loan should vary accordingly. The risk-based allocation of capital will then require different pricing in order for the loan to hit a targeted return. This protection of return, on a risk-adjusted basis, is the final step in good governance – in this case, to protect the shareholders specific contribution (of their equity) to funding the loan in question.

Finally, if I were a director, regulator or an auditor (again), and I reviewed all of these fine policies related to risk management, and did not see them reflected in deal pricing, I would have to ask “why?”.  It would seem that either executive management doesn’t really believe in their own policies, or they are willing to set them aside when negotiating deals for the added business. Maybe loan management doesn’t want to be bothered by the policies while they’re out there in the “real world” fighting for added loan volume. Either way, there seems to be a governance disconnect. Which I know on the golf course, leads to lost balls and unnecessary poor scores.

My second major reason will follow in my next blog.

Part 1

Risk-based pricing starts as a product-level reflection of a bank’s financial and risk characteristics. In my last few posts we have covered the key parts of how risk-based loan pricing works. In doing so, we have discussed how the key foundation elements involved in risk-adjusted loan pricing can (and should) relate to the bank’s accounting results and strategic policies:

• Loan balance, rate and fee data relates to the bank’s actual general ledger amounts;
• The administrative costs are also derived from actual non-interest expenses; 
• The cost of funds is aligned with the policies used in the ALCO operation and in the IRR management processes; 
• The statistical cost of credit risk used in pricing (providing sensitivity to the loan’s risk rating) is derived partially from the bank’s credit and provisioning policies;
• The taxes are the bank’s actual average experience; and 
• For banks using ROE/RAROC, the equity allocation is related to the bank’s overall (unexpected) risk posture and its capital sufficiency policies.

Once a bank understands risk-adjusted pricing and can calculate the risk-adjusted return (ROA or ROE/RAROC) for a given loan, what more can we do to help the lender close the deal? And, what can we do to help lenders assist the bank with meeting profit goals? The answer to both questions is: “quite a lot”. First, bank management and lending executives can set various risk-based goals or guidelines that are based on the same data and foundation logic that was used to create the risk-based profit calculations. This analytical form of targeting helps take the profit (and therefore pricing) process out of the realm of “blue sky” numbers or simply wishful thinking on the part of management. The risk-based targeting guidelines benefit from the same analytical processes that went into the logic behind creating the profit calculations. The targets should be as well-founded as the analysis that went into the profit calculations.

Then the fun begins.
First at the loan level: Once we have the ability to calculate risk-adjusted loan profit and we have similarly founded targets or guidelines, we can easily use the profit calculations in reverse to solve for a required loan rate and/or origination fee that will meet the target profit. The lender can change a structural aspect of the loan under consideration and quickly see the impact on risk-adjusted profit. More importantly, they can see how these changes relate to the guidelines or target.

In fact, the lender could look at any number of changes to the loan amount, tenor, amortization rate, moving the risk rating up or down, and changing the rate from fixed to floating impact to see what relative impact the change has on risk-adjusted profit. Because knowledge is one key to successful negotiation, the lender is in a substantially stronger position to conduct the sales and negotiation phases of landing the deal. There is a substantially higher likelihood the resulting loan will be a better risk-adjusted return for the bank than would take place by ignoring such pricing practices. Add up all of the loan and lines done in the course of a year and you see a significant impact on the bank’s overall performance.

In my next post, I’ll expand this concept to the relationship management level.

So here it is!  The moment you all have been waiting for--the top ten hot topics of 2009 (in no particular order of importance).

1. Portfolio Risk Management – You should really focus on this topic in 2009.  With many institutions already streamlining the origination process, portfolio management is the logical next step.  While the foundation is based in credit quality, portfolio management is not just for the credit side. 
2. Review of Data (aka “Getting Behind the Numbers”) – We are not talking about scorecard validation; that’s another subject.  This is more general.  Traditional commercial lending rarely maintains a sophisticated database on its clients.  Even when it does, traditional commercial lending rarely analyzes the data. 

3. Lowering Costs of Origination – Always a shoe-in for a goal in any year!  But how does an institution make meaningful and marked improvements in reducing its costs of origination? 

4. Scorecard Validation – Getting more specific with the review of data.  Discuss the basic components of the validation process and what your institution can do to best prepare itself for analyzing the results of a validation.  Whether it be an interim validation or a full-sized one, put together the right steps to ensure your institution derives the maximum benefit from its scorecard.

5. Turnaround Times (Response to Client) –Rebuild it.  Make the origination process better, stronger and faster.  No; we aren’t talking about bionics here -- nor how you can manipulate the metrics to report a faster turnaround time.  We are talking about what you can do from a loan applicant perspective to improve turnaround time.

6. Training – Where are all the training programs?  Send in all the training programs!  Worry, because they are not here.  (Replace training programs with clowns and we might have an oldies song.)  Can’t find the right people with the right talent in the marketplace? 

7. Application Volume/Marketing/Relationship Management – You can design and execute the most efficient origination and portfolio management processes.   But, without addressing client and application volume, what good are they?

8. Pricing/Yield on Portfolio – “We compete on service, not price.” We’ve heard this over and over again.  In reality, the sales side always resorts to price as the final differentiator.  Utilizing standardization and consistency can streamline your process and drive improved yields on your portfolio.

9. Management Metrics – How do I know that I am going in the right direction?  Strategize, implement, execute, measure and repeat.  Learn how to set your targets to provide meaningful bottom line results.

10. Operational Risk Management – Different from credit risk, operational risk and its management, operational risk management deals with what an institution should do to make sure it is not open to operational risk in the portfolio. Items totally in the control of the institution, if not executed properly, can cause significant loss.

Well, that’s it.  We encourage your feedback on this list.  Let us know which of these ten topics is a priority for your institution and what specific areas in each topic you would like to see addressed.

Part 2

Return on Equity (ROE)
ROE is the risk-adjusted profit divided by the equity amount associated with the loan in question.

ROE =      Risk-adjusted profit
                Equity amount of the loan

There are two large advantages to using ROE. One, you can use it to compare profit performance across asset-based and non-asset-based products. This can’t be done with ROA – if there’s no “A”, you can’t create the ratio. This seems to be a crucial consideration if you are serious about cross-selling non-asset-based products (such as deposits and a long list of non-credit financial services) and if you are serious about being a truly client relationship oriented organization.

Second, by using ROE you have the possibility of risk-adjusting the amount of equity used in the denominator of the calculation.  Adjusting the equity amount based on risk, in a credible manner, creates risk-adjusted ROE, or what is referred to as risk adjusted return on capital (RAROC). The equity amount applied to the loan represents all of the remaining risk or unexpected loss (UL).instance that we did not account for in the steps that got us to the risk-adjusted profit result. RAROC, or risk-adjusted ROE, is a fully risk-adjusted representation of relative value. This level of risk-based performance measurement also has the advantage of relating pricing and relationship management activities to the bank’scapital management process.

So far, we have covered several of the key parts of how risk-based pricing can work. In doing so, we have discussed how the various elements involved in pricing relate to the bank’s books and policies. The loan balance, rate and fee data relates to the banks actual general ledger amounts. The administrative costs are also derived from actual non-interest expenses. The cost of funds is aligned with the policies used in ALSO and in IRR management processes. The cost of credit risk is related to the bank’s credit and provisioning policies. The taxes are the bank’s actual average experience. And, for banks using ROE/RAROC, the equity allocation is related to the bank’s overall risk posture and its capital sufficiency policies.

I stated earlier that “Risk-based pricing analysis is a product-level microcosm of risk-based bank performance”. It is that and more. In addition to pricing’s linkage to financial figures and results, risk-based pricing should also be a reflection of the bank’s most critical risk management policies and governance processes.