Financial Risk Management

--by Roger Ahern

The value of a good decision can generate $150 or more in customer net present value, while the cost of a bad decision can cost you $1,000 or more.  For example, acquiring a new and profitable customer by making good prospecting and approval and pricing decisions and decisioning strategies may generate $150 or much more in customer net present value and help you increase net interest margin and other key metrics.  While the cost of a bad decision (such as approving a fraudulent applicant or inappropriately extending credit that ultimately results in a charge-off) can cost you $1,000 or more.

Why is risk management decisioning important?

This issue is critical because average-sized financial institutions or telecom carriers make as many as eight million customer decisions each year (more than 20,000 per day!).  To add to that, very large financial institutions make as many as 50 billion customer decisions annually.  By optimizing decisions, even a small 10-to-15 percent improvement in the quality of these customer life cycle decisions can generate substantial business benefit. 

Experian recommends that clients examine the types of decisioning strategies they leverage across the customer life cycle, from prospecting and acquisition, to customer management and collections.  By examining each type of decision, you can identify those opportunities for improvement that will deliver the greatest return on investment by leveraging credit risk attributes, credit risk modeling, predictive analytics and decision-management software.

--by Kennis Wong

It's true that intent is difficult to prove. It's also true that financial situations change. That's why financial institutions have not, yet, successfully fought off first-party fraud. However, there are some tell-tale signs of intent when you look at the consumer's behavior as a whole, particularly across all his/her financial relationships.

For example, in a classic bust out case, you would see that the consumer, with pristine credit history, applies for more and more credit cards while maintaining a relatively low balance and utilization across all issuers. If you graph the number of credit cards and number of credit applications over time, you would see two hockey-stick lines. When the accounts go bad, they do so at almost the same time. This pattern is not always apparent at the time of origination, that's why it's important to monitor frequently for account review and fraud database alerts.

On the other hand, consumers with financial difficulties have different patterns. They might have more credit lines over time, but you would see that some credit lines may go delinquent while others don't. You might also see that consumers cure some lines after delinquencies…you can see their struggle of trying to pay.

Of course the intent "pattern" is not always clear. When dealing with fraudsters in fraud account management, even with the help of the fraud database, fraud trends and fraud alert, change their behaviors and use new techniques.

--by Matt Ehrlich

On Friday, October 30th, the FTC again delayed enforcement of the “Red Flags” Rule – this time until June 1, 2010 – for financial institutions and creditors subject to the FTC’s enforcement.   Here’s the official release: http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/redflags.shtm. 

But this doesn’t mean, until then, businesses get a free pass.  The extension doesn’t apply to other federal agencies that have enforcement responsibilities for institutions under their jurisdiction.  And the extension also doesn’t alleviate an institution’s need to detect and respond to address discrepancies on credit reports.

Red Flag compliance

Implementing best practices to address the identity theft under the Red Flags Rule is not just the law, it’s good business.  The damage to reputations and consumer confidence from a problem gone unchecked or worse yet – unidentified – can be catastrophic.  I encourage all businesses – if they haven’t already done so – to use this extension as an opportunity to proactively secure a Red Flags Rule to ensure Red Flag compliance.  It’s an investment in protecting their most important asset – the customer.

--by Kari Michel

Most lenders use a credit scoring model in their decision process for opening new accounts; however, between 35 and 50 million adults in the US may be considered unscoreable with traditional credit scoring models. That is equivalent to 18-to-25 percent of the adult population. 

Due to recent market conditions and shrinking qualified candidates lenders have placed a renewed interest in assessing the risk of this under served population.  Unscoreable consumers could be a pocket of missed opportunity for many lenders. To assess these consumers, lenders must have the ability to better distinguish between consumers with a clear track record of unfavorable credit behaviors versus those that are just beginning to develop their credit history and credit risk models.

Unscoreable consumers can be split out into three populations:

• Infrequent credit users:  Consumers who have not been active on their accounts for the past six months, and who prefer to use non-traditional credit tools for their financial needs.

• New entrants:  Consumers who do not have at least one account with more than six months of activity; including young adults just entering the workforce,  recently divorced or widowed individuals with little or no credit history in their name, newly arrived immigrants, or people who avoid the traditional system by choice.

• Thin file consumers:  Consumers who have less than three accounts and rarely utilize traditional credit and likely prefer using alternative credit tools and credit score trends.

A study done by VantageScore® Solutions, LLC shows that a large percentage of the
unscoreable population can be scored with VantageScore* and a portion of these are credit-worthy (defined as the population of consumers who have a cumulative likelihood to become 90 days or more delinquent is less than 5 percent).  The following is a high-level summary of the findings for consumers who had at least one trade:

Lenders can review their credit decisioning process to determine if they have the tools in place to assess the risk of those unscoreable consumers.  As with this population there is an opportunity for portfolio expansion as demonstrated by the VantageScore study.

*VantageScore is a generic credit scoring model introduced to meet the market demands for a highly predictive consumer score. Developed as a joint venture among the three major credit reporting companies (CRCs) – Equifax, Experian and TransUnion.

--by Wendy Greenawalt 

In the last installment of my three part series dispelling credit attribute myths, we’ll discuss the myth that the lift achieved by utilizing new attributes is minimal, so it is not worth the effort of evaluating and/or implementing new credit attributes. First, evaluating accuracy and efficiency of credit attributes is hard to measure. Experian data experts are some of the best in the business and, in this edition, we will discuss some of the methods Experian uses to evaluate attribute performance.

When considering any new attributes, the first method we use to validate statistical performance is to complete a statistical head-to-head comparison. This method incorporates the use of KS (Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic), Gini coefficient, worst-scoring capture rate or odds ratio when comparing two samples. Once completed, we implement an established standard process to measure value from different outcomes in an automated and consistent format. While this process may be time and labor intensive, the reward can be found in the financial savings that can be obtained by identifying the right segments, including:

• Risk models that better identify “bad” accounts and minimizing losses
• Marketing models that improve targeting while maximizing campaign dollars spent
• Collections models that enhance identification of recoverable accounts leading to more recovered dollars with lower fixed costs

Credit attributes
Recently, Experian conducted a similar exercise and found that an improvement of 2-to-22 percent in risk prediction can be achieved through the implementation of new attributes. When these metrics are applied to a portfolio where several hundred bad accounts are now captured, the resulting savings can add up quickly (500 accounts with average loss rate of $3,000 = $1.5M potential savings). These savings over time more than justify the cost of evaluating and implementing new credit attributes.

 

--by Mike Sutton

In today’s collections environment, the challenges of meeting an organization’s financial objectives are more difficult than ever.  Case volumes are higher, accounts are more difficult to collect and changing customer behaviors are rendering existing business models less effective.

When responding to recent events, it is not uncommon for organizations to take what may seem to be the easiest path to success — simply hiring more staff. Perhaps in the short-term there may appear to be cash flow improvements, but in most cases, this is not the most effective way to cope with long-term business needs. As incremental staff is added to compensate for additional workloads, there is a point of diminishing return on investment and that can be difficult to define until after the expenditures have been made. Additionally, there are almost always significant operational improvements that can be realized by introducing new technology.  Furthermore, the relevant return on investment models often forecast very accurately.

So, where should a collections department consider investing to improve financial results? The best option may not be the obvious choice, and the mere thought can make the most seasoned collections professionals shutter at the thought of replacing the core collections system with modern technology. That said, let’s consider what has changed in recent years and explore why the replacement proposition is not nearly as difficult or costly as in the past.

Collection Management Software
The collections system software industry is on the brink of a technology evolution to modern and next-generation offerings. Legacy systems are typically inflexible and do not allow for an effective change management program. This handicap leaves collections departments unable to keep up with rapidly changing business objectives that are a critical requirement in surviving these tough economic times. Today’s collections managers need to reduce operational costs while improving these objectives: reducing losses, improving cash flow and promoting customer satisfaction (particularly with those who pose a greater lifetime profit opportunity).  The next generation collections software squarely addresses these business problems and provides significant improvement over legacy systems. Not only is this modern technology now available, but the return on investment models are extremely compelling and have been proven in markets where successful implementations have already occurred.

As an example of modern collections technologies that can help streamline operations, check out the overview and brief demonstration that is on this link:

www.experian.com/decision-analytics/tallyman-demo.html.
 

--by Mike Sutton

I recently interviewed a number of Experian clients to determine how they believe their organizations and industry peers will prioritize collections process improvement over the next 24 months. Additional contributions were collected by written surveys. Here are several interesting observations:

All of the categories mentioned above were considered important by every respondent, but the most urgent priorities were not consistent across industries.

Red Flags Rule and commercial accounts

-- by Kristan Keelan

Most financial institutions are well underway in complying with the FTC’s ID Theft Red Flags Rule by:

1.  Identifying covered accounts  
2.  Determining what red flags need to be monitored
3.  Implementing a risk based approach 

However, one of the areas that seems to be overlooked in complying with the rule is the area of commercial accounts.  Did your institution include commercial accounts when identifying covered accounts?  You’re not alone if you focused only on consumer accounts initially.

Keep in mind that commercial credit and deposit accounts also can be included as covered accounts when there is a “reasonably foreseeable risk” of identity theft to customers or to safety and soundness.

Start by determining if there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of identity theft in a business or commercial account, especially in small business accounts.   Consider the risk of identity theft presented by the methods used to open business accounts, the methods provided to access business accounts, and previous experiences with identity theft on a business account.

I encourage you to revisit your institution’s compliance program and review whether commercial accounts have been examined closely enough.

-- by Kristan Keelan

What do you think of when you hear the word “fraud”?  Someone stealing your personal identity?  Perhaps the recent news story of the five individuals indicted for gaining more than $4 million from 95,000 stolen credit card numbers?  It’s unlikely that small business fraud was at the top of your mind.   Yet, just like consumers, businesses face a broad- range of first- and third-party fraud behaviors, varying significantly in frequency, severity and complexity. Business-related fraud trends call for new fraud best practices to minimize fraud.

First let’s look at first-party fraud.  A first-party, or victimless, fraud profile is characterized by having some form of material misrepresentation (for example, misstating revenue figures on the application) by the business owner without  that owner’s intent or immediate capacity to pay the loan item.  Historically, during periods of economic downturn or misfortune, this type of fraud is more common.  This intuitively makes sense — individuals under extreme financial pressure are more likely to resort to desperate measures, such as misstating financial information on an application to obtain credit.  

Third-party commercial fraud occurs when a third party steals the identification details of a known business or business owner in order to open credit in the business victim’s name.  With creditors becoming more stringent with credit-granting policies on new accounts, we’re seeing seasoned fraudsters shift their focus on taking over existing business or business owner identities.

Overall, fraudsters seem to be migrating from consumer to commercial fraud.   I think one of the most common reasons for this is that commercial fraud doesn’t receive the same amount of attention as consumer fraud.  Thus, it’s become easier for fraudsters to slip under the radar by perpetrating their crimes through the commercial channel.   Also, keep in mind that businesses are often not seen as victims in the same way that consumers are.  For example, victimized businesses aren’t afforded the protections that consumers receive under identity theft laws, such as access to credit information.   These factors, coupled with the fact that business-to-business fraud is approximately three-to-ten times more “profitable” per occurrence than consumer fraud, play a role in leading fraudsters increasingly toward commercial fraud.
 

-- by Kelly Kent

In a recent article, www.CNNMoney.com reported that Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, said that the pace of recovery in 2010 would be moderate and added that the unemployment rate would come down quite slowly, due to headwinds on ongoing credit problems and the effort by families to reduce household debt.’

While some media outlets promote an optimistic economic viewpoint, clearly there are signs that significant challenges lie ahead for lenders. As Bernanke forecasts, many issues that have plagued credit markets will sustain themselves in the coming years. Therefore lenders need to be equipped to monitor these continued credit problems if they wish to survive this protracted time of distress.

While banks and financial institutions are implementing increasingly sophisticated and thorough processes to monitor fluctuations in credit trends, they have little intelligence to compare their credit performance to that of their peers.  Lenders frequently cite that they are concerned about their lack of awareness or intelligence regarding the credit performance and status of their peers.  Marketing intelligence solutions are important for management of risk, loan portfolio monitoring and related decisioning strategies.

Currently, many vendors offer data on industry-wide trends, but few vendors provide the information needed to allow a lender to understand its position relative to a well-defined group of firms that it considers its peers. As a result, too many lenders are performing benchmarking using data sources that are biased, incomplete, inaccurate, or that lack the detail necessary to derive meaningful conclusions.

If you were going to measure yourself personally against a group to understand your comparative performance, why would you perform that comparison against people who had little or nothing in common with you? Does an elite runner measure himself against a weekend warrior to gauge his performance? No; he segments the runners by gender, age, and performance class to understand exactly how he stacks up.

Today’s lending environment is not forgiving enough for lenders to make broad industry comparisons if they want to ensure long-term success. Lenders cannot presume they are leading the pack, when, in fact, the race is closer than ever.

-- by Kari Michel

In August, consumer bankruptcy filings were up by 24 percent over the past year and are expected to increase to 1.4 million this year.  “Consumers continue to turn to bankruptcy as a shield from the sustained financial pressures of today’s economy,” said American Bankruptcy Institute’s Executive Director Samuel J. Gerdano.

What are lenders doing to protect themselves from bankruptcy losses? In my last blog, I talked about the differences and advantage of using both risk and bankruptcy scores. Many lenders are mitigating and managing bankruptcy losses by including bankruptcy scores into their standard account management programs. 

Here are some ways lenders are using bankruptcy scores:

• Incorporating them into existing internal segmentation schemes for enhanced separation and treatment assessment of high risk accounts;

• Developing improved strategies to act on high-bankruptcy-risk accounts
       • In order to manage at-risk consumers proactively and
       • Assessing low-risk customers for up-sell opportunities.

Implementation of a bankruptcy score is recommended given the economic conditions and expected rise in consumer bankruptcy. When conducting model validations/assessments, we recommend that you use the model that best rank orders bankruptcy or pushes more bankruptcies into the lowest scoring ranges.  In validating our Experian/Visa BankruptcyPredict score, results showed BankruptcyPredict was able to identify 18 to 30 percent more bankruptcy compared to other bankruptcy models.  It also identified 12 to 33 percent more bankruptcy compared to risk scores in the lowest five percent of the score range.  This supports the need to have distinct bankruptcy scores in addition to risk scores.

-- by Kennis Wong

As I said in my last post, when consumers and the media talk about fraud and fraud risk, they are usually referring to third-party frauds. When financial institutions or other organizations talk about fraud and fraud best practices, they usually refer to both first- and third-party frauds.

The lesser-known fraud cousin, first-party fraud, does not involve stolen identities. As a result, first-party fraud is sometimes called victimless fraud. However, being victimless can’t be further from the truth. The true victims of these frauds are the financial institutions that lose millions of dollars to people who intentionally defraud the system.

First-party frauds happen when someone uses his/her own identity or a fictitious identity to apply for credit without the intention to fulfill their payment obligation. As you can imagine, fraud detection of this type is very difficult. Since fraudsters are mostly who they say they are, you can’t check the inconsistencies of identities in their applications. The third-party fraud models and authentication tools will have no effect on first-party frauds.

Moreover, the line between first-party fraud and regular credit risk is very fuzzy. According to Wikipedia, credit risk is the risk of loss due to a debtor's non-payment of a loan or other line of credit. Doesn’t the definition sound similar to first-party fraud? In practice, the distinction is even blurrier. That’s why many financial institutions are putting first-party frauds in the risk bucket.

But there is one subtle difference: that is the intent of the debtor.  Are the applicants planning not to pay when they apply or use the credit?  If not, that’s first-party fraud. To effectively detect frauds of this type, fraud models need to look into the intention of the applicants.
 

-- by Kennis Wong

When consumers and the media talk about fraud and fraud risk, nine out of ten times they are referring to third-party frauds. When financial institutions or other organizations talk about fraud, fraud best practices, or their efforts to minimize fraud, they usually refer to both first- and third-party frauds.

The difference between the two fraud types is huge.

Third-party frauds happen when someone impersonates the genuine identity owner to apply for credit or use existing credit. When it’s discovered, the victim, or the genuine identity owner, may have some financial loss -- and a whole lot of trouble fixing the mess. Third-party frauds get most of the spotlight in newspaper reporting primarily because of large-scale identity data losses. These data losses may not result in frauds per se, but the perception is that these consumers are now more susceptible to third-party frauds.

Financial institutions are getting increasingly sophisticated in using fraud models to detect third-party frauds at acquisition. In a nutshell, these fraud models are detecting frauds by looking at the likelihood of applicants being who they say they are. Institutions bounce the applicants’ identity information off of internal and external data sources such as: credit; known fraud; application; IP; device; employment; business relationship; DDA; demographic; auto; property; and public record. The risk-based approach takes into account the intricate similarities and discrepancies of each piece of data element.

In my next blog entry, I’ll discuss first-party fraud.
 

-- By Ken Pruett

I find it interesting that the media still focuses all of their attention on identity theft when it comes to credit-related fraud.  Don’t get me wrong.  This is still a serious problem and is certainly not going away any time soon.  But, there are other types of financial fraud that are costing all of us money, indirectly, in the long run.  I thought it would be worth mentioning some of these today. 

Although third party fraud, (which involves someone victimizing a consumer), gets most of the attention, first party fraud (perpetrated by the actual consumer) can be even more costly.  “Never pay” and “bust out” are two fraud scenarios that seem to be on the rise and warrant attention when developing a fraud prevention program. 

Never Pay   
A growing fraud problem that occurs during the acquisition stage of the customer life cycle is “never pay”.  This is also classified as first payment default fraud.  Another term we often hear to describe this type of perpetrator is “straight roller”. 

This type of fraudster is best described as someone who signs up for a product or service -- and never makes a payment.

This fraud problem occurs when a consumer makes an application for a loan or credit card. The consumer provides true identification information but changes one or two elements (such as the address or social security number).  He does this so that he can claim later that he did not apply for the credit.  When he’s granted credit, he often makes purchases close to the limit provided on the account.  (Why get the 32 inch flat screen TV when the 60 inch is on the next store shelf -- when you know you are not going to pay for it anyway?) 

These fraudsters never make any payments at all on these accounts. The accounts usually end up in collections. 

Because standard credit risk scores look at long term credit, they often are not effective in predicting this type of fraud.  The best approach is to use a fraud model specifically targeted for this issue. 

Bust Out Fraud
Of all the fraud scenarios, bust out fraud is one of the most talked about topics when we meet with credit card companies.  This type of fraud occurs during the account management phase of the customer lifecycle.  It is characterized by a person obtaining credit, typically a loan or credit card, and maintaining a good credit history with the account holder for a reasonable period of time.  Just prior to the bust out point, the fraudster will pay off the majority of the balance, often by using a bad check.  She will then run the card up close to the limit again -- and then disappear. 

Losses for this type of fraud are higher than average credit card losses.  Losses between 150 to 200 percent of the credit limit are typical.  We’ve seen this pattern at numerous credit card institutions across many of their accounts. 

This is a very difficult type of fraud to prevent. At the time of application, the customer typically looks good from a credit and fraud standpoint.  Many companies have some account management tools in place to help prevent this type of fraud, but their systems only have a view into the one account tied to the customer.  A best practice for preventing this type of fraud is to use tools that look at all the accounts tied to the consumer -- along with other metrics such as recent inquiries.  When taking all of these factors into consideration, one can better predict this growing fraud type.   

-- by Heather Grover

I’m often asked in various industry forums to give talks about, or opinions on, the latest fraud trends and fraud best practices. Let’s face it –  fraudsters are students of their craft and continue to study the latest defenses and adapt to controls that may be in place.

You may be surprised, then, to learn that our clients’ top-of-mind issues are not only how to fight the latest fraud trends, but how they can do so while maximizing use of automation, managing operational costs, and preserving customer experience -- all while meeting compliance requirements.

Many times, clients view these goals as being unique goals that do not affect one another. Not only can these be accomplished simultaneously, but, in my opinion, they can be considered causal. Let me explain.

By looking at fraud detection as its own goal, automation is not considered as a potential way to improve this metric. By applying analytics, or basic fraud risk scores, clients can easily incorporate many different potential risk factors into a single calculation without combing through various data elements and reports. This calculation or score can predict multiple fraud types and risks with less effort, than could a human manually, and subjectively reviewing specific results. Through an analytic score, good customers can be positively verified in an automated fashion; while only those with the most risky attributes can be routed for manual review. This allows expensive human resources and expertise to be used for only the most risky consumers.

Compliance requirements can also mandate specific procedures, resulting in arduous manual review processes. Many requirements (Patriot Act, Red Flag, eSignature) mandate verification of identity through match results. Automated decisioning based on these results (or analytic score) can automate this process – in turn, reducing operational expense.

While the above may seem to be an oversimplification or simple approach, I encourage you to consider how well you are addressing financial risk management.  How are you managing automation, operational costs, and compliance – while addressing fraud?

There are a lot of areas covered in your comment: efficiency; credit quality (human side or character in an impersonal environment); and policy adherence. 

We define efficiency and effectiveness using these metrics:

• Turnaround time from application submission to decision;
• Resulting delinquencies based upon type of underwriting (centralized vs. decentralized);
• Production levels between centralized and decentralized;
• Performance of the portfolio based upon type of underwriting; and
• Turnaround time from application submission to decision

Due to the nature of Experian’s technology, we are able to capture start and stop times of the typical activities related to loan origination.  After analyzing the data from 160+ financial institutions of all sizes, Experian publishes an annual small business benchmark report that documents loan origination process efficiencies and inefficiencies, benchmarking these as industry standards.  

Turnaround Time

From the benchmark report, we’ve seen that institutions that are centralized have consistently had a turnaround time that is half of those with decentralized environments.

Interestingly, turnaround time is also much faster for the larger institutions than for smaller.  This is confusing because the smaller community banks tend to promote the close relationship they have with their clients and their communities. Yet, when it comes to actually making a loan decision, it tends to take longer.

In addition to speed, another aspect of turnaround is consistency.  We all can think of situations where we were able to beat the stated turnaround times of the larger or the centralized institutions.  Unfortunately, these tend to be isolated instances versus the consistent performance that is delivered in the centralized environment.

Resulting delinquencies based upon type of underwriting/Performance of the portfolio based upon type of underwriting

Again, referring to the annual small business lending benchmark report, delinquencies in a centralized environment are 50% of those in a decentralized environment. 

I have worked with a number of institutions that allow the loan officer/relationship manager to “reverse the decision” made by a centralized underwriting group.  The thinking is that the human aspect is otherwise missing in centralized underwriting.  When the data is collected, though, the incremental business/portfolio that is approved by the loan officer (who is close to the client and knows the human side) is not profitable from a credit quality perspective.  Specifically, this incremental portfolio typically has a net charge-off rate that exceeds the net interest margin -- and this is before we even consider the non-interest expense incurred. 

Your choice: is the incremental business critical to your success…or could you more fruitfully direct your relationship officer’s attention elsewhere?

Production levels between centralized and decentralized

Not to beat a dead horse, but the multiple of two comes into play here too.  As one looks at the throughput of each role (data entry, underwriter, relationship manager/lender), the production levels of a centralized environment are typically double that of a decentralized.

It’s clear that the data point to the efficiency and effectiveness of a centralized environment

Put yourself in the shoes of your collections team. The year ahead is challenging. Workloads are increasing as consumer debt escalates, and collectors are working tiring, stressful shifts talking to people who don't want to talk about their debts.

What kind of incentives can improve your collections performance and at the same time as create a well motivated and productive team?

Introduction

Financial incentives have long been a popular method to help boost staff performance. These rewards usually relate to the achievement of certain goals -- either personal, team, organizational or a combination of all three. A well-constructed incentive plan will increase staff morale and loyalty, as well as making a valuable difference to the bottom line. It can help ensure you are managing a team who are running at full speed and capability during these busy, turbulent times.

However, collections managers can also implement alternative non-monetary incentive programs that can boost staff commitment and effectiveness.

This series of postings identifies cash and non-cash alternatives that can help build and maintain a motivated team.

Getting Started

Before introducing a new incentive plan, clearly explain your objectives to the team. If your main goal is to maximize profitability, boost morale by letting your team know they are a major source of profit. Their understanding of how individual performance relates to the business will deepen their commitment to the program once it begins.

To help you decide what to include in the incentive plan, you must first understand what drives your team. This should be ascertained by conducting regular performance appraisals, call monitoring, attitude surveys and informal conversations. Your staff will likely tell you that increased status and recognition, higher pay, better working conditions and improved benefits would increase both morale and performance. We can look into incentives that address these requirements individually, but let's begin with the most obvious: money.

Money is a powerful motivator

The current economic climate guarantees that money is more important to your team members than ever; they want to be financially rewarded for their efforts. In this industry, collectors work individually so it is wise to target them in this way when using financial incentives.

Comparing individuals can also achieve higher performance levels because the cachet of being 'top dog' is a real motivator for some people.

Our advice is to begin by targeting staff in three familiar areas and ensure from the start that your collections system delivers the depth and granularity of management information to support your incentive program.

I would like to thank the Experian collections experts who contributed to this four-part series. The rest of the series will be posted soon!

-- by Jeff Bernstein

So, here I am with my first contribution to Experian Decision Analytics’ collections blog, and what I am discussing has practically nothing to do with analytics. But, it has everything to do with managing the opportunities to positively impact collections results and leveraging your investment in analytics and strategies, beginning with the most important weapon in your arsenal – collectors.

Yes, I know it’s a bit unconventional for a solutions and analytics company to talk about something other than models; but the difference between mediocre results and optimization rests with your collectors and your organization’s ability to manage customer interactions.

Let’s take a trip down memory lane and reminisce about one of the true landscape changing paradigm shifts in collections in recent memory – the use of skill models to become payment of choice.

AT&T Universal Card was one of the first early adopters of a radical new approach towards managing an emerging Gen X debtor population during the early 1990s. Armed with fresh research into what influenced delinquent debtors into paying certain collectors while dogging others, they adopted what we called a “management systems” approach towards collections.

They taught their entire collections team a new set of skills models that stressed bridging skills between the collector and the customer, thus allowing the collector to interact in a more collaborative, non-aggressive manner. The new approach enabled collectors to more favorably influence customer behavior, creating payment solutions collaboratively that allowed AT&T to become “payment of choice” when competing with other creditors competing for share of wallet.

A new of set of skill metrics, which we now affectionately call our “dashboard,” were created to measure the effective use of the newly taught skill models, and collectors were empowered to own their own performance – and to leverage their team leader for coaching and skills development. Team developers, the new name for front line collection managers, were tasked with spending 40-50% or more of their time on developmental activities, using leadership skills in their coaching and development activities.  

The game plan was simple.

• Engage collectors with customer focused skills that influenced behavior and get paid sooner.
• Empower collectors to take on the responsibility for their own development.
• Make performance results visible top-to-bottom in the organization to stimulate competitiveness, leveraging our innate desire for recognition.
• Make leaders accountable for continuous performance improvement of individuals and teams.

It worked. AT&T Universal won the Malcom Baldrige National Quality Award in 1992 for its efforts in “delighting the customer” while driving their delinquencies and charge-offs to superior levels. A new paradigm shift was unleashed and spread like wildfire across the industry, including many of the major credit card issuers and top tier U.S. banks, and large retailers.

Why do I bring this little slice of history up in my first blog?

I see many banking and financial services companies across the globe struggle with more complex customer situations and harder collections cases -- with their attention naturally focused on tools, models, and technologies. As an industry, we are focused on early lifecycle treatment strategy, identifying current, non-delinquent customers who may be at-risk for future default, and triaging them before they become delinquent. Risk-based collections and segmentation is now a hot topic. Outsourcing and leveraging multiple, non-agent based contact channels to reduce the pressures on collection resources is more important than ever. Optimization is getting top billing as the next “thing.”

What I don’t hear enough of is how organizations are engaged in improving the skills of collectors, and executing the right management systems approach to the process to extract the best performance possible from our existing resources. In some ways, this may be lost in the chaos of our current economic climate. With all the focus on analytics, segmentation, strategy and technology, the opportunity to improve operational performance through skill building and leadership may have taken a back seat.

I’ve seen plenty of examples of organizations who have spent millions on analytical tools and technologies, improving portfolio risk strategy and targeting of the right customers for treatment. I’ve seen the most advanced dialer, IVR, and other contact channel strategies used successfully to obtain the highest right party contact rates and the lowest possible cost. Yet, with all of that focus and investment, I’ve seen these right party contacts mismanaged by collectors who were not provided with the optimal coaching and skills.

With the enriched data available for decisioning, coupled with the amazing capabilities we have for real time segmentation, strategy scripting, context-sensitive screens, and rules-based workflow management in our next generation collections systems, we are at a crossroads in the evolution of collections.

Let’s not forget some of the “nuts and bolts” that drive operational performance and ensure success.

Something old can be something new. Examine your internal processes aimed at producing the best possible skills at all collector levels and ensure that you are not missing the easiest opportunity to improve your results.

Much of the discussion on Capitol Hill revolves around sufficient risk-based capital and the derivation of how much tier 1 capital and/or common equity capital is appropriate. Most of our solution offerings and consulting services address various aspects of risk management, from targeting prospective customers, through loan origination and risk-based pricing, to ongoing relationship management and portfolio monitoring. We have been addressing risk management with our clients long before the recent financial and economic crises. We are both ready and able to assist new and existing clients in many ways: to effectively and efficiently address the management of credit and other risks and to develop strategies that offer optimal risk-based profit performance. We are always monitoring regulatory developments and, as always, will strive to assist our clients with new best practices to operate as effectively as possible under any new regulations affecting risk management policies, processes and governance responsibilities.

Some articles that I’ve come across recently have puzzled me.

In those articles, authors use the terms “monetary base” and “money supply” synonymously -- but those terms are actually very different.

The monetary base (currency plus Fed deposits) is a much smaller number than the money supply (M1). The huge change in the “base”, which the Fed did affect by adding $1T or so to infuse a lot of quick liquidity into the financial system late in 2007/early 2008, does not necessarily impact M1 (which includes the base plus all bank demand deposits) all that much in the short-term, and may impact it even less in the intermediate-term if the Fed reduces its holdings of securities.  Some are correct, of course, in positing that a rotation out of securities by the Fed will tend to put pressure on market rates.

Some are equivocating the 2007 liquidity moves of the Fed, with a major monetary policy change. When the capital markets froze due to liquidity and credit risks in August/September of 2007, monetary policy was not the immediate risk, or even a consideration. Without the liquidity injections in that timeframe, monetary policy would have become less than an academic consideration.

Tying the “constrained” (which actually was a slowdown in growth of) bank lending to bank reserves on account at the Fed I don’t think their Fed reserve balance was ever an issue for lending. Banks slowed down lending because the level of credit risk increased. Borrowers were defaulting. Bank deposit balances were actually increasing through the financial crisis. [See my Feb 26 and March 5 blogs] So, loan funding, at least from deposit sources was not the problem for most banks. Of course, for a small number of banks that had major securities losses, capital was being lost and therefore not available to back increased lending. But demand deposit balances were growing.

Some authors are linking bank reserves to the ability of banks to raise liabilities, which makes little sense. Banks’ respective abilities to gather demand deposits (insured by the FDIC, at no small expense to the banks) was always wide open, and their ability to borrow funds is much more a function of asset quality (or net asset value) more than it relates their relatively small reserve balances at the Fed.

These actions may result in high inflation levels and high interest rates -- but it will be because of poor Fed decisions in the future, not because of the Fed’s action of last year. It will also depend on whether the fiscal (deficit) actions of the government are: 1) economically productive and 2) tempered to a recovery, or not. I think that is a bigger macro-economic risk than Fed monetary policy.

In fact, the only way bank executives can wisely manage the entity over an extended timeframe is to be able to direct resources across all possibilities on a risk-adjusted basis. The question isn’t whether risk-based pricing is appropriate for all lines of business, but rather how might or should it be applied.

For commercial lending into the middle and corporate markets, there is enough money at stake to warrant evaluating each loan and deposit, as well as the status of the client relationship, on an individual basis. This means some form of simulation modeling by relationship managers on new sales opportunities (including renewals) and the model’s ready access to current data on all existing pieces of business with each relationship. [See my April 24 blog entry.]

This process also implies the ability to easily aggregate the risk-return status of a group of related clients and to show lenders how their portfolio of accounts is performing on a risk-adjusted basis. This type of model-based analysis needs to be flexible enough to handle differing loan structures, easy for a lender to use and quick. The better models can perform such analysis in minutes. I’ve discussed the elements of such models in earlier posts.

But, with small business and consumer lending there are other considerations that come into play. The principles of risk-based pricing are consistent across any loan or deposit. With small business lending, the process of selling, negotiating, underwriting and origination is significantly more streamlined and under some form of workflow control.

With consumer lending, there are more regulations to take into account and there are mass marketing considerations driving the “sales” process.

Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.