Loan Portfolio Monitoring

• Maximizing client retention
• Maximizing cross-sell opportunities
• Minimizing loss potential due to credit-risk issues
• Minimizing loss potential due to operational risks
• Maximizing profitability through the timely identification o f risk and the appropriate allocation of capital

In addition to behavioral models, collections and account management groups need the ability to implement collections workflow strategies in order to effectively handle and process accounts, particularly when the optimization of resources is a priority. While the behavioral models will effectively evaluate and measure the likelihood that an account will become delinquent or result in a loss, strategies are the specific actions taken, based on the score prediction, as well as other key information that is available when those actions are appropriate.

Identifying high-risk accounts, for example, may result in strategies designed to accelerate collections management activity and execute more aggressive actions. On the other hand, identifying low-risk accounts can help determine when to take advantage of cost-saving actions and focus on customer retention programs.  Effective strategies also address how to handle accounts that fall between the high- and low-risk extremes, as well as accounts that fall into special categories such as first payment defaults, recently delinquent accounts and unique customer or product segments.

To accommodate lenders with systems that cannot support either behavioral scorecards or strategies, Experian developed the powerful service bureau solution, Portfolio Management Package, which is also referred to as PMP. To use this service, lenders send Experian customer master file data on a daily basis. Experian processes the data through the Portfolio Management Package system which includes calculating Fast Start behavior scores and identifying special handling accounts and electronically delivers the recommended strategies and actions codes within hours. Scoring and strategy parameters can be easily changed, as well as portfolio segmentation, special handling options and scorecard selections.

PMP also supports Champion Challenger testing to enable users to learn which strategies are most effective. Comprehensive reports suites provide the critical information needed for lenders to design strategies and evaluate and compare the performance of those strategies.
 

Below are a few risk management strategies that your financial institution can implement through the utilization of automated portfolio monitoring:

Special accounts strategies
Focus your internal resources on accounts with a high probability of recovery. Minimize "distractions" of resources and determine the probability of rehabilitation. By utilizing these strategies, your financial institution may be able to handle more accounts with same staff levels and have quicker and more accurate responses.

Focus your internal resources
Focus your risk management resources on the accounts that are showing signs of deterioration, those that have fallen below minimum thresholds and show a significant decline from prior year performance. By doing this you can avoid credit review by identifying continuing high performers and negligible declines in credit quality.
 

• Take a look at how your perception of small business loans has kept you from preventing problem situations.
   
• Consider migrating to a more proactive approach in your loan renewal/review process; it can have an impact on your profitability.
   
• Consider freeing up more time for your lenders and relationship managers and investigate what could be done with that time to better benefit your financial institution.

Currently, financial institutions focus on the existing customer base and prioritize collections to recover more cash, and do it faster. There is also a need to invest in strategic projects with limited budgets in order to generate benefits in a very short term, to rationalize existing strategies and processes while ensuring that optimal decisions are made at each client contact point.
To meet the present challenging conditions, financial institutions increasingly are performing business reviews with the goal of evaluating needs and opportunities to maximize the value created in their portfolios.  Business reviews assess an organization’s capacity to leverage on existing opportunities as well as identifying any additional capability that might be necessary to realize the increased benefits.

An effective business review covers the following four phases:

• Problem definition: Establish and qualify what the key objectives of the organization are, the most relevant issues to address, the constraints of the solution, the criteria for success and to summarize how value management fits into the company’s corporate and business unit strategies.
• Benchmark against leading practice: Strategies, processes, tools, knowledge, and people have to be measured using a review toolset tailored to the organization’s strategic objectives.
• Define the opportunities and create the roadmap: The elements required to implement the opportunities and migrating to the best practice should be scheduled in a phased strategic roadmap that includes the implementation plan of the proposed actions.
• Achieve the benefits: An ROI-focused approach, founded on experience in peer organizations, will allow analysis of the cost-benefits of the recommended investments and quantify the potential savings and additional revenue generated. A continuous fine-tuning (i.e. impact of market changes, looking for the next competitive edge and proactively challenge solution boundaries) will ensure the benefits are fully achieved.

Today’s blog is an extract of an article written by Burak Kilicoglu, an Experian Global Consultant

To read the entire article in the April edition of Experian Decision Analytics’ global newsletter e-news, please follow the link below:

http://www.experian-da.com/news/enews_0903/Story2.html
 

As I'm preparing for traveling to the Baker Hill Solution Summit next week, I thought I would revisit the ideas of risk-based loan pricing.

Risk Adjusted Loan Pricing – The Major Parts 

I have referred to risk-adjusted commercial loan pricing (or the lack of it) in previous posts. At times, I’ve commented on aspects of risk-based pricing and risk-based bank performance measurement,  but I haven’t discussed what risk-based pricing is -- in a comprehensive manner. Perhaps, I can begin to do that now, and in my next posts.

Risk-based pricing analysis is a product-level microcosm of risk-based bank performance. You begin by looking at the financial implications of a product sale from a cost accounting perspective. This means calculating the revenues associated with a loan, including the interest income and any fee-based income. These revenues need to be spread over the life of the loan, while taking into account the amortization characteristics of the balance (or average usage for a line of credit). To save effort (and in providing good client relationship management), we often download the balance and rate information for existing loans from a bank’s loan accounting system.

To “risk-adjust” the interest income, you need to apply a cost of funds that has the same implied market risk characteristics as the loan balance. This is not like the bank’s actual cost of funds for several reasons. Most importantly, there is usually no automatic risk-based matching between the manner in which the bank makes loans and the term characteristics of its deposits and/or borrowing. Once we establish a cost of funds approach that removes interest rate risk from the loan, we subtract the risk-adjusted interest expense from the revenues to arrive at risk-adjusted net interest income, or our risk-adjusted gross margin.

We then subtract two types of costs. One cost includes the administrative or overhead expenses associated with the product. Our best practice is to derive an approach to operating expense breakdowns that takes into account all of the bank’s non-interest expenses. This is a “full absorption” method of cost accounting. We want to know the marginal cost of doing business, but if we just apply the marginal cost to all loans, a large portion of real-life expenses won’t be covered by resulting pricing. As a result, the bank’s profits may suffer.

We fully understand the argument for marginal cost coverage, but have seen the unfortunate end-result of too many sales -- that use this lower cost factor -- hurt a bank’s bottom line. Administrative cost does not normally require additional risk adjustment, as any risk-based operational expenses and costs of mitigating operation risk are already included in the bank’s general ledger for non-interest expenses.

The second expense subtracted from net interest income is credit risk cost. This is not the same as the bank’s provision expense, and is certainly not the same as the loss provision in any one accounting period.  The credit risk cost for pricing purposes should be risk adjusted based on both product type (usually loan collateral category) and the bank’s risk rating for the loan in question. This metric will calculate the relative probability of default for the borrower combined with the loss given default for the loan type in question.

We usually annualize the expected loss numbers by taking into account a multi-year history and a one- or two-year projection of net loan losses. These losses are broken down by loan type and risk rating based on the bank’s actual distribution of loan balances.

The risk costs by risk rating are then created using an up-sloping curve that is similar in shape to an industry default experience curve. This assures a realistic differentiation of losses by risk rating. Many banks have loss curves that are too flat in nature, resulting in little or no price differentiation based on credit quality. This leads to poor risk-based performance metrics and, ultimately, to poor overall financial performance. The loss expense curves are fine-tuned so that over a period of years the total credit risk costs, when applied to the entire portfolio, should cover the average annual expected loss experience of the bank.

By subtracting the operating expenses and credit risk loss from risk-adjusted net interest income, we arrive at risk-adjusted pre-tax income. In my next post we’ll expand this discussion further to risk-adjusted net income, capital allocation for unexpected loss and profit ratio considerations.

1.       Portfolio Management – You should really focus on this topic in 2009.  With many institutions already streamlining the origination process, portfolio management is the logical next step.  While the foundation is based in credit quality, portfolio management is not just for the credit side. 

2.       Review of Data (aka “Getting Behind the Numbers”) – We are not talking about scorecard validation; that’s another subject.  This is more general.  Traditional commercial lending rarely maintains a sophisticated database on its clients.  Even when it does, traditional commercial lending rarely analyzes the data. 

3.       Lowering Costs of Origination – Always a shoe-in for a goal in any year!  But how does an institution make meaningful and marked improvements in reducing its costs of origination? 

4.       Scorecard Validation – Getting more specific with the review of data.  Discuss the basic components of the validation process and what your institution can do to best prepare itself for analyzing the results of a validation.  Whether it be an interim validation or a full-sized one, put together the right steps to ensure your institution derives the maximum benefit from its scorecard.

5.       Turnaround Times (Response to Client) –Rebuild it.  Make the origination process better, stronger and faster.  No; we aren’t talking about bionics here -- nor how you can manipulate the metrics to report a faster turnaround time.  We are talking about what you can do from a loan applicant perspective to improve turnaround time.

6.       Training – Where are all the training programs?  Send in all the training programs!  Worry, because they are not here.  (Replace training programs with clowns and we might have an oldies song.)  Can’t find the right people with the right talent in the marketplace? 

7.       Application Volume/Marketing/Relationship Management – You can design and execute the most efficient origination and portfolio management processes.   But, without addressing client and application volume, what good are they?

8.       Pricing/Yield on Portfolio – “We compete on service, not price.” We’ve heard this over and over again.  In reality, the sales side always resorts to price as the final differentiator.  Utilizing standardization and consistency can streamline your process and drive improved yields on your portfolio.

9.       Management Metrics – How do I know that I am going in the right direction?  Strategize, implement, execute, measure and repeat.  Learn how to set your targets to provide meaningful bottom line results.

10.    Operational Risk Management – Different from credit risk, operational risk and its management, operational risk management deals with what an institution should do to make sure it is not open to operational risk in the portfolio. Items totally in the control of the institution, if not executed properly, can cause significant loss.

What do you think? As the end of April approaches, are these still hot topics in your financial institution?

We have talked about: the creation of the vision for our loan portfolios (current state versus future state) – e.g. the strategy for moving our current portfolio to the future vision. Now comes the time for execution of that strategy.

In changing portfolio composition and improving credit quality, the discipline of credit must be strong (this includes in the arenas of commercial loan origination, loan portfolio monitoring, and credit risk modeling of course). Consistency, especially, in the application of policy is key. Early on in the change/execution process there will be strong pressure to revert back to the old ways and stay in a familiar comfort zone.  Credit criteria/underwriting guidelines will have indeed changed in the strategy execution.

In the coming blogs we will be discussing:

• assessment of the current state in your loan portfolio;
• development of the specific strategy to effect change in the portfolio from a credit quality perspective and composition;
• business development efforts to affect change in the portfolio composition; and 
• policy changes to support the strategy/vision.

This post is a feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Barry Timm, Senior Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian.

2008 has proven to be an unbelievably challenging year for the economy as a whole, let alone the financial industry.  Never before have we experienced the type and degree of turmoil that we did in 2008, even since the “Great Depression”.
 

These economic challenges have been quick, severe and widespread; and, from large corporations to the individual consumer, all have been impacted to some degree.  The stock market is down, unemployment up, consumer confidence down, delinquencies up ….not exactly a pleasant roller coaster ride. 
 

And, there is no longer any projecting as to when the “bubble” is going to burst.  It happened.   Decreased real estate values have occurred not only in high impact geographic regions but throughout the country.  While home equity products have traditionally been the “golden child” of consumer loan product offerings, recent economic changes have caused a shift in that perspective.  As a result, tightened underwriting standards have limited the availability of the product as a whole.  In some markets the product offering has even been temporarily halted.
 

We frequently hear the terminology “bailout” being used in the news.  While we all have expectations as it relates to the bailout approach, I thought I would “Google” the word “bailout” to see what would magically appear.  Interestingly enough, the first listing was titled “Walk away from your home”, with a link to the home page for a mortgage default legal team.  This is not exactly what I was expecting to find, but is definitely reflective of the times.
 

And, according to the FDIC, there have been 25 failed financial instituions in the year 2008.  This single year number equates to the total number of failed financial institutions between the prior periods 2001 through 2007. 

Okay … enough doom and gloom.  In spite of all that has occurred within the economy, some financial institutions continue to maintain a strong credit quality position in their consumer portfolios and have maintained profitability throughout all of the market volatility.  

What are the strong survivors doing that differentiates themselves from the others?

1. They understand their portfolio.  
Advisory Services frequently assists clients with various types of portfolio management analysis and often presents those findings to senior management.  We often hear that management is surprised by the results of that analysis. The point is that high-level management reporting is not enough these days. Additional detail and depth are necessary. 

More specifically, as opposed to evaluating payment performance at the portfolio level, it is important to consider the following:

• Do you know your delinquency numbers at the product level? 
• How do delinquencies compare to your product approval rates? 
• Do you routinely compare approval/decline rates and delinquencies to scorecard results and/or credit bureau scores?  
• Do you know where pricing exceptions are being made and are you receiving sufficient return for the level of risk?

2. A focused strategy is in place.
It is important to re-emphasize the specific, strategic direction and focus of your defined market.  Now is not the time to be “pushing the envelope” and extending into untested waters.  There is something to be said about focusing on your strengths, staying within your defined footprint and meeting the needs of your core, proven line of business while following sound financial risk management.

3. The underwriting process is under control.
This does not automatically mean that a “tightening” of underwriting standards is necessary.  It does mean, however, that stronger attention to detail is warranted.  It is important that underwriting criteria is reviewed and that you are sure that defined underwriting practices are consistently applied.  As noted in item number one above, this may require digging a little deeper and reviewing current and past decisioned loans (preferably with a critical eye of an independent third party).  Assessing the underwriting process becomes increasing complex and more critical with a decentralized underwriting approach.

Focus on the positive
Now that 2008 is behind us, let’s continue to focus on the positives to come in 2009.  Reflect on the past, but strive to center your attention on ongoing portfolio monitoring, financial risk management assessments and improvements for the future. 

 

Part 1

Ok, it’s me again, your business development guy in financial risk management clothing. In my first blog, I promised that I would start providing specific tactics related to optimizing penetration and retention efforts.
 
So, in “non-consultant” speak, we’re trying to figure out:

• how we are going to get deeper with existing clients;
• keep the (good) business we have; and 
• find new opportunities.

Today, we’ll focus on client penetration strategies. Some of this should be pretty self-explanatory.  If it is, that’s good. If it isn’t, you have a lot of work to do.

First, let’s recognize that not clients are going to be suitable candidates for increasing the existing relationship. Secondly, we can’t focus strictly on those “A” clients in our portfolio (assuming that you’ve implemented even the most rudimentary sales segmentation strategy, which is categorization into three to four tiers based on total relationship). There simply aren’t that many and if you’ve done your job effectively, there shouldn’t be many more “A” clients to add.

Getting deeper requires a defined approach. It doesn’t just happen. Clients will not call you on a regular or on-going basis and tell you that they need more services (well not usually). Rather, the responsibility rests on our shoulders to uncover changes in their operations and to look for signs that indicate growth, changes in direction and/or priority or changes in their day-to-day activities.

Sounds simple right? So, how should you do this?

One approach might be to engage in a “client call/touch routine” that will have you contacting the upper 65 percent of your portfolio on a pre-defined schedule or frequency. The rationale being that continued and consistent interaction with the client base will result in both uncovering possible “new” needs as well ensuring that in the event there is a competitive effort underway, we will have the opportunity to provide our recommendation.  

My next blog will feature two additional tactics to include in your relationship management process.
 

Hello. My name is Prince Varma and I’ve spent the better part of the last 16 years helping financial institutions (FI) successfully improve their in business development, portfolio growth and client relationship management practices.

So, since the focus of this blog is to speak to readers about risk management, many of you are probably wondering what a “sales and business development” guy is doing writing a piece related to mitigating and managing risk?

Great question!

The simple fact is that the traditional or prevailing sentiment or definition related to risk management – mitigating credit risk -- is incomplete. A more accurate and comprehensive approach would be to recognize, acknowledge and address that “risk” cuts across the entire client relationship spectrum of:

• client penetration/growth;
• client retention; and
• client credit risk mitigation.

How do penetration and retention count as “risk factors”?
(this is where the sales guy stuff comes in)

From a penetration perspective, the failure to recognize potential opportunities either within the existing client base or in the operating market, introduces revenue growth risk (meaning we aren’t keeping our eye on the top line). Ultimately it impacts the FI’s ability to add assets (either deposits or loans) and also has a direct affect on efficiency and deposit to loan ratios.

From a retention perspective, the risk is even more obvious. Our most valued clients are the ones that we must continuously engage in a proactive manner. Let’s face it. In even the smallest markets, there are no less than four to six other institutions waiting to jump on your client in the event that you grow complacent. There is a huge difference between selection and satisfaction. And, if we aren’t focused on keeping a client after securing them, our net portfolio growth targets will be impossible to achieve. 

Considering the current market environment, now more than ever, effectively managing these three elements of “risk/exposure to the FI” is crucial to an institutions success both practically and pragmatically. Everyone internally at the bank is focused on the “credit risk mitigation” piece. The conversations that are occurring outside of the bank’s walls however are focused on the “L” word or liquidity and getting credit flowing again.

How many times have we read or more frankly been beaten with this comment from business owners “…there’s no one making loans anymore…” or “…its impossible to get credit…?”

That should be read as … penetration and retention

Striking a balance between effective and appropriate credit risk exposure and deepening or growing the portfolio has been a challenge facing those of us in the front office for as long as I can remember. The “sales revolution” is effectively over. We’ve learned the critical lesson that we need to evolve beyond being strictly a credit officer (you did learn that right??!!). And, you didn’t/shouldn’t become a “banking products generalist” with no analytical depth. Knowing all this, it is important that we return to the guiding principles of effective lending which include:
- evaluating the scope of the opportunity;
- isolating the risk and identifying a reasonable and realistic recovery/mitigation remedy;
- determining what other alternatives the borrower might be considering; and
- being willing to let the “bad deals” walk.

In subsequent blogs, I’ll provide you with specific tactics aimed at optimizing penetration and retention efforts and implementing effective and practical client management strategies.

After all what would you expect from a business development guy…
 

What is porfolio risk management? It is the active and effective oversight of the current client base with the intent of:

• Maximizing client retention –LOVE
  • Everyone wants to retain clients and deepen relationships!
• Maximize cross-sell opportunities –LOVE
  • Again, everyone wants to retain clients and deepen relationships!
• Minimize loss potential due to credit risk issues –HATE
  • No one wants credit issues to develop!
• Minimize loss potential due to operational risks –HATE
• Maximize profitability through timely identification of risk and appropriate allocation of capital –LOVE / HATE

• Which clients are likely to need additional products and services?
• Which clients have a high potential of leaving your financial institution?
• When do you shift from client retention to credit risk management?
  
   

Part 2

In my last post, I started my review of the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest financial institution peer groups through the end of 2008.

Now, lets look at the resutls relating to credit cost, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings. Again, as you look at these results, I encourage you to consider the processes that your bank currently utilizes for credit risk modeling and financial risk management.

Credit costs
More loans, especially in an economic downturn, mean more credit risk. Credit costs were up tremendously. The Peer group 1 banks reported net loan losses of .89% of total loans. This is an increase from .28% in 2007, which was up from an average of 18 basis points on the portfolio in 2006/2005.  The Peer group 2 banks reported net loan losses of .74%. This is also up substantially from 24 basis points in 2007 and an average of 15 basis points in 2006/2005. The net loan losses reported in the fourth quarter significantly boosted both groups’ year-end loss percentages above where they stood through the first three quarters last year.

Loss allowance accounts
Both groups also ramped up their reserve for future expected losses substantially. The year-end loss allowance account (ALLL) as a percent of total loans stood at 1.81% for the largest banks. This is an increase of almost 50% from an average of 1.21% in the years 2007/2004. Peer group 2 banks saw their reserve for losses go up to 1.57% from an average of 1.24% in the years 2007/2004.

The combination of covering the increased net loan losses and also increasing the loss reserve balance required a huge provision expenses. So, loan balances were up even in the face of increased write-offs and expected forward losses.

Impacts on earnings
Obviously, we would expect this provisioning burden to negatively impact earnings. It did, greatly. Peer group 1 banks saw a decline in return on assets to a negative .07%. This is just below break-even as a group. The average net income percentage stood at .42% of average assets at the end of the third quarter. So, the washout in the fourth quarter reports took the group average to a net loss position for the year. The ROA was at .96% in 2007 and an average of 1.26% in 2006/2005. That is a 111% decline in ROA from 2007. Return on equity also went into the red, down from 11.97% in 2007. ROE stood at 14.36% in 2005.

For the $1B to $3B banks, ROA stood at .35%. This is still a positive number, however, it is way down from 1.08% in 2007, 1.30% in 2006 and 1.33% in 2005. The decline in 2008 was 67% from 2007. ROE for the group was also down, at 4.11% from 12.37% in 2007. The drops in profitability were not entirely the result of credit losses, but this was by far the largest impact from 2007.

The seriously beefed-up ALLL accounts would seem to indicate that, as a group, the banks expect further loan losses, at least through 2009.  These numbers largely pre-dated the launch of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the tier one funding it provided in 2008. But, it is clear that banks had not contracted lending for all of 2008, even in the face of mounting credit issues and a declining economic picture. It will be interesting to see how things unfold in the next several quarters.
 

Part 1

It may be quite useful to compare your financial institution's portfolio risk management process or your investment plans , to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same -- believe it or not. Here are the averages. You should look for differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers and the other half may be naturally worse.

As promised, I have again reviewed the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest peer groups through the end 2008. The Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) is a compilation of the FDIC, based on the call reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC reports peer averages for various bank size groupings and here are a few notable findings for the two largest groups that covers 494 reporting banks.

Peer group 1

• Peer group 1 consisted of 189 institutions over $3 billion in average total assets for the year.
• Net loans accounted for 67.31% of average total assets, which is up from 65.79 % in 2007. 
• Loans, as a percent of assets, have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for the largest banks was also up to 96% from 91% in 2007 and 88% in both 2006 and 2005.

So, it appears these banks were lending more in 2008 as an allocation of their total asset base and relative to their deposit sources of funding.

In fact, net loans grew at a rate of 9.34% for this group, which is down from the average growth rate of 15.07% for the years 2005 through 2007.  The growth rate in loans is down, which is probably due to tightened credit standards. However, it is still growth. And, since total average assets also had growth of 11.58% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances increased at the largest banks.

• Peer group 2 consisted of 305 reporting financial institutions between $1B and $3B in total assets.
• The net loans accounted for 72.96% of average total assets, up from 71.75% in 2007. 
• Again, the loans as a percent of total assets have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for these banks was up to 95% from 92% in 2007 and an average of 90% for 2006 and 2005.

So, these banks are also lending more in 2008 as a portion of their asset base and relative to their deposit source of funding.

Net loans grew at a rate of 10.48% for this group in 2008 which is down from 11.94% growth in 2007 and down from an average growth of 15.04% for 2006 and 2005. And, since total average assets also had growth of 10.02% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances also increased at the intermediate size banks. Again here, the growth rate in loans is down, probably due to tightened credit standards, but it is still growth and it is at a slightly more aggressive rate than the largest bank group.

Combined, for these 494 largest financial institutions, loans were still growing through 2008 both as a percentage of asset allocation and in absolute dollars.

Tune in to my next blog to read more about the results shown relating to credit costs, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings.
 

Part 1

Beyond the risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital position, which is directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk.  We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk.

Business risk includes:

• A variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making;
• Governance considerations; 
• Executive behavior (for lack of better terminology);
• Management succession events or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business.

Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a 20% infusion of added tier 1 capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department does not have voting rights like common shareholders, but the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form includes at least 35 pages of terms, plus the required Letter Agreement, Schedules attached to the Letter Agreement and at least five significant Annex’s to the Purchase Agreement. It’s NOT an easy, quick or fun read.

In the Recitals section, it states that the bank: “agrees to expand the flow of credit to U.S. consumers and businesses on competitive terms as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy” and, later, “agrees to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms of residential mortgages as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy.” Fortunately, if you’re a banker, these topics are not (currently) revisited elsewhere in the document, period. However, these are examples of the new shareholder effecting business decision making without the need to be on the Board of Directors, or voting common shares.

The Agreement covers a number of other requirements and limitations, such as executive compensation, dividend payments, other capital sourcing and retention of bank holding company status. None of these are particularly onerous, but they must be taken into account by management.

Visit my next post to read about the very interesting Amendment clause that may represent an open-ended business portfolio risk management decision for the future.