Decision Analytics | Relationship Management

---by Monica Bellflower

When a client is selecting questions to use, Knowledge Based Authentication is always about the underlying data – or at least it should be.  The strength of Knowledge Based Authentication questions will depend, in large part, on the strength of the data and how reliable it is.  After all, if you are going to depend on Knowledge Based Authentication for part of your risk management and decisioning strategy the data better be accurate.  I’ve heard it said within the industry that clients only want a system that works and they have no interest where the data originates.  Personally, I think that opinion is wrong. 

I think it is closer to the truth to say there are those who would prefer if clients didn’t know where the data that supports their fraud models and Knowledge Based Authentication questions originates; and I think those people “encourage” clients not to ask.  It isn’t a secret that many within the industry use public record data as the primary source for their Knowledge Based Authentication products, but what’s important to consider is just how accessible that public record information is.  Think about that for a minute.  If a vendor can build questions on public record data, can a fraudster find the answers in public record data via an online search? 

Using Knowledge Based Authentication for fraud account management is a delicate balance between customer experience/relationship management and risk management.  Because it is so important, we believe in research – reading the research of well-known and respected groups like Pew, Tower, Javelin, etc. and doing our own research.  Based on our research, I know consumers prefer questions that are appropriate and relative to their activity.  In other words, if the consumer is engaged in a credit-granting activity, it may be less appropriate to ask questions centered on personal associations and relatives.  Questions should be difficult for the fraudster, but not difficult or perceived as inappropriate or intrusive by the true consumer.  Additionally, I think questions should be applicable to many clients and many consumers.  The question set should use a mix of data sources: public, proprietary, non-credit, credit (if permissible purpose exists) and innovative. 

Is it appropriate to have in-depth data discussions with clients about each data source?  Debatable.  Is it appropriate to ensure that each client has an understanding of the questions they ask as part of Knowledge Based Authentication and where the data that supports those questions originates?  Absolutely.

 

-- by Kari Michel

The Credit Card Act has important implications on risk management, relationship management and assessing credit risk.  The Federal Reserve Board approved final rules implementing the Credit Card Act which will require credit card issuers to assess borrowers’ “ability to pay”.  The Credit Card Act added new Truth in Lending Act (TILA) Section 150 prohibiting a card issuer from opening a credit card account for a consumer, or increasing the credit limit applicable to a credit card account, unless the card issuer considers the consumer’s ability to make the required minimum payment.

The final rules explicitly allow for the use of “empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound models that reasonably estimate a consumer’s income or assets.”  The Board clarified that the card issuers are not obligated to obtain income or asset information directly from a consumer.  Instead, card issuers may also rely on information from third parties, subject to any applicable restrictions on information sharing. The rule provides that card issuers may use models that reasonably estimate a consumer’s income or assets.  This rule will become effective February 22, 2010.

Many lenders were relieved to hear that ‘ability to pay’ models can be used to comply with this new regulation.  Experian’s Income InsightSM addresses the requirements of the final Federal Reserve Board rules for assessment of ability to pay.  The model supports lenders’ compliance in a cost-effective and efficient manner.

--by Monica Bellflower

I received a call on my cell phone the other day. It was my bank calling because a transaction outside of my normal behavior pattern tripped a flag in their fraud models. “Hello!" said the friendly, automated voice, “I’m calling from [bank name] and we need to talk to you about some unusual transaction activity on your account, but before we do, I need to make sure Monica Bellflower has answered the phone. We need to ask you a few questions for security reasons to protect your account. Please hold on a moment.” 

At this point, the IVR (Interactive Voice Response) system invoked a Knowledge Based Authentication session that the IVR controlled. The IVR, not a call center representative, asked me the Knowledge Based Authentication questions and confirmed the answers with me. 

When the session was completed, I had been authenticated, and the friendly, automated voice thanked me before launching into the list of transactions to be reviewed. Only when I questioned the transaction was I transferred, immediately – with no hold time, to a human fraud account management specialist. The entire process was seamless and as smooth as butter.

Using IVR technology is not new, but using IVR to control a Knowledge Based Authentication session is one way of controlling operational expenses. An example of this is reducing the number of humans that are required, while increasing the ROI made in both the Knowledge Based Authentication tool and the IVR solution. 

From a risk management standpoint, the use of decisioning strategies and fraud models allows for the objective review of a customer’s transactions, while employing fraud best practices. After all, an IVR never hinted at an answer or helped a customer pass Knowledge Based Authentication, and an IVR didn't get hired in a call center for the purpose of committing fraud.  

These technologies lend themselves well, to fraud alerts and identity theft prevention programs, and also to account management activities. Experian has successfully integrated Knowledge Based Authentication with IVR as part of relationship management and/or risk management solutions. 

--Kelly Kent

A recent New York Times (1) article outlined the latest release of credit borrowing by the Federal Reserve, indicating that American’s borrowed less for the ninth-straight month in October. Nested within the statistics released by the Federal Reserve were metrics around reduced revolving credit demand and comments about how “Americans are borrowing less as they try to replenish depleted investments.”

While this may be true, I tend to believe that macro-level statements are not fully explaining the differences between consumer experiences that influence relationship management choices in the current economic environment.

To expand on this, I think a closer look at consumers at opposite ends of the credit risk spectrum tells a very interesting story. In fact, recent bank card usage and delinquency data suggests that there are at least a couple of distinct patterns within the overall trend of reducing revolving credit demand:

• First, although it is true that overall revolving credit balances are decreasing, this is a macro-level trend that is not consistent with the detail we see at the consumer level. In fact, despite a reduction of open credit card accounts and overall industry balances, at the consumer-level, individual balances are up – that’s to say that although there are fewer cards out there, those that do have them are carrying higher balances.

• Secondly, there are significant differences between the most and least-risky consumers when it comes to changes in balances. For instance, consumers who fall into the least-risky VantageScore® tiers, Tier A and B, show only 12 percent and 4 percent year-over-year balance increases in Q3 2009, respectively. Contrast that to the increase in average balance for VantageScore F consumers, who are the most risky, whose average balances increased more than 28 percent for the same time period.

So, although the industry-level trend holds true, the challenges facing the “average” consumer in America are not average at all – they are unique and specific to each consumer and continue to illustrate the challenge in assessing consumers' credit card risk in the current credit environment.

1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/business/economy/08econ.html

--by Tom Hannagan

I was hoping someone would ask about these risk management terms…and someone did. The obvious answer is that the “A” and the “O” are reversed. But, there’s more to it than that. First, let’s see how the acronyms were derived. RORAC is Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital. RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital. Both of these five-letter abbreviations are a step up from ROE.

This is natural, I suppose, since ROE, meaning Return on Equity of course, is merely a three-letter profitability ratio. A serious breakthrough in risk management and profit performance measurement will have to move up to at least six initials in its abbreviation. Nonetheless, ROE is the jumping-off point towards both RORAC and RAROC.

ROE is generally Net Income divided by Equity, and ROE has many advantages over Return on Assets (ROA), which is Net Income divided by Average Assets. I promise, really, no more new acronyms in this post.

The calculations themselves are pretty easy. ROA tends to tell us how effectively an organization is generating general ledger earnings on its base of assets.  This used to be the most popular way of comparing banks to each other and for banks to monitor their own performance from period to period. Many bank executives in the U.S. still prefer to use ROA, although this tends to be those at smaller banks.

ROE tends to tell us how effectively an organization is taking advantage of its base of equity, or risk-based capital. This has gained in popularity for several reasons and has become the preferred measure at medium and larger U.S. banks, and all international banks. One huge reason for the growing popularity of ROE is simply that it is not asset-dependent. ROE can be applied to any line of business or any product. You must have “assets” for ROA, since one cannot divide by zero. Hopefully your Equity account is always greater than zero. If not, well, lets just say it’s too late to read about this general topic.

The flexibility of basing profitability measurement on contribution to Equity allows banks with differing asset structures to be compared to each other.  This also may apply even for banks to be compared to other types of businesses. The asset-independency of ROE can also allow a bank to compare internal product lines to each other. Perhaps most importantly, this permits looking at the comparative profitability of lines of business that are almost complete opposites, like lending versus deposit services. This includes risk-based pricing considerations. This would be difficult, if even possible, using ROA.

ROE also tells us how effectively a bank (or any business) is using shareholders equity. Many observers prefer ROE, since equity represents the owners’ interest in the business. As we have all learned anew in the past two years, their equity investment is fully at-risk. Equity holders are paid last, compared to other sources of funds supporting the bank. Shareholders are the last in line if the going gets rough. So, equity capital tends to be the most expensive source of funds, carrying the largest risk premium of all funding options. Its successful deployment is critical to the profit performance, even the survival, of the bank. Indeed, capital deployment, or allocation, is the most important executive decision facing the leadership of any organization.

So, why bother with RORAC or RAROC? In short, it is to take risks more fully into the process of risk management within the institution. ROA and ROE are somewhat risk-adjusted, but only on a point-in-time basis and only to the extent risks are already mitigated in the net interest margin and other general ledger numbers. The Net Income figure is risk-adjusted for mitigated (hedged) interest rate risk, for mitigated operational risk (insurance expenses) and for the expected risk within the cost of credit (loan loss provision).

The big risk management elements missing in general ledger-based numbers include: market risk embedded in the balance sheet and not mitigated, credit risk costs associated with an economic downturn, unmitigated operational risk, and essentially all of the strategic risk (or business risk) associated with being a banking entity. Most of these risks are summed into a lump called Unexpected Loss (UL). Okay, so I fibbed about no more new acronyms. UL is covered by the Equity account, or the solvency of the bank becomes an issue.

RORAC is Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RORAC doesn’t add much risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, but it can take into account the risk of unexpected loss. It does this, by moving beyond just book or average Equity, by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. This, in turn, makes it possible to move towards risk-based pricing at the relationship management level as well as portfolio risk management.  This equity, or capital, allocation should be based on the relative risk of unexpected loss for the different product groups. So, it’s a big step in the right direction if you want a profitability metric that goes beyond ROE in addressing risk. And, many of us do.

RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RAROC does add risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, by taking into account the unmitigated market risk embedded in an asset or liability. RAROC, like RORAC, also takes into account the risk of unexpected loss by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. So, RAROC risk-adjusts both the Net Income in the numerator AND the allocated Equity in the denominator. It is a fully risk-adjusted metric or ratio of profitability and is an ultimate goal of modern risk management. 

So, RORAC is a big step in the right direction and RAROC would be the full step in management of risk. RORAC can be a useful step towards RAROC. RAROC takes ROE to a fully risk-adjusted metric that can be used at the entity level.  This  can also be broken down for any and all lines of business within the organization. Thence, it can be further broken down to the product level, the client relationship level, and summarized by lender portfolio or various market segments. This kind of measurement is invaluable for a highly leveraged business that is built on managing risk successfully as much as it is on operational or marketing prowess.

Please refer to my blogs five and six for more information about ROE and the term “unpredictable variability:”  http://www.decisionanalyticsblog.experian.com/blog/risk-based-pricing-2

--by Mike Sutton

I recently interviewed a number of Experian clients to determine how they believe their organizations and industry peers will prioritize collections process improvement over the next 24 months. Additional contributions were collected by written surveys. Here are several interesting observations:

All of the categories mentioned above were considered important by every respondent, but the most urgent priorities were not consistent across industries.

There are a lot of areas covered in your comment: efficiency; credit quality (human side or character in an impersonal environment); and policy adherence. 

We define efficiency and effectiveness using these metrics:

• Turnaround time from application submission to decision;
• Resulting delinquencies based upon type of underwriting (centralized vs. decentralized);
• Production levels between centralized and decentralized;
• Performance of the portfolio based upon type of underwriting; and
• Turnaround time from application submission to decision

Due to the nature of Experian’s technology, we are able to capture start and stop times of the typical activities related to loan origination.  After analyzing the data from 160+ financial institutions of all sizes, Experian publishes an annual small business benchmark report that documents loan origination process efficiencies and inefficiencies, benchmarking these as industry standards.  

Turnaround Time

From the benchmark report, we’ve seen that institutions that are centralized have consistently had a turnaround time that is half of those with decentralized environments.

Interestingly, turnaround time is also much faster for the larger institutions than for smaller.  This is confusing because the smaller community banks tend to promote the close relationship they have with their clients and their communities. Yet, when it comes to actually making a loan decision, it tends to take longer.

In addition to speed, another aspect of turnaround is consistency.  We all can think of situations where we were able to beat the stated turnaround times of the larger or the centralized institutions.  Unfortunately, these tend to be isolated instances versus the consistent performance that is delivered in the centralized environment.

Resulting delinquencies based upon type of underwriting/Performance of the portfolio based upon type of underwriting

Again, referring to the annual small business lending benchmark report, delinquencies in a centralized environment are 50% of those in a decentralized environment. 

I have worked with a number of institutions that allow the loan officer/relationship manager to “reverse the decision” made by a centralized underwriting group.  The thinking is that the human aspect is otherwise missing in centralized underwriting.  When the data is collected, though, the incremental business/portfolio that is approved by the loan officer (who is close to the client and knows the human side) is not profitable from a credit quality perspective.  Specifically, this incremental portfolio typically has a net charge-off rate that exceeds the net interest margin -- and this is before we even consider the non-interest expense incurred. 

Your choice: is the incremental business critical to your success…or could you more fruitfully direct your relationship officer’s attention elsewhere?

Production levels between centralized and decentralized

Not to beat a dead horse, but the multiple of two comes into play here too.  As one looks at the throughput of each role (data entry, underwriter, relationship manager/lender), the production levels of a centralized environment are typically double that of a decentralized.

It’s clear that the data point to the efficiency and effectiveness of a centralized environment

Much of the discussion on Capitol Hill revolves around sufficient risk-based capital and the derivation of how much tier 1 capital and/or common equity capital is appropriate. Most of our solution offerings and consulting services address various aspects of risk management, from targeting prospective customers, through loan origination and risk-based pricing, to ongoing relationship management and portfolio monitoring. We have been addressing risk management with our clients long before the recent financial and economic crises. We are both ready and able to assist new and existing clients in many ways: to effectively and efficiently address the management of credit and other risks and to develop strategies that offer optimal risk-based profit performance. We are always monitoring regulatory developments and, as always, will strive to assist our clients with new best practices to operate as effectively as possible under any new regulations affecting risk management policies, processes and governance responsibilities.

Some articles that I’ve come across recently have puzzled me.

In those articles, authors use the terms “monetary base” and “money supply” synonymously -- but those terms are actually very different.

The monetary base (currency plus Fed deposits) is a much smaller number than the money supply (M1). The huge change in the “base”, which the Fed did affect by adding $1T or so to infuse a lot of quick liquidity into the financial system late in 2007/early 2008, does not necessarily impact M1 (which includes the base plus all bank demand deposits) all that much in the short-term, and may impact it even less in the intermediate-term if the Fed reduces its holdings of securities.  Some are correct, of course, in positing that a rotation out of securities by the Fed will tend to put pressure on market rates.

Some are equivocating the 2007 liquidity moves of the Fed, with a major monetary policy change. When the capital markets froze due to liquidity and credit risks in August/September of 2007, monetary policy was not the immediate risk, or even a consideration. Without the liquidity injections in that timeframe, monetary policy would have become less than an academic consideration.

Tying the “constrained” (which actually was a slowdown in growth of) bank lending to bank reserves on account at the Fed I don’t think their Fed reserve balance was ever an issue for lending. Banks slowed down lending because the level of credit risk increased. Borrowers were defaulting. Bank deposit balances were actually increasing through the financial crisis. [See my Feb 26 and March 5 blogs] So, loan funding, at least from deposit sources was not the problem for most banks. Of course, for a small number of banks that had major securities losses, capital was being lost and therefore not available to back increased lending. But demand deposit balances were growing.

Some authors are linking bank reserves to the ability of banks to raise liabilities, which makes little sense. Banks’ respective abilities to gather demand deposits (insured by the FDIC, at no small expense to the banks) was always wide open, and their ability to borrow funds is much more a function of asset quality (or net asset value) more than it relates their relatively small reserve balances at the Fed.

These actions may result in high inflation levels and high interest rates -- but it will be because of poor Fed decisions in the future, not because of the Fed’s action of last year. It will also depend on whether the fiscal (deficit) actions of the government are: 1) economically productive and 2) tempered to a recovery, or not. I think that is a bigger macro-economic risk than Fed monetary policy.

In fact, the only way bank executives can wisely manage the entity over an extended timeframe is to be able to direct resources across all possibilities on a risk-adjusted basis. The question isn’t whether risk-based pricing is appropriate for all lines of business, but rather how might or should it be applied.

For commercial lending into the middle and corporate markets, there is enough money at stake to warrant evaluating each loan and deposit, as well as the status of the client relationship, on an individual basis. This means some form of simulation modeling by relationship managers on new sales opportunities (including renewals) and the model’s ready access to current data on all existing pieces of business with each relationship. [See my April 24 blog entry.]

This process also implies the ability to easily aggregate the risk-return status of a group of related clients and to show lenders how their portfolio of accounts is performing on a risk-adjusted basis. This type of model-based analysis needs to be flexible enough to handle differing loan structures, easy for a lender to use and quick. The better models can perform such analysis in minutes. I’ve discussed the elements of such models in earlier posts.

But, with small business and consumer lending there are other considerations that come into play. The principles of risk-based pricing are consistent across any loan or deposit. With small business lending, the process of selling, negotiating, underwriting and origination is significantly more streamlined and under some form of workflow control.

With consumer lending, there are more regulations to take into account and there are mass marketing considerations driving the “sales” process.

Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.
 

• Investigate how your sales organization manages and provides oversight on referrals and new opportunities
  • Are you aware of what is going on in these critical areas? 
• Document how your process ensures that pre- and post-funding conditions on credit facilities are fulfilled
  • Are critical requirements falling through the cracks?
• Ask how your financial institution makes sure that your credit facility and its related collateral remain in good standing
  • Are your processes (that ensure you stay on top of financial information, UCC filings, borrowing bases, insurance, etc.) effective?

• Take a look at how your perception of small business loans has kept you from preventing problem situations.
   
• Consider migrating to a more proactive approach in your loan renewal/review process; it can have an impact on your profitability.
   
• Consider freeing up more time for your lenders and relationship managers and investigate what could be done with that time to better benefit your financial institution.

• Price your transactions during the pre-sales process for differential risk (for all risk types).
• Sell services to your clients through relationship management based on risk-adjusted profit.
• Consider looking at risk-based lender performance metrics in your financial institution.
• Benchmark your entity performance over time.
• Benchmark your entity performance and compare that to your peers.

As I'm preparing for traveling to the Baker Hill Solution Summit next week, I thought I would revisit the ideas of risk-based loan pricing.

Risk Adjusted Loan Pricing – The Major Parts 

I have referred to risk-adjusted commercial loan pricing (or the lack of it) in previous posts. At times, I’ve commented on aspects of risk-based pricing and risk-based bank performance measurement,  but I haven’t discussed what risk-based pricing is -- in a comprehensive manner. Perhaps, I can begin to do that now, and in my next posts.

Risk-based pricing analysis is a product-level microcosm of risk-based bank performance. You begin by looking at the financial implications of a product sale from a cost accounting perspective. This means calculating the revenues associated with a loan, including the interest income and any fee-based income. These revenues need to be spread over the life of the loan, while taking into account the amortization characteristics of the balance (or average usage for a line of credit). To save effort (and in providing good client relationship management), we often download the balance and rate information for existing loans from a bank’s loan accounting system.

To “risk-adjust” the interest income, you need to apply a cost of funds that has the same implied market risk characteristics as the loan balance. This is not like the bank’s actual cost of funds for several reasons. Most importantly, there is usually no automatic risk-based matching between the manner in which the bank makes loans and the term characteristics of its deposits and/or borrowing. Once we establish a cost of funds approach that removes interest rate risk from the loan, we subtract the risk-adjusted interest expense from the revenues to arrive at risk-adjusted net interest income, or our risk-adjusted gross margin.

We then subtract two types of costs. One cost includes the administrative or overhead expenses associated with the product. Our best practice is to derive an approach to operating expense breakdowns that takes into account all of the bank’s non-interest expenses. This is a “full absorption” method of cost accounting. We want to know the marginal cost of doing business, but if we just apply the marginal cost to all loans, a large portion of real-life expenses won’t be covered by resulting pricing. As a result, the bank’s profits may suffer.

We fully understand the argument for marginal cost coverage, but have seen the unfortunate end-result of too many sales -- that use this lower cost factor -- hurt a bank’s bottom line. Administrative cost does not normally require additional risk adjustment, as any risk-based operational expenses and costs of mitigating operation risk are already included in the bank’s general ledger for non-interest expenses.

The second expense subtracted from net interest income is credit risk cost. This is not the same as the bank’s provision expense, and is certainly not the same as the loss provision in any one accounting period.  The credit risk cost for pricing purposes should be risk adjusted based on both product type (usually loan collateral category) and the bank’s risk rating for the loan in question. This metric will calculate the relative probability of default for the borrower combined with the loss given default for the loan type in question.

We usually annualize the expected loss numbers by taking into account a multi-year history and a one- or two-year projection of net loan losses. These losses are broken down by loan type and risk rating based on the bank’s actual distribution of loan balances.

The risk costs by risk rating are then created using an up-sloping curve that is similar in shape to an industry default experience curve. This assures a realistic differentiation of losses by risk rating. Many banks have loss curves that are too flat in nature, resulting in little or no price differentiation based on credit quality. This leads to poor risk-based performance metrics and, ultimately, to poor overall financial performance. The loss expense curves are fine-tuned so that over a period of years the total credit risk costs, when applied to the entire portfolio, should cover the average annual expected loss experience of the bank.

By subtracting the operating expenses and credit risk loss from risk-adjusted net interest income, we arrive at risk-adjusted pre-tax income. In my next post we’ll expand this discussion further to risk-adjusted net income, capital allocation for unexpected loss and profit ratio considerations.

1.       Portfolio Management – You should really focus on this topic in 2009.  With many institutions already streamlining the origination process, portfolio management is the logical next step.  While the foundation is based in credit quality, portfolio management is not just for the credit side. 

2.       Review of Data (aka “Getting Behind the Numbers”) – We are not talking about scorecard validation; that’s another subject.  This is more general.  Traditional commercial lending rarely maintains a sophisticated database on its clients.  Even when it does, traditional commercial lending rarely analyzes the data. 

3.       Lowering Costs of Origination – Always a shoe-in for a goal in any year!  But how does an institution make meaningful and marked improvements in reducing its costs of origination? 

4.       Scorecard Validation – Getting more specific with the review of data.  Discuss the basic components of the validation process and what your institution can do to best prepare itself for analyzing the results of a validation.  Whether it be an interim validation or a full-sized one, put together the right steps to ensure your institution derives the maximum benefit from its scorecard.

5.       Turnaround Times (Response to Client) –Rebuild it.  Make the origination process better, stronger and faster.  No; we aren’t talking about bionics here -- nor how you can manipulate the metrics to report a faster turnaround time.  We are talking about what you can do from a loan applicant perspective to improve turnaround time.

6.       Training – Where are all the training programs?  Send in all the training programs!  Worry, because they are not here.  (Replace training programs with clowns and we might have an oldies song.)  Can’t find the right people with the right talent in the marketplace? 

7.       Application Volume/Marketing/Relationship Management – You can design and execute the most efficient origination and portfolio management processes.   But, without addressing client and application volume, what good are they?

8.       Pricing/Yield on Portfolio – “We compete on service, not price.” We’ve heard this over and over again.  In reality, the sales side always resorts to price as the final differentiator.  Utilizing standardization and consistency can streamline your process and drive improved yields on your portfolio.

9.       Management Metrics – How do I know that I am going in the right direction?  Strategize, implement, execute, measure and repeat.  Learn how to set your targets to provide meaningful bottom line results.

10.    Operational Risk Management – Different from credit risk, operational risk and its management, operational risk management deals with what an institution should do to make sure it is not open to operational risk in the portfolio. Items totally in the control of the institution, if not executed properly, can cause significant loss.

What do you think? As the end of April approaches, are these still hot topics in your financial institution?

• Engage in relationship reviews
  • These are a way to proactively outreach key clients
  • This is NOT the "annual credit review"
  • They must be objective in order to map and identify future opportunities
  • Think in a longer-term perspective such as a 12- to 18-month duration

• Have you purchased a “list” from a third party in the past 12 months?
• Did you include any of the following elements in the data that you retrieved
  • Commercial Intelliscore/PayDex Score
  • Combined Trade Balance
  • UCC Counts
  • Industry segment
     
• What method did you use to distribute the names (manual or using technology such as a customer relationship management tool)?

Good day all. My last blog revolved around practical approaches to effective client relationship management. It time to get back to a “risk” type conversation.

I recently told my wife that if I hear the phrase “…in this economic environment …” uttered as a caveat one more time, I’m going to scream. I have truly come to anticipate the beginning or introduction to interviews and articles to lead in with this sentiment and it’s driving me nuts.

In these economic times (you can tell I’m from the sales side, I cleverly changed the phrase), it is clearly not business as usual within most financial institutions. Conversations with CEOs and bank presidents over the past two months have usually followed the same theme, “I’ve got money to lend, but I just can’t find a decent deal” or “I’ve got applications up the wazoo, but the quality just isn’t there.”

So, what is going on?
The obvious answer is that we are looking at applications more closely and the credit side (risk management guys) is deliriously happy because everytime they make a recommendation about “reviewing the opportunity further” they also don’t hesitate to mention, “in this economic environment.”

Really, what is the scoop and how do we adjust on the front line?
Clearly, we know that deeper reviews and management of risk is being undertaken. The problem is that the established standards are no longer valid. Yes, the basics ratios still need to be run, but let’s face it, in this economic environment a company’s historical performance is no longer an effective indicator as to their future performance. The playing field is no longer consistent. The past two to three years of financials are based on circumstances that no longer apply. This means that the analysts are having a difficult time establishing effective benchmarks from which to apply credit policy – and we know that those guys are the paragons of adaptability.

We are being asked to evaluate risk in an uncertain circumstance. We are looking at projected revenues and earnings and examining receivables. We are also comparing this business to others in the industry, determining which other market segments have a direct (and indirect) impact on the performance of this one, reviewing business plans and evaluating management depth and experience. And, at the end of the day, either saying no, saying yes but not so much or holding our breath and hoping that divine intervention shows us the way.

Does any of this should sound familiar to you?
It should. We see these type of deals all of the time and we call them the start-ups.

Ok, so what am I recommending? Quite simply, that we take a step back from our typical approach to the established business and engage with them the way we would a start-up.

When an opportunity or request presents itself, restrain the urge to go down the garden path. Slow down! No... stop! Take a deep breath, put on your “economic development hat ” and approach the deal the way you would if it were a start-up (and I don’t mean running away at top speed in the opposite direction screaming). You should: 

• look for or help them construct a short term (next four to six month) tactical action/priority plan;
• help them or review their 12-month business plan;
  o NOTE: If the business hasn’t realized that they need a short-term survival plan and a mid-term business plan… run! Run far and run fast!
• examine their market and have them explain why they will make it versus the competition;
• dig into their management expertise (think AIG);
• have them explain how their tactical and 12-month business plan will keep the doors open and the lights on (since its coming into summer we’ll cut them some slack on the heat); and finally
• review and revise their projections.

If at the end of this, you still feel that the deal has legs, it probably does, and you’ve done a pretty thorough job building the business case for the credit side.

Or, you could just lament that there really isn’t much out there in this economic environment.
 

Part 2

Two additional tactics that you should incorporate into your relationship management penetration strategy include:

• Conducting relationship reviews in addition to loan reviews; and
• Identifying and proactively monitoring changes in client behavior.

Relationship reviews
Relationship reviews are a comprehensive and thorough examination of the client’s business and should be the foundation for your relationship management process. They seek to provide both the client and the relationship manager with a roadmap for the upcoming 14- to 16-month period by identifying specific goals and concerns, as well as constructing a snapshot of the client today. The purpose of a relationship review is to understand the broader direction.  Bluntly put, an annual loan review is not a penetration activity. Its primary focus is to verify the ongoing credit worthiness of an existing deal in the books. More details will come about this topic in a future blog.

Monitoring changes in behavior
Monitoring changes in client behavior through the use of “activity thresholding” is quickly becoming a mainstay in the financial industry. The idea isn’t new; however, the application of the concept to penetration is. Instead of having changes in credit score trigger an alert related to risk management and mitigation, we would instead look at thresholds related to line usage, number of deposit transactions, changes in average deposit amount and credit card transactions.

These kinds of client behaviors and activities provide insight into what is occurring within a clients business and as such, allow us to provide recommendations for products and services that are meaningful and appropriate.
 
 

Part 1

Ok, it’s me again, your business development guy in financial risk management clothing. In my first blog, I promised that I would start providing specific tactics related to optimizing penetration and retention efforts.
 
So, in “non-consultant” speak, we’re trying to figure out:

• how we are going to get deeper with existing clients;
• keep the (good) business we have; and 
• find new opportunities.

Today, we’ll focus on client penetration strategies. Some of this should be pretty self-explanatory.  If it is, that’s good. If it isn’t, you have a lot of work to do.

First, let’s recognize that not clients are going to be suitable candidates for increasing the existing relationship. Secondly, we can’t focus strictly on those “A” clients in our portfolio (assuming that you’ve implemented even the most rudimentary sales segmentation strategy, which is categorization into three to four tiers based on total relationship). There simply aren’t that many and if you’ve done your job effectively, there shouldn’t be many more “A” clients to add.

Getting deeper requires a defined approach. It doesn’t just happen. Clients will not call you on a regular or on-going basis and tell you that they need more services (well not usually). Rather, the responsibility rests on our shoulders to uncover changes in their operations and to look for signs that indicate growth, changes in direction and/or priority or changes in their day-to-day activities.

Sounds simple right? So, how should you do this?

One approach might be to engage in a “client call/touch routine” that will have you contacting the upper 65 percent of your portfolio on a pre-defined schedule or frequency. The rationale being that continued and consistent interaction with the client base will result in both uncovering possible “new” needs as well ensuring that in the event there is a competitive effort underway, we will have the opportunity to provide our recommendation.  

My next blog will feature two additional tactics to include in your relationship management process.