Risk-based pricing

Thomas A. Hannagan – Senior Client Partner at Baker Hill – Pricing and Profitability

Welcome to my blog! My name is Tom Hannagan and I am a senior client partner at Baker Hill, a part of Experian. I specialize in advising bank management on enhanced profitability strategies in commercial lending -- through better loan pricing simulation and more profit-oriented relationship management.

I have assisted banks with the successful deployment of risk-based pricing and relationship management tools, along with summary reporting of their portfolio performance.

My goals for this blog will be to discuss assessing, planning and deploying risk-adjusted and systematic commercial loan pricing methodology and other ways to perform risk management for your organization.

I am a graduate of the University of Illinois with a Bachelors degree in Finance and Accounting and a Masters degree in Economics. I grew up Champaign, IL and I enjoy playing golf and sports car racing.

--by Tom Hannagan

I was hoping someone would ask about these risk management terms…and someone did. The obvious answer is that the “A” and the “O” are reversed. But, there’s more to it than that. First, let’s see how the acronyms were derived. RORAC is Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital. RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital. Both of these five-letter abbreviations are a step up from ROE.

This is natural, I suppose, since ROE, meaning Return on Equity of course, is merely a three-letter profitability ratio. A serious breakthrough in risk management and profit performance measurement will have to move up to at least six initials in its abbreviation. Nonetheless, ROE is the jumping-off point towards both RORAC and RAROC.

ROE is generally Net Income divided by Equity, and ROE has many advantages over Return on Assets (ROA), which is Net Income divided by Average Assets. I promise, really, no more new acronyms in this post.

The calculations themselves are pretty easy. ROA tends to tell us how effectively an organization is generating general ledger earnings on its base of assets.  This used to be the most popular way of comparing banks to each other and for banks to monitor their own performance from period to period. Many bank executives in the U.S. still prefer to use ROA, although this tends to be those at smaller banks.

ROE tends to tell us how effectively an organization is taking advantage of its base of equity, or risk-based capital. This has gained in popularity for several reasons and has become the preferred measure at medium and larger U.S. banks, and all international banks. One huge reason for the growing popularity of ROE is simply that it is not asset-dependent. ROE can be applied to any line of business or any product. You must have “assets” for ROA, since one cannot divide by zero. Hopefully your Equity account is always greater than zero. If not, well, lets just say it’s too late to read about this general topic.

The flexibility of basing profitability measurement on contribution to Equity allows banks with differing asset structures to be compared to each other.  This also may apply even for banks to be compared to other types of businesses. The asset-independency of ROE can also allow a bank to compare internal product lines to each other. Perhaps most importantly, this permits looking at the comparative profitability of lines of business that are almost complete opposites, like lending versus deposit services. This includes risk-based pricing considerations. This would be difficult, if even possible, using ROA.

ROE also tells us how effectively a bank (or any business) is using shareholders equity. Many observers prefer ROE, since equity represents the owners’ interest in the business. As we have all learned anew in the past two years, their equity investment is fully at-risk. Equity holders are paid last, compared to other sources of funds supporting the bank. Shareholders are the last in line if the going gets rough. So, equity capital tends to be the most expensive source of funds, carrying the largest risk premium of all funding options. Its successful deployment is critical to the profit performance, even the survival, of the bank. Indeed, capital deployment, or allocation, is the most important executive decision facing the leadership of any organization.

So, why bother with RORAC or RAROC? In short, it is to take risks more fully into the process of risk management within the institution. ROA and ROE are somewhat risk-adjusted, but only on a point-in-time basis and only to the extent risks are already mitigated in the net interest margin and other general ledger numbers. The Net Income figure is risk-adjusted for mitigated (hedged) interest rate risk, for mitigated operational risk (insurance expenses) and for the expected risk within the cost of credit (loan loss provision).

The big risk management elements missing in general ledger-based numbers include: market risk embedded in the balance sheet and not mitigated, credit risk costs associated with an economic downturn, unmitigated operational risk, and essentially all of the strategic risk (or business risk) associated with being a banking entity. Most of these risks are summed into a lump called Unexpected Loss (UL). Okay, so I fibbed about no more new acronyms. UL is covered by the Equity account, or the solvency of the bank becomes an issue.

RORAC is Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RORAC doesn’t add much risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, but it can take into account the risk of unexpected loss. It does this, by moving beyond just book or average Equity, by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. This, in turn, makes it possible to move towards risk-based pricing at the relationship management level as well as portfolio risk management.  This equity, or capital, allocation should be based on the relative risk of unexpected loss for the different product groups. So, it’s a big step in the right direction if you want a profitability metric that goes beyond ROE in addressing risk. And, many of us do.

RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RAROC does add risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, by taking into account the unmitigated market risk embedded in an asset or liability. RAROC, like RORAC, also takes into account the risk of unexpected loss by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. So, RAROC risk-adjusts both the Net Income in the numerator AND the allocated Equity in the denominator. It is a fully risk-adjusted metric or ratio of profitability and is an ultimate goal of modern risk management. 

So, RORAC is a big step in the right direction and RAROC would be the full step in management of risk. RORAC can be a useful step towards RAROC. RAROC takes ROE to a fully risk-adjusted metric that can be used at the entity level.  This  can also be broken down for any and all lines of business within the organization. Thence, it can be further broken down to the product level, the client relationship level, and summarized by lender portfolio or various market segments. This kind of measurement is invaluable for a highly leveraged business that is built on managing risk successfully as much as it is on operational or marketing prowess.

Please refer to my blogs five and six for more information about ROE and the term “unpredictable variability:”  http://www.decisionanalyticsblog.experian.com/blog/risk-based-pricing-2

RORAC versus RAROC ?
--by Tom Hannagan

I was hoping someone would ask about these risk management terms…nd someone did. The obvious answer is that the “A” and the “O” are reversed. But, there’s more to it than that. First, let’s see how the acronyms were derived. RORAC is Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital. RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital. Both of these five-letter abbreviations are a step up from ROE. This is natural I suppose since ROE, meaning Return on Equity of course, is merely a three-letter profitability ratio. A serious breakthrough in risk management and profit performance measurement will have to move up to at least six initials in its abbreviation. Nonetheless, ROE is the jumping-off point towards both RORAC and RAROC.

ROE is generally Net Income divided by Equity, and ROE has many advantages over Return on Assets (ROA), which is Net Income divided by Average Assets. I promise, really, no more new acronyms in this post.

The calculations themselves are pretty easy. ROA tends to tell us how effectively an organization is generating general ledger earnings on its base of assets.  This used to be the most popular way of comparing banks to each other and for banks to monitor their own performance from period to period. Many bank executives in the U.S. still prefer to use ROA, although this tends to be those at smaller banks.

ROE tends to tell us how effectively an organization is taking advantage of its base of equity, or risk-based capital. This has gained in popularity for several reasons and has become the preferred measure at medium and larger U.S. banks, and all international banks. One huge reason for the growing popularity of ROE is simply that it is not asset-dependent. ROE can be applied to any line of business or any product. You must have “assets” for ROA, since one cannot divide by zero. Hopefully your Equity account is always greater than zero. If not, well, lets just say it’s too late to read about this general topic.

The flexibility of basing profitability measurement on contribution to Equity allows banks with differing asset structures to be compared to each other.  This also may apply even for banks to be compared to other types of businesses. The asset-independency of ROE can also allow a bank to compare internal product lines to each other. Perhaps most importantly, this permits looking at the comparative profitability of lines of business that are almost complete opposites, like lending versus deposit services. This includes risk-based pricing considerations. This would be difficult, if even possible, using ROA.

ROE also tells us how effectively a bank (or any business) is using shareholders equity. Many observers prefer ROE, since equity represents the owners’ interest in the business. As we have all learned anew in the past two years, their equity investment is fully at-risk. Equity holders are paid last, compared to other sources of funds supporting the bank. Shareholders are the last in line if the going gets rough. So, equity capital tends to be the most expensive source of funds, carrying the largest risk premium of all funding options. Its successful deployment is critical to the profit performance, even the survival, of the bank. Indeed, capital deployment, or allocation, is the most important executive decision facing the leadership of any organization.

So, why bother with RORAC or RAROC? In short, it is to take risks more fully into the process of risk management within the institution. ROA and ROE are somewhat risk-adjusted, but only on a point-in-time basis and only to the extent risks are already mitigated in the net interest margin and other general ledger numbers. The Net Income figure is risk-adjusted for mitigated (hedged) interest rate risk, for mitigated operational risk (insurance expenses) and for the expected risk within the cost of credit (loan loss provision).

The big risk management elements missing in general ledger-based numbers include: market risk embedded in the balance sheet and not mitigated, credit risk costs associated with an economic downturn, unmitigated operational risk, and essentially all of the strategic risk (or business risk) associated with being a banking entity. Most of these risks are summed into a lump called Unexpected Loss (UL). Okay, so I fibbed about no more new acronyms. UL is covered by the Equity account, or the solvency of the bank becomes an issue.

RORAC is Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RORAC doesn’t add much risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, but it can take into account the risk of unexpected loss. It does this, by moving beyond just book or average Equity, by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. This, in turn, makes it possible to move towards risk-based pricing at the relationship management level as well as portfolio risk management.  This equity, or capital, allocation should be based on the relative risk of unexpected loss for the different product groups. So, it’s a big step in the right direction if you want a profitability metric that goes beyond ROE in addressing risk. And, many of us do.

RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RAROC does add risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, by taking into account the unmitigated market risk embedded in an asset or liability. RAROC, like RORAC, also takes into account the risk of unexpected loss by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. So, RAROC risk-adjusts both the Net Income in the numerator AND the allocated Equity in the denominator. It is a fully risk-adjusted metric or ratio of profitability and is an ultimate goal of modern risk management. 

So, RORAC is a big step in the right direction and RAROC would be the full step in management of risk. RORAC can be a useful step towards RAROC. RAROC takes ROE to a fully risk-adjusted metric that can be used at the entity level.  This  can also be broken down for any and all lines of business within the organization. Thence, it can be further broken down to the product level, the client relationship level, and summarized by lender portfolio or various market segments. This kind of measurement is invaluable for a highly leveraged business that is built on managing risk successfully as much as it is on operational or marketing prowess.

Please refer to my blogs five and six for more information about ROE and the term “unpredictable variability:”  http://www.decisionanalyticsblog.experian.com/blog/risk-based-pricing-2

Much of the discussion on Capitol Hill revolves around sufficient risk-based capital and the derivation of how much tier 1 capital and/or common equity capital is appropriate. Most of our solution offerings and consulting services address various aspects of risk management, from targeting prospective customers, through loan origination and risk-based pricing, to ongoing relationship management and portfolio monitoring. We have been addressing risk management with our clients long before the recent financial and economic crises. We are both ready and able to assist new and existing clients in many ways: to effectively and efficiently address the management of credit and other risks and to develop strategies that offer optimal risk-based profit performance. We are always monitoring regulatory developments and, as always, will strive to assist our clients with new best practices to operate as effectively as possible under any new regulations affecting risk management policies, processes and governance responsibilities.

Some articles that I’ve come across recently have puzzled me.

In those articles, authors use the terms “monetary base” and “money supply” synonymously -- but those terms are actually very different.

The monetary base (currency plus Fed deposits) is a much smaller number than the money supply (M1). The huge change in the “base”, which the Fed did affect by adding $1T or so to infuse a lot of quick liquidity into the financial system late in 2007/early 2008, does not necessarily impact M1 (which includes the base plus all bank demand deposits) all that much in the short-term, and may impact it even less in the intermediate-term if the Fed reduces its holdings of securities.  Some are correct, of course, in positing that a rotation out of securities by the Fed will tend to put pressure on market rates.

Some are equivocating the 2007 liquidity moves of the Fed, with a major monetary policy change. When the capital markets froze due to liquidity and credit risks in August/September of 2007, monetary policy was not the immediate risk, or even a consideration. Without the liquidity injections in that timeframe, monetary policy would have become less than an academic consideration.

Tying the “constrained” (which actually was a slowdown in growth of) bank lending to bank reserves on account at the Fed I don’t think their Fed reserve balance was ever an issue for lending. Banks slowed down lending because the level of credit risk increased. Borrowers were defaulting. Bank deposit balances were actually increasing through the financial crisis. [See my Feb 26 and March 5 blogs] So, loan funding, at least from deposit sources was not the problem for most banks. Of course, for a small number of banks that had major securities losses, capital was being lost and therefore not available to back increased lending. But demand deposit balances were growing.

Some authors are linking bank reserves to the ability of banks to raise liabilities, which makes little sense. Banks’ respective abilities to gather demand deposits (insured by the FDIC, at no small expense to the banks) was always wide open, and their ability to borrow funds is much more a function of asset quality (or net asset value) more than it relates their relatively small reserve balances at the Fed.

These actions may result in high inflation levels and high interest rates -- but it will be because of poor Fed decisions in the future, not because of the Fed’s action of last year. It will also depend on whether the fiscal (deficit) actions of the government are: 1) economically productive and 2) tempered to a recovery, or not. I think that is a bigger macro-economic risk than Fed monetary policy.

In fact, the only way bank executives can wisely manage the entity over an extended timeframe is to be able to direct resources across all possibilities on a risk-adjusted basis. The question isn’t whether risk-based pricing is appropriate for all lines of business, but rather how might or should it be applied.

For commercial lending into the middle and corporate markets, there is enough money at stake to warrant evaluating each loan and deposit, as well as the status of the client relationship, on an individual basis. This means some form of simulation modeling by relationship managers on new sales opportunities (including renewals) and the model’s ready access to current data on all existing pieces of business with each relationship. [See my April 24 blog entry.]

This process also implies the ability to easily aggregate the risk-return status of a group of related clients and to show lenders how their portfolio of accounts is performing on a risk-adjusted basis. This type of model-based analysis needs to be flexible enough to handle differing loan structures, easy for a lender to use and quick. The better models can perform such analysis in minutes. I’ve discussed the elements of such models in earlier posts.

But, with small business and consumer lending there are other considerations that come into play. The principles of risk-based pricing are consistent across any loan or deposit. With small business lending, the process of selling, negotiating, underwriting and origination is significantly more streamlined and under some form of workflow control.

With consumer lending, there are more regulations to take into account and there are mass marketing considerations driving the “sales” process.

Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.
 

• Risk isn't evident in the general ledger
• Risk certainly DOES exist
• Risk needs to be identified, measured and managed
• Without (in spite of) Generally Accepted Accounting Practices, banks need other risk analytics
• Risk measures need to assist bankers with product level and relationship-level pricing and profitability

• Price your transactions during the pre-sales process for differential risk (for all risk types).
• Sell services to your clients through relationship management based on risk-adjusted profit.
• Consider looking at risk-based lender performance metrics in your financial institution.
• Benchmark your entity performance over time.
• Benchmark your entity performance and compare that to your peers.

As I'm preparing for traveling to the Baker Hill Solution Summit next week, I thought I would revisit the ideas of risk-based loan pricing.

Risk Adjusted Loan Pricing – The Major Parts 

I have referred to risk-adjusted commercial loan pricing (or the lack of it) in previous posts. At times, I’ve commented on aspects of risk-based pricing and risk-based bank performance measurement,  but I haven’t discussed what risk-based pricing is -- in a comprehensive manner. Perhaps, I can begin to do that now, and in my next posts.

Risk-based pricing analysis is a product-level microcosm of risk-based bank performance. You begin by looking at the financial implications of a product sale from a cost accounting perspective. This means calculating the revenues associated with a loan, including the interest income and any fee-based income. These revenues need to be spread over the life of the loan, while taking into account the amortization characteristics of the balance (or average usage for a line of credit). To save effort (and in providing good client relationship management), we often download the balance and rate information for existing loans from a bank’s loan accounting system.

To “risk-adjust” the interest income, you need to apply a cost of funds that has the same implied market risk characteristics as the loan balance. This is not like the bank’s actual cost of funds for several reasons. Most importantly, there is usually no automatic risk-based matching between the manner in which the bank makes loans and the term characteristics of its deposits and/or borrowing. Once we establish a cost of funds approach that removes interest rate risk from the loan, we subtract the risk-adjusted interest expense from the revenues to arrive at risk-adjusted net interest income, or our risk-adjusted gross margin.

We then subtract two types of costs. One cost includes the administrative or overhead expenses associated with the product. Our best practice is to derive an approach to operating expense breakdowns that takes into account all of the bank’s non-interest expenses. This is a “full absorption” method of cost accounting. We want to know the marginal cost of doing business, but if we just apply the marginal cost to all loans, a large portion of real-life expenses won’t be covered by resulting pricing. As a result, the bank’s profits may suffer.

We fully understand the argument for marginal cost coverage, but have seen the unfortunate end-result of too many sales -- that use this lower cost factor -- hurt a bank’s bottom line. Administrative cost does not normally require additional risk adjustment, as any risk-based operational expenses and costs of mitigating operation risk are already included in the bank’s general ledger for non-interest expenses.

The second expense subtracted from net interest income is credit risk cost. This is not the same as the bank’s provision expense, and is certainly not the same as the loss provision in any one accounting period.  The credit risk cost for pricing purposes should be risk adjusted based on both product type (usually loan collateral category) and the bank’s risk rating for the loan in question. This metric will calculate the relative probability of default for the borrower combined with the loss given default for the loan type in question.

We usually annualize the expected loss numbers by taking into account a multi-year history and a one- or two-year projection of net loan losses. These losses are broken down by loan type and risk rating based on the bank’s actual distribution of loan balances.

The risk costs by risk rating are then created using an up-sloping curve that is similar in shape to an industry default experience curve. This assures a realistic differentiation of losses by risk rating. Many banks have loss curves that are too flat in nature, resulting in little or no price differentiation based on credit quality. This leads to poor risk-based performance metrics and, ultimately, to poor overall financial performance. The loss expense curves are fine-tuned so that over a period of years the total credit risk costs, when applied to the entire portfolio, should cover the average annual expected loss experience of the bank.

By subtracting the operating expenses and credit risk loss from risk-adjusted net interest income, we arrive at risk-adjusted pre-tax income. In my next post we’ll expand this discussion further to risk-adjusted net income, capital allocation for unexpected loss and profit ratio considerations.

Beyond the financial risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital, which would be directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk. We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk. Business risk includes a variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making, corporate governance considerations, executive behavior (for better or worse), management succession events (Apple and Steve Jobs, for instance) or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business.

Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a roughly 20 percent infusion of added tier one capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department says it does not seek voting rights, but none-the-less has gotten them in at least some cases. The real “kicker” is embedded in the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form. 

The most interesting clause, that appears to represent a very open-ended business risk to management decision making, is one relatively small paragraph, named Amendment, in the middle of Article V - Miscellaneous, just ahead of governing law (which is federal law, backed up by the laws of the State of New York).

Amendment begins normally enough, requiring the usual signed agreement of each party, but then states: “provided that the Investor may unilaterally amend any provision of this Agreement to the extent required to comply with any changes after the Signing Date in applicable federal statutes.” Wow. My reading of this is that if in the future Congress enacts anything that Treasury finds applicable to any aspect of the previously signed TARP Agreement, the bank is bound to go along. Regardless of whether the Treasury negotiates any voting rights, once the TARP Agreement is executed by the bank, management is not only bound by what is in the document to begin with, it is subject to future federal law as long as the TARP shares are held by the government. As a result, many banks have said no thank you to TARP.

At least four banks have recently paid back $340 million to repurchase the government’s shares. And, apparently another bank has offered to pay back $1 billion but, according to Andrew Napolitano at Fox Business Channel, the offer was turned down and the bank was threatened with adverse consequences if it persisted in its attempt to get out.

More pointed and public, and much larger in size, is the dance taking place now between Chrysler Corporation, Fiat, the UAW, four lead lenders and, you guessed it, the federal government. The secured loans in question total almost $7 billion and the government wants J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citicorp and Morgan Stanley to exchange $5 billion of the loans for Chrysler stock. The banks know they would do better (for their shareholders) by selling off Chryslers assets. This is an example of why bankruptcy exists. The stakes are large and so is the business risk of the influence from the government. It will be interesting to see how things turn out.

So, this new major owner does have a voice. If Congress wants certain lending volumes or terms, or they want certain compensation levels, it needs to be enacted into federal law. Short of having to pass a law, there is the implied threat of the big stick in the TARP agreement. The Purchase Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.

Part 6

Peer Group 2 fee income
Non-interest income again, as a percent of average total assets, declined to .86 percent from .95 percent in 2007. For Peer Group 2 (PG2), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.04 percent of assets in 2005. A smaller, non-interest bearing deposit base with no other new and offsetting sources of fee income will lead to increased pressure on this metric.

Operating expenses
Operating expenses also put more pressure on earnings on these smaller banks. They increased from 2.79 percent to 2.83 percent of average assets. That’s four basis points on the negative. Historically, this metric has been flattering for this size bank and usually moves up or down from year-to-year. It was almost equal at 2.82 percent of assets in 2004.

As a result of the sizeable decline in margins, the continued decline in fee income and the slight increase in operating expenses PG2’s efficiency ratio lost ground from 59.52 percent in 2007 to only 64.72 percent in 2008. That means that every dollar in gross revenue cost them almost 65 cents in administrative expenses this year. This metric averaged 56 cents in 2005/2006. It’s amazing how close these numbers are for banks of very different size where you would expect clear economies of scale.

The total impact of margin performance, fee income and operating expenses, plus the huge increase in provision expense of 59 basis points leads us to a total decline in pre-tax operating income of .96 percent on total assets. That is a total decline from 1.58 percent pre-tax ROA in 2007 to .64 percent pre-tax ROA, a loss of 61 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007. My same conclusion as above would hold regarding the pricing of risk into bank lending (although the smaller banks didn’t perform a badly as the larger in this regard).

Although all 490 banks are declining in all profit metrics, the smaller banks seem to have an edge in pricing loans, but not deposits. Although up dramatically in 2007, and even more in 2008 for both groups, the PG2 banks seem to be suffering fewer credit losses relative to their asset size than their larger brethren. Both groups have resulting huge profit declines, but the largest banks are under the most pressure through this period.

An interesting point, with higher loan yields and fewer apparent losses, is whether PG2 banks are somewhat better at risk-based pricing (for whatever reason) than the largest bank group. Results are results. The 2009 numbers aren’t expected to show a lot of improvement as the general economy continues to slow and credit and financial risk management issues continue. We’ll probably comment on 2009 as the quarterlies become available this year.

Part 5

This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are some findings for the two largest groups, covering 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk.

Peer Group 2 (PG2) consists of 305 reporting banks between $1 billion and $3 billion in assets. PG2’s Net Interest Income was 5.75 percent of average total assets for the year. This is also down, as expected, from 6.73 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense also decreased from 3.07 percent in 2007 to 2.31 percent for 2008.  Net Interest Margin, also declined from 3.66 percent in 2007 to 3.42 percent in 2008, or a loss of 24 basis points. These margins are 31 bps or 10 percent higher than found in Peer Group 1 (PG1), but the drop of .24 percent was much larger than the .05 percent decline in PG1.

As with all banks, Net Interest Margins have shown a steady chronic decline, but the drops for PG2 have been coming in larger chunks the last two years -- -24 basis points last year after dropping 16 points from 2006 to 2007.

Behind the drop in margins, we find loans yields of 6.53 percent for 2008, which is down from 7.82 percent in 2007. This is a decline of 129 basis points or 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.70 percent in 2007 to 2.75 percent in 2008. This 95 basis point decline represents a 26 percent lower cost of interest-bearing deposits. Again, with a steeper decline in interest costs, you would think that margins should have improved somewhat. It wasn’t meant to be. 

We see the same two culprits as we did in PG1. Total deposit balances declined from 78 percent of average assets to 77 percent which means again, that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits continued an already steady decline from 5.58 percent of average assets in 2007 to 5.03 percent. This, of course, resulted in fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size and a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits.

Check my next blog for more on an analysis of Peer Group 2’s fee income, operating expenses and their use of risk-based pricing.

 

Part 4

Let’s dig a bit deeper into why Peer Group 1’s margins didn’t improve. We see two possible reasons: Total deposit balances declined from 72 percent of average assets to 70 percent. This means that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund their assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits declined from 4.85 percent of average assets to 4.24 percent. So, fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size, along with a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits, appear to have made the difference.

Fee income
Non-interest income, again as a percent of average total assets, was down to 1.12 percent from 1.23 percent in 2007. This was a decline of 9 percent. For Peer Group 1 (PG1), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.49 percent of assets in 2005. A lot of fee income is deposit based and largely based on non-interest bearing deposits. So, the declining interest-free balances, as a percent of total assets, are a source of pressure on fee income and have a negative impact on net interest margins.

Operating expenses
Operating expenses constituted more bad news as they increased from 2.63 percent to 2.77 percent of average assets. Most of the large scale cost-cutting didn’t get started early enough to favorably impact this number for last year. Historically, this metric has moved down, irregularly, as the size of the largest banks has grown. This number stood at 2.54 percent in 2006, for instance. We saw increase in both 2007 and again in 2008.

As a result of the decline in margins and the larger percentage decline in fee income, while operating costs increased, the Peer Group 1 efficiency ratio lost ground from 57.71 percent in 2007 up to 63.70 percent in 2008. This 10 percent increase is a move to the bad. It means every dollar in gross revenue [net interest income + fee income] cost them almost 64 cents in administrative expenses in 2008. This metric averaged 55 cents in 2005/2006.

The total impact of changes in margin performance, fee income, operating expenses and the 2008 increase in provision expense of 87 basis points, we arrive at a total decline in pre-tax operating income of 1.23 percent on total assets. That is a total decline of 80 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007 of 1.53 percent pre-tax ROA to the 2008 result for the group of only .30 percent pre-tax ROA.

It would appear that banks have not been utilizing pricing enough credit risk into their loan rates.  This would be further confirmed if you compared bank loan rates to the historic risk spreads and absolute rates that the market currently has priced into both investment grade and below-investment-grade corporate bonds. These spreads have decreased some very recently, but it is predicted that more credit risk is present than bank lending rates would indicate.
 

Part 3

I believe it is quite important to compare your bank or your investment plans in a financial institution to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same, believe it or not. In this column, we use the averages. Again, look for the differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers, while the other half are naturally worse. It can tell a useful story.

This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are the findings for the two largest groups that cover 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk.

Peer Group 1 (PG1) is made up of the largest 189 reporting banks or those with over $3 billion in average total assets for 2008. Interest income was 5.25 percent of average total assets for the period. This is down, as we might expect, based on last year’s decline in the general level of interest rates from 6.16 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense was also down from 2.98 percent in 2007 to 2.06 percent average for the year. Net Interest Margin, the difference between the two metrics, was down from 3.16 percent in 2007 to 3.11 percent as a percentage of total assets.

It should be noted that Net Interest Margins have been in a steady, chronic decline for at least 10 years, with a torturous regular drop of 2 to 5 basis points per annum in recent years. Last year’s drop of five basis points is in line with that progression and it does add to continuing difficulty in generating bottom-line profits.

To find out a bit more about why margins dropped, especially in light of the steady increase in lending over the same past decade, we looked first at loan pricing yields. For PG1 these averaged 6.12 percent for 2008, down (again, expectedly) from 7.32 percent in 2007. This is a drop of 120 basis points or a decline of 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.41 percent in 2007 to 2.39 percent in 2008. This 102 basis point decline represents a 30 percent lower interest expense on interest-bearing deposits. Based only on these two metrics, it seems like margins should have improved and not declined for these banks.

Check my next blog for more on the reasons for Peer Group 1’s drop in margins and an analysis of the fee income and operating expenses for these institutions.
 

Part 2

In my last post, I started my review of the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest financial institution peer groups through the end of 2008.

Now, lets look at the resutls relating to credit cost, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings. Again, as you look at these results, I encourage you to consider the processes that your bank currently utilizes for credit risk modeling and financial risk management.

Credit costs
More loans, especially in an economic downturn, mean more credit risk. Credit costs were up tremendously. The Peer group 1 banks reported net loan losses of .89% of total loans. This is an increase from .28% in 2007, which was up from an average of 18 basis points on the portfolio in 2006/2005.  The Peer group 2 banks reported net loan losses of .74%. This is also up substantially from 24 basis points in 2007 and an average of 15 basis points in 2006/2005. The net loan losses reported in the fourth quarter significantly boosted both groups’ year-end loss percentages above where they stood through the first three quarters last year.

Loss allowance accounts
Both groups also ramped up their reserve for future expected losses substantially. The year-end loss allowance account (ALLL) as a percent of total loans stood at 1.81% for the largest banks. This is an increase of almost 50% from an average of 1.21% in the years 2007/2004. Peer group 2 banks saw their reserve for losses go up to 1.57% from an average of 1.24% in the years 2007/2004.

The combination of covering the increased net loan losses and also increasing the loss reserve balance required a huge provision expenses. So, loan balances were up even in the face of increased write-offs and expected forward losses.

Impacts on earnings
Obviously, we would expect this provisioning burden to negatively impact earnings. It did, greatly. Peer group 1 banks saw a decline in return on assets to a negative .07%. This is just below break-even as a group. The average net income percentage stood at .42% of average assets at the end of the third quarter. So, the washout in the fourth quarter reports took the group average to a net loss position for the year. The ROA was at .96% in 2007 and an average of 1.26% in 2006/2005. That is a 111% decline in ROA from 2007. Return on equity also went into the red, down from 11.97% in 2007. ROE stood at 14.36% in 2005.

For the $1B to $3B banks, ROA stood at .35%. This is still a positive number, however, it is way down from 1.08% in 2007, 1.30% in 2006 and 1.33% in 2005. The decline in 2008 was 67% from 2007. ROE for the group was also down, at 4.11% from 12.37% in 2007. The drops in profitability were not entirely the result of credit losses, but this was by far the largest impact from 2007.

The seriously beefed-up ALLL accounts would seem to indicate that, as a group, the banks expect further loan losses, at least through 2009.  These numbers largely pre-dated the launch of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the tier one funding it provided in 2008. But, it is clear that banks had not contracted lending for all of 2008, even in the face of mounting credit issues and a declining economic picture. It will be interesting to see how things unfold in the next several quarters.
 

Part 1

It may be quite useful to compare your financial institution's portfolio risk management process or your investment plans , to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same -- believe it or not. Here are the averages. You should look for differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers and the other half may be naturally worse.

As promised, I have again reviewed the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest peer groups through the end 2008. The Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) is a compilation of the FDIC, based on the call reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC reports peer averages for various bank size groupings and here are a few notable findings for the two largest groups that covers 494 reporting banks.

Peer group 1

• Peer group 1 consisted of 189 institutions over $3 billion in average total assets for the year.
• Net loans accounted for 67.31% of average total assets, which is up from 65.79 % in 2007. 
• Loans, as a percent of assets, have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for the largest banks was also up to 96% from 91% in 2007 and 88% in both 2006 and 2005.

So, it appears these banks were lending more in 2008 as an allocation of their total asset base and relative to their deposit sources of funding.

In fact, net loans grew at a rate of 9.34% for this group, which is down from the average growth rate of 15.07% for the years 2005 through 2007.  The growth rate in loans is down, which is probably due to tightened credit standards. However, it is still growth. And, since total average assets also had growth of 11.58% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances increased at the largest banks.

• Peer group 2 consisted of 305 reporting financial institutions between $1B and $3B in total assets.
• The net loans accounted for 72.96% of average total assets, up from 71.75% in 2007. 
• Again, the loans as a percent of total assets have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for these banks was up to 95% from 92% in 2007 and an average of 90% for 2006 and 2005.

So, these banks are also lending more in 2008 as a portion of their asset base and relative to their deposit source of funding.

Net loans grew at a rate of 10.48% for this group in 2008 which is down from 11.94% growth in 2007 and down from an average growth of 15.04% for 2006 and 2005. And, since total average assets also had growth of 10.02% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances also increased at the intermediate size banks. Again here, the growth rate in loans is down, probably due to tightened credit standards, but it is still growth and it is at a slightly more aggressive rate than the largest bank group.

Combined, for these 494 largest financial institutions, loans were still growing through 2008 both as a percentage of asset allocation and in absolute dollars.

Tune in to my next blog to read more about the results shown relating to credit costs, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings.
 

This post is a feature from my colleague and guest blogger, John Robertson, Senior Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian.

Years ago, I attended a seminar at which the presenter made a statement that struck me as odd, but has proven to be quite prophetic.  He simply stated, “margins will continue to narrow … forever!” He was spot on.
At that time, a variety of loan products (such as mortgage loans) were becoming commoditized and this emerging market acted as an intermediary for needed cash to provide banks the wherewithal to continue to lend in their respective locales. The presenter continued by making a call for a systematic and effective pricing methodology then and “forever”.
Pricing loans in a competitive market does not necessarily translate into smaller yields. Nor should banks be willing to accept smaller yields for less than quality loans. There are several viable options to consider when loan pricing in a market where the margins continue to shrink.

Cutting operating expenses
Generally, a financial institution’s first reaction to narrowing margins is to cut operating expenses. Periodically the chaff does need culling, but most banks run efficient shops by depending heavily on technology to create those efficiencies and for risk management. They continually measure themselves with efficiency ratios which, in part, help to drive their strategic operating decisions. So, when the edict comes from above to cut operating expenses, there aren’t too many options.

So, why is a bank’s first reaction usually an all-out call to cut operating expenses? Generally, it’s because these operating expenses are more easily identifiable and banks still lack effective tools to measure the value of their customers and relationships. Couple that with the perception that there is no control over a competitive market with narrowing margins. As a result, banks price accordingly -- just to get the deal. Consequently, their efficiency ratios may look good, but what about the potential impact on yield, service and internal morale? Community banks, in particular, pride themselves on customer service and, in fact, site it as one of their strengths against larger banks. Do you give up that advantage?

Relationship management
To price effectively in a market where margins have narrowed, the bank has to also consider the relationship’s value. The value of deposits should be measured and included to allow for more competitive pricing. The influence of deposits on the relationship allows the bank to be more aggressive in its loan pricing or can enhance the relationship yield itself.
Loan pricing in a competitive market does not have to translate into smaller yields and/or credit quality. The key to staying ahead of competition is measuring the value of the relationship and applying any or all of the outlined effective risk-based pricing methodologies to position the bank to win the deal and still meet the targeted return objectives. While the phrase “margins will continue to narrow … forever” may seem to hold true, banks can counter by using the “power of pricing” to offset the impact to earnings …forever!
 

Part 2

There is one rather interesting clause that appears to represent an open-ended business porfolio risk management decision for the future. It is one small paragraph, named Amendment, in the middle of Article V - Miscellaneous, just ahead of governing law (which is federal law, backed up by the laws of the State of New York).

Amendment begins normally enough, requiring the usual signed agreement of each party, but then states: “provided that the Investor may unilaterally amend any provision of this Agreement to the extent required to comply with any changes after the Signing Date in applicable federal statutes.” Wow. My understanding of this is that if Congress in the future, enacts anything that Treasury finds (or Congress requires Treasury to find) applicable to any aspect of the previously signed TARP Agreement, the bank is bound to adhere. Forget about the non-voting aspect of the preferred shares issued to the Treasury. Once the TARP Agreement is executed by the bank, management is not only bound by what’s in the document to begin with, it is in addition, subject to future federal law as long as the TARP shares are held by the government.

So, this new major owner does have a voice. The Purchase Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion, along with the various financial implications of the funding.
 

Part 1

Beyond the risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital position, which is directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk.  We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk.

Business risk includes:

• A variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making;
• Governance considerations; 
• Executive behavior (for lack of better terminology);
• Management succession events or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business.

Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a 20% infusion of added tier 1 capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department does not have voting rights like common shareholders, but the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form includes at least 35 pages of terms, plus the required Letter Agreement, Schedules attached to the Letter Agreement and at least five significant Annex’s to the Purchase Agreement. It’s NOT an easy, quick or fun read.

In the Recitals section, it states that the bank: “agrees to expand the flow of credit to U.S. consumers and businesses on competitive terms as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy” and, later, “agrees to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms of residential mortgages as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy.” Fortunately, if you’re a banker, these topics are not (currently) revisited elsewhere in the document, period. However, these are examples of the new shareholder effecting business decision making without the need to be on the Board of Directors, or voting common shares.

The Agreement covers a number of other requirements and limitations, such as executive compensation, dividend payments, other capital sourcing and retention of bank holding company status. None of these are particularly onerous, but they must be taken into account by management.

Visit my next post to read about the very interesting Amendment clause that may represent an open-ended business portfolio risk management decision for the future.